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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE GLOBAL AUDIT MARKET: IFRS-RELATED
CHANGES AND DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE BIG 4 GLOBAL NETWORKS
by
William N. Riccardi
Florida International University, 2014
Miami, Florida
Professors Kannan Raghunandan and Dasaratha Rama, Co-Major Professors
Ongoing debates within the professional and academic communities have raised a
number of questions specific to the international audit market. This dissertation consists
of three related essays that address such issues. First, I examine whether the propensity to
switch between auditors of different sizes (i.e., Big 4 versus non-Big 4) changes as
adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) becomes a more common
phenomenon, arguing that smaller auditors have an opportunity to invest in necessary
skills and training needed to enter this market. Findings suggest that clients are relatively
less (more) likely to switch to (away from) a Big 4 auditor if the client’s adoption of
IFRS occurs in more recent years.
In the second essay, I draw on these inferences and test whether the change in
audit fees in the year of IFRS adoption changes over time. As the market becomes less
concentrated, larger auditors becomes less able to demand a premium for their services.
Consistent with my arguments, results suggest that the change in audit service fees
declines over time, although this effect seems concentrated among the Big 4. I also find
that this effect is partially attributable to a differential effect of the auditors’ experience in
5

pricing audit services related to IFRS based on the period in which adoption occurs. The
results of these two essays offer important implications to policy debates on the costs and
benefits of IFRS adoption.
In the third essay, I differentiate Big 4 auditors into three classifications—Parent
firms, Brand Name affiliates, and Local affiliates—and test for differences in audit fee
premiums (relative to non-Big 4 auditors) and audit quality. Results suggest that there is
significant heterogeneity between the three classifications based on both of these
characteristics, which is an important consideration for future research. Overall, this
dissertation provides additional insights into a variety of aspects of the global audit
market.
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CHAPTER 1: IFRS ADOPTION AND CHANGES IN AUDITOR SWITCHING
1.1 Introduction
In this essay, I examine the impact of widespread adoption of International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on the market for audit services. Motivation for
this study comes from ongoing policy debates regarding the relative costs and benefits of
adoption of IFRS. Opponents of IFRS adoption in the United States (U.S.) have voiced
concerns regarding the potentially adverse and unexpected outcomes following adoption.
For example, Hail, Leuz, and Wysocki (2010) note that IFRS adoption could lead to an
even greater gap between large and small auditors, with the “Big 4” auditors (Deloitte,
PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, and Ernst & Young) taking business away from
smaller firms. As auditors are likely to play a key role in shaping future reporting
practices related to IFRS (Ball, 2006), it is important to further our understanding of how
the global audit market has been impacted as a result of a shift toward accounting
standard globalization.
Recent studies have examined the associations between mandatory IFRS adoption
in the European Union (E.U.) and audit market consequences, including the propensity of
clients to engage large audit firms (Comprix, Muller, and Sinclair, 2011; Wieczynska,
2013). I differentiate my study from prior research in this area. First, rather than
examining only the likelihood of a client to switch auditors in the year of IFRS adoption,
I hypothesize that such propensities change over time due to smaller auditors’ acquisition
of skills and experience necessary to provide IFRS-related audit services; such actions by
smaller auditors should promote a less concentrated market for such services. A change
of this type would result in a market that is less concentrated among the Big 4. In

1

addition, using newly available data sources, I form a sample that is more comprehensive
in coverage than prior related research.
Based on a sample of firms in 26 countries from 2004 through 2011, my primary
results suggest that non-Big 4 audit clients adopting IFRS in more recent years are less
likely to switch to a Big 4 auditor relative to firms adopting IFRS in earlier years. I
similarly find that while Big 4 audit clients are less likely to switch to a non-Big 4 auditor
in the year of IFRS adoption, they are relatively more likely to do so in more recent
years. Thus, I find support for my hypotheses that the market for IFRS-related audit
services has become less concentrated among large, global auditors over time. Similar
inferences are drawn when I repeat the analysis with global auditors defined as the
“Global 6,” including BDO and Grant Thornton in addition to the Big 4.
This study offers a number of contributions to the literature. First, related research
focuses on the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the E.U. While appealing, such a setting
does not enable researchers to draw broader inferences regarding changes in the global
audit market over time. Conversely, my study expands on prior research by assessing
changes in these likelihoods using a more comprehensive sample. These results offer
timely evidence of one potential audit market outcome associated with IFRS adoption
and provide potentially policy-relevant evidence regarding how the audit market has been
impacted by IFRS adoption, and such research has been called for by prior studies (Hail
et al., 2010). Finally, my results add to the auditing literature in a broader sense by
examining the effect of widespread and impactful accounting regime changes on an
important aspect of the global audit market.

2

The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes related
prior research and develops my hypotheses. The third section details the research design.
Section 4 describes the sample selection procedures and data employed in this study.
Section five provides explanations of the empirical results and associated inferences. I
conclude in Section 6 and offer suggestions for future research.
1.2 Hypothesis Development
1.2.1 Background: IFRS Adoption and Auditor Switching
Numerous papers have examined the accounting consequences and economic
outcomes following both voluntary and mandatory IFRS adoption (see Soderstrom and
Sun (2007) and Brüggemann, Hitz, and Sellhorn (2012) for reviews of recent literature
and Hail et al. (2010) for a discussion of potential economic implications of IFRS adoption
in the U.S.). While fewer papers have examined how the audit market has been affected
by IFRS adoption, recent research has made advances in the area of auditor selection
and auditor switching due to IFRS adoption. As research shifts in focus from an analysis
of the intended benefits to the potentially unexpected outcomes associated with IFRS
adoption, a recurring theme is to extrapolate inferences relevant to countries that
continue to report under local accounting standards.
More broadly, there has been concern from regulatory bodies regarding the
concentration of the audit market and the market share of the largest public accounting
firms (e.g., U.S. Senate, 1976; U.S. House of Representatives, 1985; SOX, 2002; GAO,
2003; FRC, 2007; U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2008; European Commission, 2011;
House of Lords, 2011). This problem can only be exacerbated as countries switch
accounting regimes, as larger and more experienced auditors have the opportunity to
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capitalize on such changes to dominate the market. Research has therefore examined the
auditor choice behavior of clients during the transition to IFRS. Comprix et al. (2011)
examine auditor replacements after firms switch reporting standards following the
mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005 by the E.U., treating 2007 as the “post IFRS” period
and 2003 as the “pre IFRS” period. Their findings suggest that larger clients and those
domiciled in countries with greater differences between their local GAAP and IFRS are
more likely to engage a Big 4 auditor, leading to supply-side constraints that permit
smaller auditors to pick up clients not falling into those categories. Since auditor
replacements over this time period may not necessarily be caused by client firms’ adoption
of IFRS, Wieczynska (2013) expands on this finding and more precisely examines the
timing of auditor replacements for firms that adopt IFRS. Her results suggest that
auditor replacements of IFRS adopting clients are, in general, concentrated in the adoption
year, and she also finds evidence that the strength of a country’s regulatory quality is
positively (negatively) associated with the likelihood of switching from a small to a large
(large to a small) audit firm.
In summary, recent literature has examined the likelihood of auditor switches
surrounding IFRS adoption and generally finds that auditor switches are more likely to
occur due to client firms’ adoption of IFRS. In general, these studies find that clients are
more likely to engage a larger auditor during the transition to IFRS (Wieczynska, 2013),
but it is possible that certain types of clients may be dropped by the Big 4 and forced to
switch to a smaller audit firm (Comprix et al., 2011). Thus, the extent to which the
auditor switching behavior that is associated with IFRS has changed over time has not yet
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been examined. I fill this gap in the literature and examine these issues in the current
study.
1.2.2 Hypotheses Related to Auditor Switching in the Year of IFRS Adoption
Mandatory IFRS adoption in the E.U. was announced in 2002, with compliance
required for publicly-listed firms for fiscal years beginning after January 1, 2005.1 Prior
to this shift in reporting practices, adoption of IFRS was permitted on a voluntary basis in
many countries. As a result, it should be expected that fewer audit firms possessed the
necessary skillset to assist clients in their transition to IFRS and, likewise, to audit IFRS
financial statements prior to the mandatory requirement. Over time, however, this
knowledge should spread to smaller audit firms, and there are several explanations as to
why this may occur. First, Comprix et al. (2011) posit that supply-side constraints during
the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the E.U. caused the market share of the Big 4 auditors
to decrease in quantity and shift to a particular type of clientele (larger companies and
those in countries with greater differences between their local GAAP and IFRS). In other
words, smaller clients and those from countries with fewer differences between their
local GAAP and IFRS may have been forced to switch from a Big 4 to a smaller audit
firm during this particular time period. This problem was exacerbated due to the
mandatory adoption of IFRS in the E.U. coinciding with implementation of Section 404
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the U.S., which led to further dismissal of clients by

1

The two exceptions to mandatory adoption of IFRS in the E.U. were for (1) companies with securities
listed in other countries where other internationally-accepted accounting standards were used for the basis
of preparing consolidated financial statements (e.g., U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles), or
(2) companies that listed only debt securities. If a company met either of these two criteria, they could defer
adoption of IFRS until 2007.
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the Big 4 (Rama and Read, 2006).2 Thus, any clients cross-listed in the U.S. faced a
greater risk of being dropped by the Big 4.
Second, there is a plethora of literature suggesting that larger auditors charge a
premium for their services (Francis, 1984; Palmrose, 1986; Francis and Simon, 1987;
Ireland and Lennox, 2002) due to higher quality audits (DeAngelo, 1981) or industry
expertise (Craswell, Francis, and Taylor, 1995; Carson, 2009). Lin and Yen (2010) further
argue that clients adopting IFRS face an additional fee premium due to the auditor’s
expertise in providing IFRS-related services and because the client has limited means to
select a different auditor. To avoid higher fees related to adoption of IFRS, clients
may be more likely to shift to a smaller auditor as it becomes more practical for these
audit firms to provide services commensurate with client demands.
Third, smaller auditors with fewer large clients may be able to provide additional
attention to individual companies that require assistance during the transition to IFRS. In
earlier years, this trade-off may be outweighed by the inexperience of smaller firms. Over
time, however, certain clients may find a smaller auditor to be more desirable. Finally,
Atkinson, Taylor, Flesher, and Stocks (2002) suggest that clients are more likely to
switch auditors as new individual reporting standards are implemented due to
disagreements between the client and auditor regarding proper application of the new
rules. In earlier years, especially before IFRS is mandated in a particular country, it may
be expected that clients seek the guidance of relatively more experienced and

2

This issue became significant enough that the SEC’s chief accountant cautioned the Big 4 not to use SOX
404 as justification to drop their smaller audit clients (Taub, 2004).
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knowledgeable auditors. As such information spreads to smaller auditors, however, this
behavior may become less prudent.
Admittedly, many of these reasons to explain a change in the auditor switching
behavior over time is dependent upon improvements by smaller audit firms, making them
more attractive alternatives to clients. Bonner and Walker (1994) provide evidence to
suggest that gains in knowledge in the audit industry are dependent on practice and
experience, which smaller auditors can only obtain as the market shifts in their favor.
Thus, to the extent that the market for IFRS-related audit services becomes less
concentrated among large, global auditors, smaller audit firms have the opportunity to
gain relevant skills and knowledge through an increasing coverage of clients. In addition,
Libby and Luft (1993) outline that improvements in decision-making and performance in
accounting environments is a function of ability, knowledge, motivation, and
environment. As the demand for IFRS-related audit services increases, audit firms of all
size have an increase in their motivation to invest in improving related skillsets and
technologies and, as a result, continue to expand their knowledge of and gain experience
in providing IFRS-related audit services.
Prior research documents that IFRS adoption is associated with an increase in the
propensity of clients to switch auditors (Comprix et al., 2011; Wieczynska, 2013).
Accordingly, I do not state formal hypotheses for the likelihood of an auditor switch in
the year of IFRS adoption and expect that the results of these prior studies hold for my
expanded sample. Rather, my primary interest is to determine if these propensities vary
over time. Due to fluctuations in the market concentration for IFRS-related audit services,
I predict that clients adopting IFRS in more recent years will be less likely to switch away
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from a small auditor in favor of a large auditor, with clients of large auditors being more
likely to switch to a small auditor. Thus, I state my first hypotheses as follows, in the
alternative form:
H1A: In more recent years, clients are less likely to switch from a small to
a large auditor in the year of IFRS adoption.
H1B: In more recent years, clients are more likely to switch from a large
to a small auditor in the year of IFRS adoption.
Taken together, these hypotheses predict that clients adopting IFRS in more recent
years are more (less) likely to engage (switch away from) a small auditor. I define a large
(small) auditor as a Big 4 (non-Big 4) accounting firm. Note that these predictions are
made only for “directional” auditor switches (i.e., from a small to a large or from a large
to a small audit firm). I do not make predictions for changes in the likelihood of
switching between auditors of similar size (“lateral” switches) because my expectations
regarding fluctuations in the audit market apply only to switches between audit firms of
different size. Clients may switch to a different auditor of similar size for reasons unrelated
to changes in the market for IFRS-related services. For example, a client may switch
from one Big 4 to another in order to obtain industry-specific expertise during the
transition to IFRS. I therefore expect that changes in the likelihood of directional switches
are different from the change in the likelihood of the corresponding lateral auditor
switch, and state an additional hypothesis accordingly:
H1C: In more recent years, the relative likelihood of a directional auditor
switch in the year of IFRS adoption is different from the likelihood of the
corresponding lateral auditor switch.

8

1.3 Research Design
1.3.1 Development of Multinomial Logistic Regression Model
To examine changes in the likelihood of firms to switch auditors due to IFRS
adoption, I first divide the full sample into Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit clients, based on the
auditor engaged prior to IFRS adoption. I then estimate a multinomial logistic regression
on each subsample to model the likelihood of different types of auditor switches against
the base condition of not switching auditors. This approach has several benefits. First,
this allows me to assess how one aspect of the audit market has changed due to client
firms’ adoption of IFRS over time by examining whether clients are more or less likely to
switch to a particular type of auditor. Second, this approach mitigates the concern that my
classification scheme of auditor switches consists of comparisons between heterogeneous
firms. Prior studies that examine auditor switching surrounding IFRS adoption pool all
observations into a single model (e.g. Wieczynska, 2013). However, the decision of
whether or not to switch auditors during the transition to IFRS may be different for
clients of small auditors compared to clients of large auditors. Third, specifying the
model in this way permits for statistical comparisons both between treatment and control
groups and among alternative switching decisions for firms within the same group.
I collect data for a global sample of firms from 2004 through 2011.3 In order to
draw inferences regarding changes in the likelihood of switching auditors due to IFRS
adoption, I pool observations such that the sample consists of (a) the year in which firms

3

Results for all auditor switching tests are consistent if I use a sample period beginning in 2001. In this
expanded sample period, I do not code auditor switches of Arthur Andersen clients as equal to one since
these were involuntary. However, only 2.6% of firms, before eliminating observations with missing data,
can be included in the treatment sample prior to 2004.
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adopt IFRS (treatment group), (b) periods other than the year of IFRS adoption (control
group, non-adoption years of treatment firms), and (c) firms that adopted IFRS prior to
the start of the sample period (control group, non-adopting firms). After partitioning my
sample based on audit firm size as previously described, I estimate the following
multinomial logistic regression on each subsample to empirically test H1A and H1B:
AUDSWITCHi,t =

0 IFRS _ ADOPTi,t 

(1)


1 POSTi,t 2 SIZE i,t  3 NI i,t  


 4 GROWTHi,t 5 LOSSi,t 1 


[(IFRS _ ADOPTi,t , NON _ ADOPTi,t )   6 QUALi,t 1  7 FINANCE i,t 
  USLIST   VOLUN
 
8
i,t
9
i,t

 

HIGHDIFFi,t  REGQ 
10
 
11
i,t 

 COUNTRY i,t

In Equation (1), AUDSWITCH is an index variable coded as zero if firm i does not switch
auditors in year t, one if firm i switches between auditors of similar size (i.e., a lateral
switch) in year t, and two if firm i switches to an auditor of a different size (i.e., from a
small to a large audit firm for non-Big 4 clients, or vice versa for Big 4 clients) in year t.4
IFRS_ADOPT is an indicator variable coded as one if year t is the IFRS adoption
year for firm i, and zero otherwise. I collect data on accounting standards from
Worldscope and define the adoption period as the first year in which a firm reports under
4

I obtain auditor data from Thompson Reuters Fundamentals, which provides time-series data on the
auditor engaged in each year, whereas Worldscope provides data only for the most recent fiscal year. The
data item provided by the database is a code, rather than the name of the auditor, and this code is based on
the individual, local audit firm. I am very grateful to Thomson Reuters for providing a file linking these
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individual and numerous audit firm codes to the associated “Parent Auditor.” To perform the analyses in
this study, I use the parent auditor when coding variables based on audit firm size or other characteristics.
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IFRS after switching from other reporting standards.5 I eliminate firms that Worldscope
indicates reported under non-IFRS accounting standards after the initial year of IFRS
reporting, thus ensuring that treatment firms in my sample fully switched to IFRS in the
period I code as the adoption year. I expect a positive coefficient on IFRS_ADOPT for all
types of auditor switches, with the exception being switches from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4
auditor, since certain clients may be more likely to utilize a larger audit firm (Comprix et
al., 2011). NON_ADOPT is similarly determined and is an indicator variable equal to one
if firm i did not adopt IFRS in year t, and zero otherwise.
The initial increase in IFRS reporting occurred due to the mandatory requirement
in the E.U. and Australia that publicly-listed firms switch from local reporting standards
to IFRS for fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 2005. Although global use of
IFRS increased dramatically in 2005, a large proportion of firms in my sample have nonDecember 31st fiscal year-ends. Therefore, there are a significant number of adopting
firms in 2006 is due to these firms’ first fiscal year beginning after 1/1/2005 ending
during 2006. Additionally, E.U. firms were permitted to delay adoption of IFRS in
certain circumstances, and other countries began implementing IFRS reporting in later
years, explaining small but nontrivial numbers of adopting firms in 2007 through 2010.
The large increase in the number of adopting firms in 2011 is primarily due to adoption
of IFRS in Canada and Korea.

5

I follow the coding described in Table 1-1A, Panel A of Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi (2013) in
classifying accounting standards based on the numeric code extracted from Worldscope. As a robustness
test, I follow the stricter coding described by Daske et al. (2013) in coding accounting standards and results
are consistent.
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Given this trend of IFRS adoption over time, I define POST as an indicator
variable equal to one for firm-years ending after 11/30/2006 and zero otherwise.6 The
interaction term POST*IFRS_ADOPT is the primary variable of interest, capturing the
likelihood of an auditor switch in the year of IFRS adoption for more recent fiscal years
after the initial shock to the audit market caused by the mandatory adoption of IFRS in
the E.U. and Australia. In more recent years, I expect that clients of small auditors are
less likely to switch to a large auditor (negative coefficient on POST*IFRS_ADOPT) and
that clients of large auditors are more likely to switch to a smaller auditor (positive
coefficient on POST*IFRS_ADOPT) relative to the base condition of not switching
auditors. The second variable of interest is POST*NON_ADOPT, capturing any changes
in the likelihood to switch auditors not driven by IFRS adoption.
I include a number of variables to control for factors identified in prior research as
being associated with auditor choice and switching (Simunic, 1980; Francis and Wilson,
1988; Johnson and Lys, 1990; DeFond, 1992; Chan, Lin, and Mo, 2006; Landsman,
Nelson, and Rountree, 2009), and I allow the coefficients on these variables to differ for
treatment and control firm-years since factors influencing the decision to switch auditors
may have different implications for adopting compared to non-adopting firms.7 SIZE is
defined as the natural logarithm of total assets; in general, larger clients are less likely to

6

For robustness, I consider the following alternative classifications for the time period variable, POST: (1)
fiscal years ending after 12/31/2006; (2) fiscal years ending after 3/31/2007, by which time most audits
following the initial adoption of IFRS would be complete; (3) fiscal years ending after 3/31/2007, eliminating
firms with fiscal years ending between 11/30/2006 and 3/31/2007. The reported results are robust to all
of these definitions.
7

Since the expected signs of the control variables may differ depending on the type of auditor switch and
depending on whether or not the firm adopts IFRS, I do not explicitly denote directional predictions of all
control variables in this section.
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switch auditors due to potentially higher fees driven by the new auditor’s effort in
becoming familiar with the client. NI is measured as net income scaled by total assets,
controlling for the relative likelihood of more profitable firms to switch auditors.
GROWTH is measured as the percentage change in sales, since firms may be more likely
to switch auditors when expanding their operations. LOSS is an indicator variable equal
to one if the firm reports negative net income in year t-1 and zero otherwise; firms in
poorer financial condition may undergo restructuring of operations, which could include
changing to a new auditor. QUAL is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm receives
a qualified audit opinion in year t-1 and zero otherwise, controlling for auditor switches
driven by deterioration in the auditor-client relationship after the client receives a nonclean audit opinion. FINANCE is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm raised debt
or equity capital in year t, and zero otherwise, since clients that expand their business or
seek additional capital are more likely to be misaligned with their current auditor. USLIST
is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is listed on a U.S. stock exchange
and zero otherwise, controlling for the exposure of cross-listed firms to the relatively
higher regulatory oversight in the U.S.8
Since my sample period spans a number of years and there is a possible
endogeneity concern given that I do not restrict my analysis to the effects of mandatory
adoption of IFRS in a specific country or region, I include several additional control
variables. VOLUN is a control variable equal to one if the firm adopts IFRS before the
mandatory requirement in its country of origin and zero otherwise, controlling for
8

My inferences are unchanged if I include additional variables to control for the absolute value of total
accruals, mergers, assets from acquisitions, and book-to-market ratios. Similarly, my results are consistent
if I include a continuous measure for changes in long-term debt and equity rather than FINANCE.
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differing incentives between voluntary and mandatory adopters of IFRS (Leuz and
Verrecchia, 2000; Leuz, 2003). HIGHDIFF is an indicator variable equal to one if the
differences between firm i’s previous local accounting standards and IFRS are greater
than the sample median, based on the measure derived in Bae, Tan, and Welker (2008),
and zero otherwise. Clients with greater differences between their previous reporting
standards and IFRS may be more likely to switch auditors (Comprix et al., 2011). REGQ
is a continuous index variable that captures the regulatory environment in firm i’s country
of domicile, as reported by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009).9 This measure
quantifies the ability of a government to implement and enforce regulations, which may
impact the likelihood that a firm will switch auditors, especially during the transition to
IFRS (Wieczynska, 2013). In addition to HIGHDIFF and REGQ, I also include country
fixed-effects to capture other time-invariant differences (e.g., legal system) across
countries in my sample.
1.3.2 Tests of Differences between Regression Coefficients
My research design allows for useful comparisons of the regression coefficients
both between treatment and control samples and among alternative auditor switch choices
for firms within the same group. After estimating Equation (1), I apply a likelihood ratio
chi-square test for statistically significant differences of regression coefficients. This test
indicates whether the likelihood of one type of auditor switch is less or greater than
another, or whether the same type of auditor switch is more or less likely for different

9

The sample period in Kaufmann et al. (2009) ends in 2008. Accordingly, I use the value of REGQ from
2008 for all subsequent years in my analysis.
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groups of firms. These tests provide additional support for H1A and H1B and allow me to
statistically test H1C.
To that end, I perform the following comparisons. First, for each type of auditor
switch against the base condition of no auditor switch, I test whether the likelihood of
switching auditors after the specified time period cutoff is different between observations
coded as IFRS adoption years and non-adoption firms or years (i.e., I test for statistically
significant difference between POST*NON_ADOPT and POST*IFRS_ADOPT). I expect
the two coefficients to be significantly different or that the magnitude of the two
coefficients, if they are the same sign, will be greater for adopting firms. Second, I
perform a similar test across types of auditor switches within each subsample. In this
case, my interest is in determining whether there is a statistically significant difference
between the coefficients on POST*IFRS_ADOPT for the two possible types of auditor
switches within each subsample. Again, I expect there to be a significant difference
between the two and in this case, if both coefficients are signed the same, I expect the
associated effect of the directional switch to be greater than that of a lateral switch.
1.4 Data and Sample Selection
I begin by obtaining a sample of publicly-listed firms available in Worldscope
from 2004 through 2011. The coverage of firms in Worldscope extends to smaller
companies and those listed in less regulated markets, whereas the alternative of Global
Vantage contains only the largest and most prominent firms. I form my initial sample
after coding the year of IFRS adoption for treatment firms based on reported accounting
standards data, as described in the previous section. I do not include firms in certain East
Asian countries (China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand), despite the use
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of IFRS, for two reasons. First, for firms in China, adoption of IFRS was a gradual rather
than immediate process; that is, Chinese accounting standards converged with IFRS over
time. Similarly, while local GAAP in Hong Kong are nearly identical to IFRS, full
conversion to IFRS took place over a number of years, so the effective implementation
dates of individual standards differ from the initial reported year of IFRS adoption.
Second, the reporting environment in these countries is significantly different from other
parts of the world. Despite a legal system of common law origin, the incentives of
managers and auditors diverge from the western world due to differences in enforcement,
family ownership, and government control (Ball, Robin, and Wu, 2003).
I delete observations with missing auditor information and those with SIC codes
6000-6999 due to the differing operating characteristics of financial institutions. All data
other than the firm’s auditor are obtained from Worldscope, and I delete observations
with missing financial data used to construct control variables. Audit firm data is obtained
from Thompson Reuters Fundamentals.
Panel A of Table 1-1 summarizes the selection procedure for the sample used in
the auditor switching tests. In Panel B, I provide sample distributions by country and by
year. Not unexpectedly, countries with the largest capital markets (Australia, Canada,
Korea, and the United Kingdom) each contribute more observations to the overall sample
than other, smaller countries for both treatment and control firms. For the breakdown by
year, the control sample is distributed evenly with 10-15% of the total observations in
each year. For adopting firms, there are larger proportions in 2005 and 2006 due to the
mandatory adoption of IFRS in the E.U. and Australia and in 2011 due to the mandatory
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adoption of IFRS in Canada and Korea.10 The final sample for testing the likelihood of
auditor switching consists of 6,050 (60,381) firm-year observations included in the
treatment (control) group.
In Table 1-2, I provide descriptive statistics for the variables used in my auditor
switching analysis. For non-Big 4 clients, the frequency of auditor replacements is similar
across treatment and control firms, though the base condition of no auditor switch is
significantly (p < 0.05) more common for control observations. Differences in control
variables between treatment and control firms in the non-Big 4 partition are, in general,
not statistically significant. For Big 4 clients, the frequency of auditor replacements is
greater for control observations. As clients of Big 4 auditors may be less likely to switch
auditors during the transition to IFRS (compared to non-Big 4 clients), coupled with the
larger number of observations in the control group, this is not unexpected. As with nonBig 4 clients, the treatment and control observations for the Big 4 sample partition appear
to be composed of similar firms, based on the control variables.
1.5 Empirical Results
1.5.1 Results: Auditor Switching in the Year of IFRS Adoption
I begin by reporting the results to test for changes in the likelihood of clients to
switch auditors in the year of IFRS adoption. Table 1-3 presents regression results from
estimating Equation (1) after partitioning audit firm size as Big 4 and non-Big 4. In Table
1-3, the labels STB, STS, BTS, and BTB denote the following types of auditor
replacements, respectively: from a non-Big 4 to a Big 4 auditor (STB); from a non-Big 4
10

Ending the sample period in 2010 and, as a result, excluding Canada and Korea from the treatment
samples does not impact my results.
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to a different non-Big 4 auditor (STS); from a Big 4 auditor to a non-Big 4 auditor (BTS);
and from a Big 4 auditor to a different Big 4 auditor (BTB). The likelihoods of all auditor
switches are tested against the base condition of not switching auditors.
Panel A of Table 1-3 reports results for auditor switching behavior of non-Big 4
audit clients in the year of IFRS adoption. For clients switching from a non-Big 4 to a Big
4 auditor (STB), and consistent with expectations, the coefficient on IFRS_ADOPT is
positive and marginally significant (p < 0.10), suggesting that clients are more likely to
switch to a large auditor in the year of IFRS adoption; this is consistent with the findings
of prior studies. However, the coefficient on the interaction term POST*IFRS_ADOPT is
significantly negative (p < 0.05). This finding suggests that non-Big 4 client firms
adopting IFRS in more recent years are relatively less likely to switch to a large auditor.
On the other hand, the coefficient on POST*NON_ADOPT is not significant at
conventional levels (p > 0.10), suggesting that the change in auditor switching behavior is
restricted to years in which firms adopt IFRS. The finding that, in more recent years,
firms are relatively less likely to switch from a small to a large auditor in the year of
IFRS adoption provides empirical support for H1A.
For clients switching from a non-Big 4 to a different non-Big 4 auditor (STS),
results are quite different. Again, the coefficient on IFRS_ADOPT is significantly
positive (p < 0.05), supporting the prediction that auditor switches of all types are more
likely in the year of IFRS adoption. However, results also suggest that auditor switches of
this type are more likely in more recent years for both adopting and non-adopting clients,
as the coefficients on both POST*NON_ADOPT and POST*IFRS_ADOPT are positive
and significant (p < 0.10 and p < 0.05, respectively). This is contrary to the above results,
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as only IFRS adopting clients are found to be less likely to switch from a non-Big 4 to a
Big 4 auditor (STB). Since the above result suggests that switches between small auditors
is more likely for both treatment and control firms, I cannot attribute this difference to
changes in the market for IFRS-related audit services. However, as I did not make
directional predictions regarding lateral auditor switches, this finding does not refute any
individual hypothesis, and additional analysis is needed.
The explanatory variables included in the model suggest that the likelihood of
switching from a non-Big 4 to a Big 4 auditor (STB) is negatively associated with client
size (SIZE*NON_ADOPT and SIZE*IFRS_ADOPT), previously reporting a loss
(LOSS*IFRS_ADOPT), IFRS adopting clients having previously receive a qualified audit
opinion
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clients

seeking

external
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being

listed

in

and
and

(GROWTH*IFRS_ADOPT),
(QUAL*NON_ADOPT),

adopting

positively

prior

receipt

non-adopting

U.S.

markets

with

client

growth

qualified

audit

opinion

associated
of

clients

a

financing

seeking

external

financing

(FINANCE*NON_ADOPT), voluntary adoption of IFRS (VOLUN*IFRS_ADOPT), the
strength

of

a

country’s

regulatory

quality

(REGQ*NON_ADOPT

and

REGQ*IFRS_ADOPT), and the magnitude of the differences between adopting clients’
local reporting standards and IFRS (HIGHDIFF*IFRS_ADOPT).
For switches between non-Big 4 auditors (STS), there are two differences from
the above results. This type of auditor switch is positively associated with lower
profitability (LOSS*NON_ADOPT and LOSS*IFRS_ADOPT) and negatively associated
with

large

differences

between

local
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reporting

standards

and

IFRS

(HIGHDIFF*IFRS_ADOPT). The directional effects of all other explanatory variables
are consistent across the two types of auditor switches.
In Panel B of Table 1-3, I report the results of auditor switching for Big 4 clients.
For switches from a Big 4 auditor to a non-Big 4 auditor (BTS), the coefficient on
IFRS_ADOPT is significantly negative (p < 0.05). This suggests that clients are less
likely to switch to a smaller auditor in the year of IFRS adoption, which is consistent with
expectations and prior research. However, the coefficient on POST*IFRS_ADOPT is
significantly positive (p < 0.001), which suggests that Big 4 clients are more likely to
switch down to a smaller audit firm in more recent years. As with the switches from a
non-Big 4 to a Big auditor (STB), this result is restricted to the treatment group, as the
coefficient on POST*NON_ADOPT is significantly negative (p < 0.05). Thus, as these
results suggest that firms adopting IFRS in more recent years are more likely to switch
from a large to a small auditor, I find support for H1B.
Results also suggest that clients are more likely to switch between Big 4 auditors
(BTB) in the year of IFRS adoption, as the coefficient on IFRS_ADOPT is positive and
marginally significant (p < 0.10). The coefficients on both POST*IFRS_ADOPT and
POST*NON_ADOPT are also positive and significant (p < 0.001 and p < 0.05,
respectively), suggesting that the likelihood of switching between Big 4 auditors is greater
in more recent years. As with switches between non-Big 4 auditors (STS), I cannot
attribute this finding to changes in the market for IFRS-related audit services, since
non-adopting firms are also affected.
For switches from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4 auditor (BTS), the control variables
suggest

that

switching

auditors

is

negatively
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associated

with

client

size

(POST*NON_ADOPT and POST*IFRS_ADOPT), clients seeking external financing
(FINANCE*NON_ADOPT),

the

strength

of

a

country’s

regulatory

quality

(REGQ*NON_ADOPT), and the differences between local standards and IFRS, for
treatment observations (HIGHDIFF*IFRS_ADOPT), and positively associated with
previously reporting a loss (LOSS*NON_ADOPT and LOSS*IFRS_ADOPT), prior
receipt of a qualified audit opinion (QUAL*NON_ADOPT), and voluntary adoption of
IFRS (VOLUN*IFRS_ADOPT).
There are several differences between the above results and the associations
between control variables and switches between Big 4 auditors (BTB). Lower
profitability of IFRS-adopting firms is positively associated with this type of auditor
switch (LOSS*IFRS_ADOPT), as is the prior receipt of a qualified audit opinion
(QUAL*IFRS_ADOPT). Large differences between local GAAP and IFRS are also
positively associated with a switch to a different Big 4 auditor for treatment firm-years
(HIGHDIFF*IFRS_ADOPT).
1.5.2 Results: Differences between Regression Coefficients for the Auditor Switching
Model
In this section, I further test for statistically significant differences of the
regression coefficients derived from estimating Equation (1), as reported in the previous
section. Specifically, I perform a likelihood ratio chi-square test of the regression
coefficients

for

the

variables

of

interest

(POST*IFRS_ADOPT

and

POST*NON_ADOPT). Panel A of Table 1-4 reports the tests for statistically significant
differences of the regression coefficients for the non-Big 4 client sample partition. For
switches from a non-Big 4 to a Big 4 auditor (STB), the coefficient of -0.073 on
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POST*IFRS_ADOPT is significantly different (p < 0.001) from the coefficient of 0.033
on POST*NON_ADOPT. This confirms my previous inferences that the changing trend
in auditor switches of this type is restricted to IFRS adopting firms. Both adopting and
non-adopting firms appear to be more likely to switch between non-Big 4 auditors (STS),
as the coefficients on both POST*IFRS_ADOPT and POST*NON_ADOPT are positive.
However, the effect is greater for adopting firms, and the difference between the two
coefficients is marginally significant (p < 0.10). Regarding differences between the two
types of switches, the coefficient of -0.073 on POST*IFRS_ADOPT for switches from a
non-Big 4 to a Big 4 auditor (STB) is significantly different (p < 0.001) from the
coefficient on POST*IFRS_ADOPT of 0.288 for switches between non-Big 4 auditor
(STS), which provides support for H1C that changes in the likelihood of directional
auditor switches is different from the change in the likelihood of lateral auditor switches.
There is no significant difference between the two types of auditor switches for nonadopting firms.
The tests for differences in the regression coefficients for Big 4 clients are reported
in Table 1-4, Panel B. Results are similar to the non-Big 4 sample partition.
Specifically, for switches from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4 auditor (BTS), the coefficient on
POST*IFRS_ADOPT of 0.703 is significantly greater (p < 0.001) than the coefficient on
POST*NON_ADOPT of -0.082. This reaffirms my finding in support of H1B that IFRS
adopting clients are more likely to switch from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4 auditor in more
recent years. Contrary to expectations, although the coefficients on both variables are
positive for switches between Big 4 auditors (BTB), the effect is greater for firms in the
control sample, and their difference of 0.125 is marginally significant (p < 0.10). Thus, I
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fail to find evidence that there is a change in the likelihood of IFRS adopting clients to
switch between Big 4 auditors. However, consistent with my predictions, the coefficient
on POST*IFRS_ADOPT is significantly greater (p < 0.001) for switches from Big 4 to
non-Big 4 auditors (BTS) compared to switches between Big 4 auditors (BTB), which
supports H1C. For control firms, on the other hand, the likelihood of auditor switches
between Big 4 auditors (BTB) is greater than the likelihood of switches from a Big 4 to a
non-Big 4 auditor (BTS), and their difference of 0.642 is statistically significant (p <
0.001).
In summary, the above results suggest that the market for IFRS-related audit
services has become less concentrated over time. My findings indicate that while clients
of non-Big 4 auditors are more likely to switch to a larger auditor in the year of IFRS
adoption, this type of switch becomes less likely in more recent years. Similarly, the
likelihood of Big 4 clients to switch to a small auditor is lower in the year of IFRS
adoption, but relatively more likely for firms adopting IFRS in more recent years. In
addition, tests of differences of the regression coefficients suggest that the changes in the
likelihood of directional switches are significantly different from that of the
corresponding lateral auditor switches for IFRS adopting firms. I also find that, in most
cases, the relative likelihood of switching auditors in more recent years is different
between treatment and control firms.
Taken together, these results motivate my additional tests regarding changes in
the IFRS-related fee premium. To the extent that the audit market has become less
concentrated, smaller audit firms should have obtained the knowledge and experience
necessary to attract clients during their transition to IFRS. Likewise, a market with lower
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concentration should promote competition among audit firms. Combined, these two
factors may play an important role in the fee premium charged by the auditor in relation
to clients’ adoption of IFRS.
1.5.3 Sensitivity Tests
I repeat my analysis based on defining large auditors as Global 6 (the Big 4, plus
BDO and Grant Thornton). This makes my results comparable to prior studies (e.g.,
Wieczynska, 2013), and it is also possible that the second tier global auditors were
similarly affected over the sample period. I report these adjusted results in Tables 5 and 6
and discuss the primary implications in this section. In these tables, the abbreviations
STG and GTS replace STB and BTS, respectively.
Panel A of Table 1-5 reports results for auditor switching behavior of non-Global
6 audit clients in the year of IFRS adoption. For clients switching from a non-Global 6 to
a Global 6 auditor (STG), and consistent with expectations, the coefficient of on
IFRS_ADOPT is positive and marginally significant (p < 0.10), again suggesting that
clients are more likely to switch to a large auditor in the year of IFRS adoption. However,
the coefficient on the interaction term POST*IFRS_ADOPT is significantly negative (p <
0.05). This finding suggests that, as with non-Big 4 clients, non-Global 6 client firms
adopting IFRS in more recent years are less likely to switch to a larger auditor.
Conversely, the coefficient on POST*NON_ADOPT is positive and

marginally

significant (p < 0.10), suggesting that this change in auditor switching behavior is
restricted to IFRS adopting firms. As with the non-Big 4 client partition, these findings
support H1A. The results of switching between small auditors (STS) are somewhat
different when defined in this way. The coefficient on IFRS_ADOPT is positive but not
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significant at conventional levels. However, results suggest that auditor switches between
non-Global 6 auditors are more likely in more recent years for IFRS adopting clients, as
the coefficient POST*IFRS_ADOPT is positive and significant (p < 0.05). Firms in the
control group, on the other hand, appear less likely to switch between non-Global 6
auditors; the coefficient on POST*NON_ADOPT for auditor switches of this type is
negative and marginally significant (p < 0.10). This finding regarding changes in the
likelihood of switching between non-Global 6 auditors (STS) provides support that the
change in the likelihood of switching from a non-Global 6 to a Global 6 auditor (STG) is
not simply caused by an increase in the likelihood of all types of auditor switches for
non-Global 6 clients.
Panel B of Table 1-5 reports the results of auditor switching for Global 6 clients.
For switches from a Global 6 to a non-Global 6 auditor (GTS), the coefficient on
IFRS_ADOPT is negative and marginally significant (p < 0.10). Consistent with
expectations, this result suggests that clients are less likely to switch down to a smaller
auditor in the year of IFRS adoption. The coefficient on POST*IFRS_ADOPT is positive
and significant (p < 0.001), which suggests that Global 6 clients are more likely to switch
down to a smaller audit firm in more recent years. This result holds only for IFRS
adopting firms, as the coefficient on POST*NON_ADOPT is significantly negative (p <
0.001) for auditor switches of this type. Again, this provides support for H1B that firms
adopting IFRS in more recent years are more likely to switch to a smaller auditor in the
year of IFRS adoption. Results also suggest that clients are more likely to switch between
Global 6 auditors (GTG) in the year of IFRS adoption, as the coefficient on
IFRS_ADOPT is positive and marginally significant (p < 0.10). The coefficient on

26

POST*IFRS_ADOPT is also positive and marginally significant (p < 0.10), suggesting
that IFRS adopting clients are also more likely to switch between Global 6 auditors in
more recent years. However, as with switches between Big 4 auditors, the coefficient on
POST*NON_ADOPT is also positive and significant (p < 0.001), which suggests that the
change in the likelihood of switching between Global 6 auditors is not restricted to IFRS
adopting clients.
Table 1-6 provides the results of executing a chi-square test for the difference in
the regression coefficients using the adjusted coding scheme. Panel A reports the results
for the non-Global 6 sample partition, and results are generally consistent with the nonBig 4 client sample partition. For switches from a non-Global 6 to a Global 6 auditor
(STG), the statistically significant difference (p < 0.001) in the coefficients of 0.395 on
POST*IFRS_ADOPT and POST*NON_ADOPT provides support for H1C. Results
suggest that the increased likelihood of switching between non-Global 6 auditors (STS)
for treatment firms is significantly different from the corresponding change for control
firms,

as

the

difference

in

the

coefficients

on

POST*IFRS_ADOPT

and

POST*NON_ADOPT is statistically significant. For comparisons between the types of
auditor switches, only the coefficients on POST*IFRS_ADOPT are significantly different
(p < 0.001). Thus, I find additional support for H1C given that the change in the likelihood
to switch from non-Global 6 to Global 6 auditors (STG) is restricted to IFRS adopting
firms.
Finally, Panel B of Table 1-5 reports the results of testing for statistically
significant difference of the regression coefficients for the Global 6 sample partition. For
switches from a Global 6 to a non-Global 6 auditor (GTS) and in support of H1B, the
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coefficient of 0.597 on POST*IFRS_ADOPT is significantly different (p < 0.001) than
the coefficient on POST*NON_ADOPT of -0.148. For Global 6 clients, the coefficients
on both POST*IFRS_ADOPT and POST*NON_ADOPT are positive, but their difference
is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Thus, as with Big 4 clients, I do not
find evidence of a change in the likelihood to switch between Global 6 auditors (GTG)
for IFRS adopting firms. Also similar to the Big 4 client partition, the coefficient on
POST*IFRS_ADOPT is positive for both switches from a Global 6 to a non-Global 6
auditor (GTS) and between Global 6 auditors (GTG), and their difference of -0.298 is
marginally significant (p < 0.10). Thus, as expected, the increased likelihood of IFRS
adopting firms to switch auditors in more recent years is greater for switches down from
a Global 6 to a non-Global 6 auditor (GTS) compared to switches between Global 6
auditors (GTG), providing support for H1C. For non-adopting firms, the likelihood of
switches between Global 6 auditors (GTG) in more recent years is significantly greater (p
< 0.05) than the likelihood from a Global 6 to a non-Global 6 auditor (GTS). In summary,
although some inconsequential differences exist, the primary findings are upheld
regardless of whether large and small auditors are partitioned on the basis of inclusion
among the Big 4 or Global 6 auditors.
1.6 Conclusion
This essay examines how the market for IFRS-related audit services has changed
over time as a result of a global shift in the accounting regime of individual countries
from local standards to IFRS. My findings suggest that clients adopting IFRS in more
recent years are less likely to switch away from a non-Big 4 auditor to a Big 4 auditor
and, similarly, more likely to switch from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4 auditor relative to firms
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that adopt IFRS in more recent years. Taken together, these results suggest that the
market for IFRS-related audit services has become less concentrated among large, global
auditors. These results add to the international auditing literature by providing evidence
on changes in one aspect of the audit market as a result of IFRS adoption over time,
which has become a popular topic in current research. Additionally, my study offers
potentially policy-relevant evidence to add to the debate over whether or not the U.S.
should require IFRS adoption by publicly-listed firms. While the findings of previous
studies offer evidence that is consistent with these undesirable outcomes, my results
suggest that gradual changes in the audit market may mitigate concerns regarding the
concentration of the audit market among large, global auditors.
It is important to note that I draw these inferences based on a global sample not
including U.S. firms. These results are therefore suggestive, but not definitive, of how the
audit market specific to the U.S. may be affected following IFRS adoption, especially
given the relatively more stringent reporting environment relative to other countries.
Another important caveat of this study is that I examine auditor switching only in the
year of IFRS adoption rather than employing a more general auditor choice model in the
years surrounding the event. Nevertheless, it is important for regulators in the U.S. to
consider changes in the global audit market, in addition to the consequences surrounding
more concentrated events (e.g., mandatory IFRS adoption), in order to draw reliable
inferences regarding both positive and negative outcomes of IFRS adoption in the U.S.
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Table 1-1: Sample Selection and Description - Auditor Switching
Panel A: Sample Selection
Firm-Year Observations
Treatment
Control

Sample
#

Initial Sample

10,052

137,542

(240)
(2,609)
(1,153)
6,050

(24,935)
(35,969)
(16,257)
60,381

Less:
Missing audit firm data
Financial firms (SIC Code 6000-6999)
Missing financial data
Sample used in auditor switching regression analysis:
Panel B: Sample distribution by country
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Chile
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Korea
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Philippines
Portugal
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom

Treatment
734
12.1%
41
0.7%
128
2.1%
121
2.0%
621
10.3%
134
2.2%
95
1.6%
68
1.1%
396
6.5%
254
4.2%
217
3.6%
32
0.5%
252
4.2%
49
0.8%
833
13.8%
10
0.2%
89
1.5%
86
1.4%
151
2.5%
117
1.9%
38
0.6%
146
2.4%
97
1.6%
254
4.2%
52
0.9%
1,035
6,050

17.1%
100%

Control
8,304
13.8%
861
1.4%
1,377
2.3%
915
1.5%
9,668
16.0%
971
1.6%
808
1.3%
592
1.0%
3,900
6.5%
3,648
6.0%
1,370
2.3%
219
0.4%
1,908
3.2%
1,333
2.2%
7,196
11.9%
101
0.2%
602
1.0%
595
1.0%
1,064
1.8%
768
1.3%
291
0.5%
1,405
2.3%
781
1.3%
2,214
3.7%
1,059
1.8%
8,431
60,381
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14.0%
100%

Table 1-1 (Continued)
Panel C: Sample distribution by year
Treatment
Control
2004
144
2.4%
7,280
2005
1,357
22.4%
6,225
2006
1,093
18.1%
6,012
2007
709
11.7%
7,713
2008
541
8.9%
8,327
2009
125
2.1%
9,044
2010
218
3.6%
8,907
2011
1,863
30.8%
6,873
6,050
100%
60,381

12.1%
10.3%
10.0%
12.8%
13.8%
15.0%
14.8%
11.4%
100%

This table summarizes the procedure to select the sample used in the auditor switching analysis. Panel A
details the selection criteria for the treatment (IFRS-adopting) and control (non-adopting) firm-year
observations. Panel B and Panel C provide details on the sample distribution by country and year,
respectively.
#

The initial sample consists of all publicly-listed firms available from Worldscope from 2004 through 2011
located in the countries listed in Panel B. I first identify treatment (IFRS-adopting) firms based on
accounting standards data in Worldscope, and delete remaining observations with missing accounting
standards data.
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Table 1-2: Descriptive Statistics - Auditor Switching
Non-Big 4 Clients (n = 29,883)
Treatment Observations
Variable
Test Variables (%)
Audswitch = 0
Audswitch = STB
Audswitch = STS
POST
Control Variables
SIZE
NI
GROWTH
LOSS (%)
QUAL (%)
FINANCE (%)
VOLUN (%)
USLIST (%)
REGQ
HIGHDIFF (%)

M e an St. De v.

Big 4 Clients (n = 36,548)

Control Observations
Me an

Treatment Observations

St. De v.

0.6771
0.0948
0.2281
0.6134

0.4677
0.2931
0.4197
0.4871

0.6940 **
0.0875
0.2185
0.6433 ***

0.4608
0.2826
0.4132
0.4790

18.826
-0.2898
0.6498
0.5159
0.2780
0.4625
0.0276
0.0361
1.2929
0.2862

3.8070
1.0880
5.2697
0.4998
0.4481
0.4962
0.1638
0.0600
0.5162
0.4521

18.767
-0.2873
0.2755 ***
0.5218
0.1197 ***
0.4501
0.2849 ***
0.0951 ***
1.3070
0.2746

3.9466
1.9595
4.2561
0.4915
0.3246
0.4975
0.4514
0.0771
0.4968
0.4463

Test Variables (%)
Audswitch = 0
Audswitch = BTS
Audswitch = BTB
POST
Control Variables
SIZE
NI
GROWTH
LOSS (%)
QUAL (%)
FINANCE (%)
VOLUN (%)
USLIST (%)
REGQ
HIGHDIFF (%)

Control Observations

M e an St. De v.

Me an

St. De v.

0.8451
0.0577
0.0972
0.5235

0.3618
0.2331
0.2963
0.4995

0.7829 ***
0.0702 ***
0.1469 ***
0.6636 ***

0.4123
0.2555
0.3540
0.4725

20.598
-0.0493
0.2921
0.3315
0.1010
0.5078
0.0314
0.0893
1.4039
0.3864

3.6161
0.3573
2.2420
0.4708
0.3003
0.5000
0.1743
0.0941
0.4460
0.4990

20.756
-0.1847 ***
0.2681
0.3336
0.0973
0.4177 ***
0.2959 ***
0.0223 ***
1.4106
0.3825

3.5900
0.6055
2.4296
0.4886
0.2923
0.4932
0.4565
0.1477
0.4155
0.4860

This table presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the auditor switching analysis. Treatment observations are years in which firms adopt IFRS.
Control observations are firm-years for which there is no change in accounting standards. A percentage sign following dichotomous variables denotes that
that mean is the proportion of firms for which the variable is equal to one. I categorize the AUDSWITCH separately for each sample partition.
AUDSWITCH=0 denotes firm-years in which clients did not switch auditors; STB indicates switches from a non-Big 4 to a Big 4 auditor; STS indicates
switches between non-Big 4 auditors; BTS indicates switches from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4 auditor; and BTB indicates switches between Big 4 auditors. POST
is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-years ending after 11/30/2006 and zero otherwise. SIZE is measured as the natural log of total assets. NI is equal
to net income scaled by total assets. GROWTH is the annual percentage change in sales. LOSS is an indicator variable equal to one for firms reporting
negative income in the prior year. QUAL is equal to one if the firm receives a qualified audit opinion in the previous year. FINANCE is an indicator variable
equal to one if the firm raised debt or equity capital in the current year and zero otherwise. VOLUN is an indicator variable for firm-years ending before the
mandatory adoption of IFRS in firm i's country of domicile. USLIST is an indicator variable equal to one for firms cross-listed in U.S. capital markets.
REGQ is an index variable capturing each country's regulatory quality, as measured by Kaufmann et al. (2009). HIGHDIFF is an indicator variable equal to
one if the differences between the local reporting standards and IFRS, based on Bae et al. (2008), is greater than the sample median and zero otherwise.
All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level.
*, **, *** denote statistically significant differences between treatment and control observations at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (based on two-tailed pvalue), respectively.
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Table 1-3: Auditor Switching Model for non-Big 4 and Big 4 Clients
Variable
Intercept
IFRS_ADOPT
POST*NON_ADOPT
POST*IFRS_ADOPT
SIZE*NON_ADOPT
SIZE*IFRS_ADOPT
NI*NON_ADOPT
NI*IFRS_ADOPT
GROWTH*NON_ADOPT
GROWTH*IFRS_ADOPT
LOSS*NON_ADOPT
LOSS*IFRS_ADOPT
QUAL*NON_ADOPT
QUAL*IFRS_ADOPT
FINANCE*NON_ADOPT
FINANCE*IFRS_ADOPT
VOLUN*NON_ADOPT
VOLUN*IFRS_ADOPT
USLIST*NON_ADOPT
USLIST*IFRS_ADOPT
REGQ*NON_ADOPT
REGQ*IFRS_ADOPT
HIGHDIFF*NON_ADOPT
HIGHDIFF*IFRS_ADOPT
Country Fixed-Effects
Pseudo-R

2

Panel A: Non-Big 4 (n = 29,883)
STB (n = 2,467)
STS (n = 6,460)
Estimate Sig
Estimate Sig
-8.5295 ***
-0.5488 **
0.2276 *
0.3209 **
0.0331
0.0542 *
-0.0734 **
0.2884 **
-0.2305 ***
-0.0644 ***
-0.0351 *
-0.0213 *
-0.0003
0.0043
0.0146
-0.0002
-0.0003
-0.0001
0.0034 ***
0.0043 ***
0.0486
0.0708 **
-0.3154 **
0.1410 *
0.4165 ***
0.3315 ***
-0.3582 **
-0.2453 **
0.2995 ***
-0.0033
-0.3169 **
-0.0647
0.0291
0.0814
0.1479 ***
0.2462 *
-0.2642 *
-0.2329 *
0.4217
-0.1512
0.9015 ***
0.0964 ***
0.3480 **
-0.0299
-0.0681
-0.1088
0.7387 ***
-0.1836 *

Panel B: Big 4 (n = 36,548)
BTS (n = 2,183)
BTB (n = 5,183)
Estimate Sig
Estimate Sig
4.9645 ***
-3.6110 ***
-0.3288 **
0.4978 *
-0.0823 *
0.5601 **
0.7028 ***
0.4355 ***
-0.2708 ***
-0.0617 ***
-0.0416 *
-0.0581 ***
0.0002
-0.0013
0.0286
0.0058
0.0000
-0.0004
0.0002
-0.0001
0.1582 ***
0.0974 ***
-0.0694
0.3073 **
0.6884 ***
0.3844 ***
0.0272
0.3223 **
-0.1801 ***
-0.1222 ***
0.0996
0.1821
0.0380
0.0373
0.5966 *
0.1577 ***
-0.3139 *
-0.5101 ***
-0.0916
-0.0534
-0.1584 ***
-0.0666 *
0.0278
-0.4011 ***
-0.0863
0.0716
-0.1591 *
0.6478 ***

Yes

Yes

7.62%

11.99%

This table presents results of estimating the multinomial logistic regression to model the likelihood of
various types of auditor switches (Equation 1) for non-Big 4 (Panel A) and Big 4 clients (Panel B).
IFRS_ADOPT is an indicator variable equal to one if year t is the year of IFRS adoption for firm i, and zero
otherwise. NON_ADOPT is equal to one if firm i does not adopt IFRS in year t, and zero otherwise. POST
is an indicator variable equal to one for observations after 11/30/2006 and zero otherwise. SIZE is measured
as the natural log of total assets. NI is net income scaled by total assets. GROWTH is measured as the
annual percentage change in sales. LOSS is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i reported a net loss in
year t-1, and zero otherwise. QUAL is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i received a qualified audit
opinion in year t-1, and zero otherwise. FINANCE is equal to one if firm i raised debt or equity capital in
year t, and zero otherwise. VOLUN is an indicator variable equal to one if year t is before the mandatory
adoption of IFRS in firm i's country of domicile, and zero otherwise. USLIST is equal to one if firm i is
cross-listed in a U.S. capital market, and zero otherwise. REGQ is a continuous measure of firm i's
country's regulatory quality, as measured in Kaufmann et al. (2009). HIGHDIFF is equal to one if the
difference between the local GAAP of firm i and IFRS is greater than the sample median, based on Bae et
al. (2008), and zero otherwise.
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Table 1-3 (Continued)
The labels STS, STB, BTS, and BTB denote switching between non-Big 4 auditors, switching from a nonBig 4 to a Big 4 auditor, switching from a Big 4 auditor to a non-Big 4 auditor, and switching between Big
4 auditors, respectively.
All
continuous
variables
are
winsorized
at
the
top
and
bottom
1%
level.
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (based on two-tailed p-value),
respectively.
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Table 1-4: Differences in Regression Coefficients - Auditor Switching
(non-Big 4 and Big 4)
POST*IFRS_ADOPT
POST*NON_ADOPT
Panel A: Non-Big 4 Sample (n = 29,883)
Switch = STB
-0.073
0.033
Switch = STS
0.288
0.054
Difference (Down)
0.362 ***
0.021
POST*IFRS_ADOPT

POST*NON_ADOPT

Difference (Across)
0.107 ***
-0.234 *

Difference (Across)

Panel B: Big 4 Sample (n = 36,548)
Switch = BTS
Switch = BTB
Difference (Down)

0.703
0.436
-0.267 ***

-0.082
0.560
0.642 ***

-0.785 ***
0.125 *

This table presents the results of performing a likelihood ratio chi-square test on the regression coefficients
for the variables of interest (POST*IFRS_ADOPT and POST*NON_ADOPT). I test both for differences
between treatment and control firms for the same type of auditor switch (Difference across) and differences
between the two coefficients for the different types of auditor switch separately for treatment and control
firms (Difference Down).
STS, STB, BTS, and BTB denote switching between non-Big 4 auditors, switching from a non-Big 4 to a
Big 4 auditor, switching from a Big 4 auditor to a non-Big 4 auditor, and switching between Big 4 auditors,
respectively.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (based on two-tailed p-values),
respectively.
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Table 1-5: Auditor Switching Model for non-Global 6 and Global 6 clients
Panel A: Non-Global 6 (n = 24,002)
STG (n = 2,663)
STS (n = 4,230)

Variable

Intercept
IFRS_ADOPT
POST*NON_ADOPT
POST*IFRS_ADOPT
SIZE*NON_ADOPT
SIZE*IFRS_ADOPT
NI*NON_ADOPT
NI*IFRS_ADOPT
GROWTH*NON_ADOPT
GROWTH*IFRS_ADOPT
LOSS*NON_ADOPT
LOSS*IFRS_ADOPT
QUAL*NON_ADOPT
QUAL*IFRS_ADOPT
FINANCE*NON_ADOPT
FINANCE*IFRS_ADOPT
VOLUN*NON_ADOPT
VOLUN*IFRS_ADOPT
USLIST*NON_ADOPT
USLIST*IFRS_ADOPT
REGQ*NON_ADOPT
REGQ*IFRS_ADOPT
HIGHDIFF*NON_ADOPT
HIGHDIFF*IFRS_ADOPT
Country Fixed-Effects
Pseudo-R

2

Estimate Sig
-7.8158 ***
0.0846 *
0.0887 *
-0.3064 **
-0.1806 ***
-0.0301 *
-0.0001
-0.0044
-0.0007
0.0024 **
0.0351
-0.1224 *
0.4368 ***
0.0278 *
0.2583 ***
-0.3506 **
0.0269
1.4667 ***
-0.0943
0.0696
0.8873 ***
0.5658 ***
-0.1293
0.9153 ***

Estimate Sig
-0.6611 **
0.0493
-0.0744 *
0.3183 **
-0.0719 ***
-0.0298 *
0.0005
0.0082
-0.0001
0.0042 **
0.1349 ***
0.1283
0.3676 ***
0.5044 ***
0.0315
-0.0975
0.0682
0.0842
-0.1509
-1.0252
0.4164 ***
0.1042
-0.0619
0.1067

Panel B: Global 6 (n = 42,429)
GTS (n = 2,118)
GTG (n = 7,282)
Estimate Sig
4.7478 ***
-0.3585 *
-0.1476 ***
0.5971 ***
-0.2571 ***
-0.1245 ***
0.0007
0.0423 *
-0.0005
0.0004
0.2235 ***
-0.0752
0.4146 ***
0.0954
-0.1791 ***
0.0294
0.0329
-0.0554
-0.6177 ***
-0.8356 **
-0.7608 ***
-0.6851 ***
-0.0892
-0.1414 ***

Yes

Yes

6.95%

8.92%

Estimate Sig
-2.1451 ***
0.6994 *
0.1589 ***
0.2988 *
-0.0029
-0.0556 ***
0.0012 *
0.0144
-0.0003
0.0001
-0.1169 ***
-0.2819 **
0.3731 ***
0.2186 *
-0.0775 ***
-0.1103 *
0.0135
0.1303 **
-0.3927 ***
-0.1227 *
-0.0455 *
-0.0362 **
0.0447
0.0595 ***

This table presents results of estimating multinomial logistic regression to model the likelihood of various
types of auditor switches (Equation 1) for non-Global 6 clients (Panel A) and Global 6 clients (Panel B).
IFRS_ADOPT is an indicator variable equal to one if year t is the year of IFRS adoption for firm i, and zero
otherwise (i.e., treatment group). NON_ADOPT is equal to one if firm i does not adopt IFRS in year t, and
zero otherwise (control group). POST is an indicator variable equal to one for observations after 11/30/2006
and zero otherwise. SIZE is measured as the natural log of total assets. NI is net income scaled by total
assets. GROWTH is measured as the percentage change in sales. LOSS is an indicator variable equal to
one if firm i reported a net loss in year t-1, and zero otherwise. QUAL is an indicator variable equal to one if
firm i received a qualified audit opinion in year t-1, and zero otherwise. FINANCE is equal to one if firm i
raised debt or equity capital in year t, and zero otherwise. VOLUN is an indicator variable equal to one if
year t is before the mandatory adoption of IFRS in firm i's country of domicile, and zero otherwise. USLIST
is equal to one if firm i is cross-listed in a U.S. capital market, and zero otherwise. REGQ is a continuous
measure of firm i's country's regulatory quality, as measured in Kaufmann et al. (2009). HIGHDIFF
is an indicator variable equal to one if the difference between the local GAAP of firm i and IFRS is
greater than the sample median, based on Bae et al. (2008), and zero otherwise.
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Table 1-5 (Continued)
The labels STS, STG, GTS, and GTG denote, respectively, switching between non-Global 6 auditors,
switching from a non-Global 6 to a Global 6 auditor, switching from a Global 6 auditor to a non-Global 6
auditor, and switching between Global 6 auditors.
All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level.
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (based on two-tailed p-value),
respectively.
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Table 1-6: Differences in Regression Coefficients - Auditor Switching
(non-Global 6 and Global 6)
POST*IFRS_ADOPT
POST*NON_ADOPT
Panel A: Non-Global 6 Sample (n = 17,109)
Switch = STG
-0.306
0.089
Switch = STS
0.318
-0.074
Difference (Down)
0.625 ***
-0.163

Difference (Across)

POST*IFRS_ADOPT
Panel B: Global 6 Sample (n = 42,429)
Switch = GTS
0.597
Switch = GTG
0.299
Difference (Down)
-0.298 *

Difference (Across)

POST*NON_ADOPT
-0.148
0.159
0.307 **

0.395 ***
-0.393 ***

-0.745 ***
-0.140

This table presents the results of performing a likelihood ratio chi-square test on the regression coefficients
for the variables of interest (POST*IFRS_ADOPT and POST*NON_ADOPT). I test both for differences
between treatment and control firms for the same type of auditor switch (Difference across) and differences
between the two coefficients for the different types of auditor switch separately for treatment and control
firms (Difference Down).
The labels STS, STG, GTS, and GTG denote, respectively, switching between non-Global 6 auditors,
switching from a non-Global 6 to a Global 6 auditor, switching from a Global 6 auditor to a non-Global 6
auditor, and switching between Global 6 auditors.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (based on two-tailed p-values),
respectively.
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CHAPTER 2: CHANGES IN THE IMPACT OF IFRS ADOPTION ON AUDIT FEES
2.1. Introduction
This essay examines the impact of widespread IFRS adoption on auditor fees. A
major concern of opponents in the U.S. has been the potentially significant financial
burden associated with such a substantial shift in the accounting regime. Hail et al. (2010)
provide a conservative estimate of economy-wide first-time preparation costs in excess of
US$8 billion based on the results of a survey conducted in the E.U. (see ICAEW, 2007).
Critics outside of the U.S. and in countries where IFRS adoption has been enacted have
voiced similar concerns regarding the increased costs associated with preparing financial
statements following the adoption of IFRS (AICD, 2005). Large, global auditors stand to
gain additional revenues if IFRS adoption takes place in the U.S. As a direct and
observable outflow of resources, audit fees are one important aspect of the costs
associated with IFRS adoption, and current research has found that fees increase
following mandatory adoption of IFRS (Kim, Liu, and Zheng, 2012; DeGeorge,
Ferguson, and Spear, 2013). However, as these studies focus only on the fixed period of
mandatory IFRS adoption, it is difficult to draw inferences regarding how auditor fees
may be affected by adoption of IFRS in the future. To the extent that the structure of the
audit market changes over time, as the results of the first essay suggest, this topic is of
practical importance.
In the following analyses, I examine whether the change in auditor fees in the
year of IFRS adoption varies over time. Specifically, I predict that audit firms with the
greatest exposure to IFRS financial statements (i.e., the Big 4) become less able to
demand as large a premium for their services, causing an overall decline in any fee
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premiums associated with IFRS adoption. Based on a sample of firms in 26 countries
from 2004 through 2011, my primary results uphold this prediction. Further tests reveal
that this effect is driven at least partially by audit firms with greater experience in
auditing IFRS statements increasing fees by smaller increments in more recent years,
consistent with the effect of increased competition. This trend does not seem to be driven
by macroeconomic conditions, as neither the audit service fees of a control group nor the
total fees of the treatment group are similarly affected. When I divide the sample into
clients audited by Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms, I find that the results hold only for the Big 4
subsample, suggesting that changes to the market for IFRS-related audit services may
have negatively impacted the Big 4’s ability to extract additional quasi-rents from clients
in the year of IFRS adoption.
This study offers several contributions to the international auditing literature.
First, I show that the change in audit fees in the year of IFRS adoption declines over time,
which I attribute to a less concentrated market. Second, while prior studies posit that
IFRS adoption leads to an increase in audit fees due, in part, to a premium charged for the
auditor’s expertise (Lin and Yen, 2010), I show that such a competitive advantage
translates into smaller fee increases in more recent years. To the extent that my results are
generalizable, I offer timely evidence of one of the costs associated with IFRS adoption,
which is especially important given that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
in the U.S. has yet to make a decisive ruling regarding adoption of IFRS, and concerns
about the costs associated with IFRS adoption have attracted a great deal of attention
from regulators, academics, and practitioners. These results are relevant to future research
given that audit fees are one of the few direct costs that have been examined in the
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context of IFRS adoption. In a more general sense, my results also show the importance
of carefully selecting auditor fee data, as different inferences can be drawn from when
auditor fees are defined based on various types of services.
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes related
prior research and develops my hypotheses. The third section details the research design.
Section 4 describes the sample selection procedures and data employed in this study.
Section five provides explanations of the empirical results and associated inferences. I
conclude in Section 6 and offer suggestions for future research.
2.2 Hypothesis Development
2.2.1 Background: IFRS Adoption and Audit Fees
A major argument against a shift to IFRS reporting is the significant financial
burden that would be imposed on adopting firms (SEC Roadmap, 2008; Hail et al., 2010).
Prior research has identified one such cost, finding that audit fees are higher after IFRS
adoption, as would be expected from such a dramatic change in the reporting
environment. Kim et al. (2012) develop an economic model to assess the impact of IFRS
adoption on audit fees, noting that the change in audit fees is driven by changes in audit
complexity and financial reporting quality, increases in the auditor’s effort, and the risk
of legal liability due to misapplication of the new reporting standards. Their findings
from empirically testing this model suggest that the increase in total fees paid to the
auditor increase for IFRS adopting firms, compared to firms in countries that did not
require IFRS adoption, is positively associated with the increase in audit complexity
(based on the differences between firms’ local GAAP and IFRS) and negatively
associated with improvements in financial reporting quality (based on changes in
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discretionary accruals) and the strength of the country’s legal regime. However, it is
important to note that Kim et al. (2012) are unable to utilize data specifically for audit
service fees.
DeGeorge et al. (2013) similarly examine the change in audit fees for Australian
firms surrounding mandatory IFRS adoption. Their findings suggest that audit service
fees are higher in the year of IFRS adoption, firms with greater audit complexity display
higher increases in audit fees surrounding IFRS adoption, and smaller clients incur
disproportionately higher costs. Additional tests reveal an economy-wide increase in
audit fees of 23% in the year of IFRS adoption and an abnormal increase of 8% beyond
standard yearly increases.
In summary, while previous studies find audit fees increase after IFRS adoption,
no existing studies have assessed whether this change in audit fees varies over time. This
is an especially interesting issue given that such a difference may be dependent on
changes in competition within the audit market itself. As my first essay examines this
latter topic and finds that the global audit market shifts in favor of smaller, local audit
firms, it is a closely related extension to examine a quantifiable cost that could vary with
changes in the market as a whole.
2.2.2 Hypotheses Related to the Change in Audit Fees in the Year of IFRS Adoption
In this essay, I assess whether the change in audit service fees in the year of IFRS
adoption has decreased over time. As a continued argument against IFRS adoption in the
U.S. is the financial burden imposed on firms as a result of such a change in the reporting
environment, empirical evidence is needed to determine potential causes and fluctuations
in audit fee changes during the IFRS transition process. Given that the SEC has yet to
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make a decisive ruling on IFRS adoption in the U.S., these results based on patterns in
audit fee changes should be of interest.
There are a number of reasons why the change in audit service fees surrounding
IFRS adoption may change over time. First, to the extent that the market concentration
changes and switching to a smaller auditor becomes a reasonable option for clients during
the transition to IFRS, increased competition may lead to lower fee increases due to a
reduction in ability of auditors to charge high premiums. This argument is consistent with
the consequences of increased audit market competition on audit fees in other, more
generalized settings (e.g., Maher, Tiessen, Colson, and Broman, 1992).
Second, audit fees are directly associated with auditor effort; as the amount of
work required to complete the audit increases, the client is responsible for additional
billable hours. In the early years of IFRS adoption, few audit firms have advanced
knowledge of the new accounting standards and, as a result, exert additional effort for
each engagement. Over time, however, auditors can apply past experience to clients more
recently adopting IFRS. These arguments are consistent with learning theory (Libby and
Luft, 1993; Bonner and Walker, 1994). In addition, as the market concentration shifts
away from larger auditors, smaller firms have the opportunity to gain experience and
similarly provide more efficient audits during the transition to IFRS.
Third, there may be an increase in audit risk due to misapplication of the new
reporting standards, which in turn leads to increased audit fees (Houston, Peters, and
Pratt, 1999). Although cross-country variations may persist with respect to the risk
component of audit fees (e.g., different legal or enforcement environments),
improvements in knowledge and skills related to the IFRS transition process could cause
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the risk component of audit fees to decline over time as audit firms become more aware
of potential problems arising from application of IFRS and increase their scrutiny
accordingly. My analysis includes a host of variables intended to mitigate the effect of
audit risk.11
I state my primary hypothesis related to the change in audit service fees as
follows, in the alternative form:
H2: The change in audit service fees in the year of IFRS adoption is lower
in more recent years.
The above hypothesis is tested using the full sample of firms with available data without
distinction to potential differences that may exist between audit firms of different size.
Prior research suggests that Big 4 auditors charge higher audit fees relative to small
auditors (Palmrose, 1986; DeFond, Francis, and Wong, 2000; Choi, Kim, Liu, and
Simunic, 2008). As the concentration of the audit market changes, audit firms with
greater experience may see the sharpest decline in the IFRS-related fee premium.12
There are several reasons to consider the Big 4 as the firms with the most
experience in auditing IFRS financial statements. First, global audit firms actively
compete with other auditors both in attracting talented personnel via recruiting events at

11

As an additional test, I also include a future financial restatement as a control variable to effectively
capture this effect. My inferences are unchanged and I find a marginally significant (p < 0.10) positive
association between future restatements and the increase in audit fees in the year of IFRS adoption,
suggesting that the fee increase is greater in the year of IFRS adoption to the extent that auditors correctly
assess client risk.
12

An alternative explanation could be that the additional audit effort required after the client switches to
IFRS decreases in subsequent years as the auditor’s knowledge of the new reporting system increases,
resulting in a detected decline in the change in audit service fees over time. My research design inherently
controls for this possibility, since each treatment firm is included as only one observation (i.e., the first year
of IFRS reporting).
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prestigious business schools and in performing high-quality audits (McWilliams, Van
Fleet, and Cory, 2009). Second, the largest audit firms financially support the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in the creation of IFRS and related
knowledge. The IASB readily considers the comments of these large accounting firms
when issuing new pronouncements. Similarly, these audit firms routinely issue
handbooks and other forms of guidance to practitioners and academics to assist in
interpreting individual standards. Third, the Big 4 have the largest presence globally
(Carson, 2009) and therefore have the greatest potential to capitalize on knowledgesharing with affiliates and local branches as clients switch from local reporting standards
to IFRS.
While the above explanations could also apply to BDO and Grant Thornton
(collectively with the Big 4, the “Global 6”), there may be significant differences between
the Big 4 and BDO and Grant Thornton, and accounting researchers frequently control
for differences between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors in various research settings in order
to capture differences in audit or financial reporting quality, audit fees, going- concern
reporting accuracy, etc. More specific to their involvement in creating IFRS and
corresponding knowledge, the Big 4 auditors provide substantially greater financial
support to the IASB than BDO and Grant Thornton. For example, the Big 4 each
contributed annually from US$2 million in 2008 and 2009 (IASC Foundation, 2008;
2009) to US$2.25 million in 2010, 2011, and 2012 (IFRS Foundation, 2010; 2011; 2012),
while BDO and Grant Thornton contributed only US$150,000 annually in the same years.
Thus, in partitioning the sample based on the most skilled and experienced audit firms, I
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segregate based on whether or not the auditor is one of the Big 4.13 While I do not
differentiate separate hypotheses, my research design considers H2 for the full sample
and, separately, for Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit client sample partitions to assess any
differential impact based on audit firm size.
I next examine whether a more specific measurement of the auditor’s expertise in
auditing IFRS financial statements, as described in more detail later, can explain the
change in the IFRS-related fee premium. Part of the model employed by Kim et al.
(2012) to predict changes in audit fees after IFRS adoption includes auditor effort. Salterio
(1994) finds that auditor efficiency and effectiveness improve over time, despite the less
than ideal nature of the audit as a learning environment. As application of IFRS becomes
more widespread, there is an increase in client demand for IFRS-related audit services.
If the market is highly concentrated among Big 4 auditors, the IFRS-related fee premium
may be at least partially attributable to such expertise. I state the following hypothesis,
in the alternative form, to test this supposition:
H3A: The auditor’s experience in auditing IFRS financial statements is
positively associated with the change in audit service fees surrounding
IFRS adoption.
On the other hand, as the market becomes less concentrated and smaller auditors acquire
the skills and knowledge necessary to audit IFRS financial statements, auditors with
relevant experience may adjust their pricing and pass along the benefits of this

13

The sample size of firms that use BDO or Grant Thornton is too small to be included as a separate
partition. However, untabulated univariate comparisons suggest that the change in audit fees in the year of
IFRS adoption for clients of these two firms is more closely related to non-Big 4 auditors. In additional
tests, I examine how my results differ if I partition audit firm size based on the Global 6.
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competitive advantage to the client in the form a more efficient and, therefore, potentially
less costly audit. Accordingly, I state the next hypothesis in the alternative form:
H3B: In more recent years, the auditor’s experience in auditing IFRS
financial statements is negatively associated with the change in audit
service fees surrounding IFRS adoption.
2.3 Research Design
2.3.1 Model: The Change in Audit Service Fees
In this analysis, I first test if the change in audit service fees related to IFRS
adoption changes over time. To draw more reliable inferences, I then separately test for
the same effect using a control group of firms that did not switch accounting standards
during the sample period. The treatment group consists of the client firms’ first year of
IFRS reporting, determined using data from Worldscope. I then form a control sample of
firms that did not switch accounting standards during the sample period. Since my analysis
spans a period of time, it is impractical to form such a control sample on condition
that firms apply non-IFRS accounting standards because nearly all firms will

have

adopted IFRS toward the end of the sample period. However, many countries,
particularly in the E.U., permitted early adoption of IFRS. Therefore, I form a control
sample based on firms that previously adopted IFRS.14
As described below, my analysis uses the change in audit service fees as the
dependent variable. While major changes in accounting regulations are likely to result in
increased audit fees, the results of previous studies (e.g., Kim et al., 2012; DeGeorge et
14

Such an approach has been used in current international accounting research (e.g., Lin, Riccardi, and
Wang, 2012; Barth, Landsman, Lang, and Williams, 2013).
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al., 2013) do not provide insights into how many years after IFRS adoption the increased
audit fees persist. Other literature examines audit fees after the introduction of SOX in
the United States (e.g., Ettredge, Scholz, and Li, 2007), and the results suggest that audit
fees are higher for two years after the initial regulation implementation before returning
to pre-SOX levels. Following this logic, a firm-year qualifies for inclusion in the control
group in my analysis if the firm has applied IFRS for at least five years.15 By the fourth
year of application of IFRS (year t+3, where t = the adoption year), audit fees should
have returned to near normal levels, but the change in audit fees may still be affected by
higher audit fees in the previous year (t+2). This effect is negated by the fifth year.
After forming the appropriate treatment and control samples, I follow DeGeorge
et al. (2013) and estimate the following OLS regression model in a change-specific form
as a variant of traditional audit fee models, controlling for factors found to be significant
in prior audit fee research (see meta-analysis by Hay and Knechel, 2006), to empirically
test H2.
AUDFEES i,t = 0 1 POSTi,t 2 IFRS _ EXPi,t 3 POST * IFRS _ EXPi,t
 4 SIZEi,t 5 INVREC i,t 6 QUICKi,t
 7 ACCRUALi,t 8 DEBTi,t  9 ROAi,t 

10 NUMSEGi,t 11LOSS
 13QUAL NEWi,t

NEWi,t  12 PROFIT

NEWi,t 

 14C
LEAN

15 BIG SWITCHi,t SWITCHi,t
  16
  17USLI
SMALL

STi,t

 18VOLUNi,t  19 REGQi,t COUNTRY i,t
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NEWi,t

(2)

15

This approach inherently allows for firms to be included in the treatment group in an earlier year and in
the control group in later years (e.g., a firm that adopts IFRS in 2004 can be in the control group beginning
in 2008). Disallowing this has no effect on my results.
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In Equation (2), the prefix Δ denotes that the variable is measured as the change from
year t-1 to year t. Audit fee data is obtained from Thompson Reuters Fundamentals,
which provides detailed data on fees paid to the audit firm. Upon inspection of the annual
reports for IFRS adopting firms, I find that firms disclose audit-related fees as “paid to
the auditor in relation to the adoption and implementation of IFRS” or else provide
similar descriptions in the footnotes of the audit fee remuneration in the years
surrounding IFRS adoption. Thus, AUDFEES is measured as the natural log of the sum of
audit service fees plus audit-related fees of firm i in year t.16
In Equation (2), the variables of interest are POST, IFRS_EXP, and
POST*IFRS_EXP. POST is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-years ending after
11/30/2006 and zero otherwise. The coefficient on POST captures any time-varying trend
in the change in audit service fees related to IFRS adoption. I follow the same logic for
coding this variable as what is described in the first essay. For treatment firms, I predict a
negative coefficient on POST. I interpret the difference between the associated effects of
the parameter estimates of POST between treatment and control firms as the change in
the IFRS-related fee premium over time. IFRS_EXP is my measure of the auditor’s
experience in auditing IFRS financial statements used to empirically test H3A and H3B,
operationalized as the total assets of firm i’s auditor’s clients that report under IFRS

16

I also compare the effect of the change in audit fees with the change in total fees. It is possible that firms
may classify fees related to IFRS adoption as “consulting” or “other fees.” To alleviate this concern, I form
a stratified random sample of 200 firms and analyze the annual reports in the year before and the year of
IFRS adoption. Among firm-years with available disclosures, 68% indicate that fees paid to the auditor
related to IFRS adoption are classified either separately as “audit-related fees” or are included in “audit
service fees,” whereas only 7% specifically state that IFRS-related fees are included as “consulting,”
“nonaudit,” or “other” fees.
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divided by the total assets of all firms reporting under IFRS.17 A significantly positive
coefficient on IFRS_EXP would lend support to H3A, while a negative and significant
coefficient on the interaction term POST*IFRS_EXP supports the prediction of H3B.
I include SIZE, measured as the natural log of total assets, to control for client
size. To control for audit complexity, I include INVREC, ACCRUAL, and NUMSEG.
INVREC is measured as the sum of inventory and receivables scaled by total assets.
ACCRUAL is the absolute value of total accruals, with accruals measured as net income
minus cash flows from operations. NUMSEG is the natural log of one plus the number of
geographic and business segments. I include QUICK and DEBT, measured as the ratio of
current assets less inventory to current liabilities and total liabilities to total assets,
respectively, to control for loss exposure. To control for audit risk, I include ROA,
measured as net income divided by total assets, and change-specific variables for losses
by the client and qualified audit opinions. LOSS_NEW is an indicator variable equal to
one if firm i reports a net loss in year t and net income in year t-1, and zero otherwise.
PROFIT_NEW is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i reports net income in year t
and a net loss in year t-1, and zero otherwise. QUAL_NEW is an indicator variable equal
to one if firm i receives a qualified audit opinion in year t and a clean audit opinion in
year t-1, and zero otherwise. CLEAN_NEW is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i
receives a clean audit opinion in year t and a qualified audit opinion year t-1, and zero
otherwise.

17

There are 26 countries represented in the main sample, whereas I use the data of client firms in 60
countries to construct this metric in order to effectively capture the auditors’ exposure to IFRS financial
statements.
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I also include control variables to capture the change in fees when firms switch
auditors. BIG_SWITCH is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i switched from a
non-Big 4 auditor to a Big 4 auditor in year t and zero otherwise. SMALL_SWITCH is an
indicator variable equal to one if firm i switched from a Big 4 auditor to a non-Big 4
auditor in year t and zero otherwise. I include USLIST to control for exposure to the
higher regulatory environment in the U.S. I include VOLUN to control for any differences
between voluntary and mandatory adopters of IFRS. Finally, I include variables for
regulatory quality, REGQ, and country fixed-effects to control for country-level
variability.
I expect positive coefficients on ΔSIZE, ΔINVREC, ΔDEBT, ΔNUMSEG,
LOSS_NEW, QUAL_NEW, BIG_SWITCH, ΔUSLIST, and REGQ and negative
coefficients on ΔQUICK, ΔROA, PROFIT_NEW, CLEAN_NEW, and SMALL_SWITCH. I
do not make directional predictions for ΔACCRUALS or VOLUN.
As an additional test, I partition the sample into Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit clients.
Having a global presence and collectively controlling a large share of the public audit
market (Carson, 2009), Big 4 auditors are most highly qualified to provide clients with
services necessary to assist in the preparation of IFRS financial statements. In all years in
my sample period, Big 4 auditors rank in the top decile of IFRS_EXP, whereas there is
much wider variation in non-Big 4 auditors. Thus, dividing the sample in this way
separates the audit firms most experienced in auditing IFRS financial statements from
those with less and varying levels of experience.
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After dividing the sample accordingly,18 I modify Equation (2) and estimate the
following OLS regression model separately for Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit clients and
separately for the treatment and control groups in order to further test H2:
AUDFEES i,t

= 0 1 POSTi,t 2 SIZEi,t 3 INVREC i,t 4 QUICKi,t

(3)

 5 ACCRUALi,t 6 DEBTi,t 7 ROAi,t 8 NUMSEGi,t
 9 LOSS NEWi,t 10 PROFIT

11QUAL NEWi,t 12CLEAN

NEWi,t 
NEWi,t 13 AUDSWITCHi,t

 14USLISTi,t 15VOLUNi,t 16 REGQi,t COUNTRY i,t
In Equation (3), POST is the variable of interest, capturing the change in the IFRS-related
audit fee premium over the specified cutoff period. I exclude IFRS_EXP in this model
because the partition based on audit firm size effectively separates the most experienced
auditors with the highest market share of IFRS clients (i.e., the Big 4). For treatment
firms, I predict a negative coefficient on POST and expect differences in the change in
audit service fees to be greater for Big 4, compared to non-Big 4, audit clients.
2.3.2 The Change in Audit Service Fees versus Total Fees
Although I employ a control sample to capture any time-varying effect in the
change in audit service fees, this approach cannot completely rule out the possibility that
my tests detect such an effect that is not related to changes in the audit market. A major
concern, for example, is that the years included as POST=1 overlap the global financial
crisis, which may impact the change in audit fees charged by the auditor regardless of
audit firm size or client characteristics.

18

In dividing the sample based on audit firm size for this test, I delete firms that switched from a Big 4 to a
non-Big 4 auditor, or vice versa.
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To further address this possibility, I perform an additional test to estimate
Equations (2) and (3) for treatment firms with the dependent variable ΔTOTFEES,
measured as the change in the natural log of total fees paid to the auditor.19 I then
compare the coefficients on the variables of interest in each sample partition between the
models estimated using ΔAUDFEES and ΔTOTFEES. If there are macroeconomic shocks
to the audit market over my sample period, then auditors’ fees should be affected at every
level, ceteris paribus. This approach mitigates concerns that my tests fail to control for
any time-varying factors that may have resulted in a declining trend in the change in audit
service fees not associated with IFRS adoption.20
To the extent that results differ, this also motivates my choice to use audit fee data
from Thompson Reuters Fundamentals, despite the smaller coverage, rather than the
alternative of using total fees reported in Worldscope. Although Kim et al. (2012) use
total fees from Worldscope to infer whether or not IFRS adoption impacts audit fees, this
measure may capture fees paid for services unrelated to adoption of IFRS, and the
authors acknowledge this data limitation.

19

My measure of total fees is reported in Worldscope and defined as “Total Fees Paid to the Auditor.”
Because Worldscope has a wider coverage of firms than Thompson Reuters Fundamentals, the sample sizes
are, in some specifications, significantly different. To draw more comparable inferences, I repeat this
analysis using only firms that are covered by both Worldscope and Thompson Reuters Fundamentals so
that the same observations are included in both the tests of the change in audit service fees and the change
in total fees. Results are qualitatively similar to those reported.
20

An ideal approach would to be compare the model estimated using the change in audit fees against a
separate test using the change in nonaudit fees. I collect audit service fee data from Thompson Reuters
Fundamentals and total fee data from Worldscope, rendering the above approach impractical for two
reasons. First, specific data on nonaudit fees is less available than that of audit service fees for the sample
used in this study due to various disclosure requirements. Second, since the two types of data are extracted
from different sources, the sample with coverage in both, which would allow manual computation of
nonaudit fees, is relatively smaller.
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2.4 Data and Sample Selection
The sample selection procedures for the tests in this essay are similar to those
employed in the first essay, with two additional criteria. First, I require auditor fee data
availability, and delete observations with missing data. Second, observations included in
the control group must be in at least their fifth year of IFRS reporting; as a result, the
control sample is much smaller than that used in the first essay.
I begin by obtaining a sample of publicly-listed firms available in Worldscope
from 2004 through 2011. The coverage of firms in Worldscope extends to smaller
companies and those listed in less regulated markets, whereas the alternative of Global
Vantage contains only the largest and most prominent firms. I form my initial sample
after coding the year of IFRS adoption for treatment firms based on reported accounting
standards data. I exclude firms in certain Asian countries (China, Hong Kong, Singapore,
Malaysia, and Thailand), despite the use of IFRS, for two reasons. First, for firms in
China, adoption of IFRS was a gradual rather than immediate process; that is, Chinese
accounting standards converged with IFRS over time. Similarly, while local GAAP in
Hong Kong are nearly identical to IFRS, the effective implementation dates of individual
standards differ from the initial reported year of IFRS adoption. Second, the reporting
environment in these countries is significantly different from other parts of the world.
Despite a legal system of common law origin, the incentives of managers and auditors
diverge from the western world due to differences in enforcement, family ownership, and
government control (Ball, Robin, and Wu, 2003).
I delete observations with missing auditor information, since all of my tests require
this data to code auditor switches, and those with SIC codes 6000-6999 due to the
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differing operating characteristics of financial institutions. All data other than the firm’s
auditor and audit fee data are obtained from Worldscope, and I delete observations with
missing financial data used to construct control variables. Audit firm and audit fee data
are obtained from Thompson Reuters Fundamentals.
Panel A of Table 2-1 summarizes the selection procedure for the sample used in
subsequent analyses. In Panel B, I provide sample distributions by country and by year.
Overall, the sample distributions are similar to those noted in the first essay, Australia,
Canada, Korea, and the United Kingdom each contributing more observations to the
overall sample than other, smaller countries due to fee data availability. For the
breakdown by year, the control sample is distributed evenly with 10-15% of the total
observations in each year. For adopting firms, there are larger proportions in 2005 and
2006 due to the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the E.U. and in 2011 due to the mandatory
adoption of IFRS in Canada and Korea.21 The treatment (control) sample used for the
change in audit fee test consists of 2,181 (9,015) firm-year observations.
In Panel A of Table 2-2, I report descriptive statistics for variables used in the
analysis of the change in audit fees for the full sample. The change in audit service fees
(ΔAUDFEES) is significantly greater (p < 0.001) for treatment observations. Although
the difference in the change in size is not significant between treatment and control
groups, significant differences exist across other dimensions. None of these univariate
results are troubling, since changes in firms’ operating characteristics may be substantial
in the year of IFRS adoption. There is also not a significant difference in REGQ between
21

Ending the sample period in 2010 and, as a result, excluding Canada and Korea from the treatment
samples does not impact my results.
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the two samples, suggesting that treatment and control observations are similar in terms
of this country-level characteristic. In Panel B, I report variable characteristics for the
change in audit fee analysis for the non-Big 4 and Big 4 client subsamples. Inferences are
similar compared to the full sample, except that Big 4 clients in the treatment group are
significantly (p < 0.001) larger than observations in the control group.
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Results: The Change in Audit Service Fees
I next provide empirical results for the change in audit fee tests from estimation of
Equations (2) and (3) separately for the treatment and control samples. Table 2-3 reports
the results for comparing the trend of the change in audit fees for the full sample of
treatment and control firms. The overall model is highly significant (F = 50.33 and F =
77.38 for treatment and control firms, respectively) and the explanatory power is
appropriate for change-specified audit fee models (R2 = 44.89% and R2 = 23.37% for
treatment and control firms, respectively). Results suggest that there is a decline in the
change in audit service fees in the year of IFRS adoption, as the coefficient on POST is
negative and significant (p < 0.05) for firms that adopt IFRS, but insignificant for control
firms. For treatment firms, the coefficient on POST of -0.1511 translates into a -14.03%
difference in the change in audit fees over the specified time period; conversely, the
effect of non-adopting firms is only -4.59%.22 These results suggest a change of -9.44%
to the IFRS-related fee premium, computed as the difference between these two effects.
Thus, I find support for H2 that the IFRS-related fee premium has declined in more

22

The associated effect of the coefficients can be obtained by applying exp(δ1) – 1.
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recent years. This effect may be at least partially attributable to an increase in
competition among audit firms due to changes in the market concentration, as reported in
the previous essay.
The other variables of interest are IFRS_EXP and POST*IFRS_EXP, capturing
the effect of the auditor’s experience in auditing IFRS financial statements and changes
in this effect over time, respectively. As expected, and in support of H3A, the coefficient
on IFRS_EXP is positive and significant (p < 0.05) for treatment firms, providing
empirical evidence that audit firms with greater exposure to IFRS financial statements
charge a premium for their services in the year of IFRS adoption. However, the
coefficient on POST*IFRS_EXP is negative and marginally significant (p < 0.10). This
suggests that in more recent years, audit firms with greater experience in auditing IFRS
financial statements attempt to reduce the change in audit service fees surrounding IFRS
adoption. This is consistent with H3B that as the audit market becomes less concentrated,
firms with greater knowledge of IFRS financial statements pass along this benefit to their
clients in the form of lower fees in order to remain competitive. Both of these variables
produce insignificant coefficients for the control sample, suggesting that the effect is
attributable only to firms adopting IFRS.
For both treatment and control firms, all of the significant control variables are in
the predicted direction. The annual change in audit service fees is positively associated
with changes in client size (ΔSIZE) and complexity (ΔINVREC, ΔTOTSEG), loss
exposure (ΔDEBT), receipt of a qualified audit opinion (QUAL_NEW), switches to a
larger auditor (BIG_SWITCH), cross-listing in U.S. markets (USLIST), and regulatory
quality (REGQ), while a negative association is found for changes in liquidity
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(ΔQUICK), changes in profitability (ΔROA, PROFIT_NEW), the receipt of a clean audit
opinion after receiving a qualified audit opinion (CLEAN_NEW), and switches to a smaller
auditor (SMALL_SWITCH). ΔACCRUALS is negatively associated with the change in
audit fees. In addition, the change in audit fees surrounding IFRS adoption is lower for
voluntary adopters, as the coefficient on VOLUN is negative and significant (p
< 0.001) for treatment firms. This could be due to either lower levels of regulatory
compliance before IFRS is mandated in a particular country or to concurrent changes in
enforcement surrounding the mandatory adoption of IFRS (e.g., Christensen, Hail, and
Leuz, 2013).
Table 2-4, Panel A reports the results of estimating Equation (3) for the Big 4
client sample partition. Again, the model is highly significant (F = 30.04 and F = 33.71
for treatment and control firms, respectively) and explanatory power is consistent with
change-specified audit fee models in prior literature (R2 = 43.83% and R2 = 16.71% for
treatment and control firms, respectively). For the treatment sample, the coefficient on
the variable of interest, POST, remains negative and significant (p < 0.05). The same
variable is not significant at conventional levels for the control sample. The parameter
estimate on POST of -0.0745 for IFRS adopting firms translates into a -7.18% difference
in the change in audit fees over the specified time period, while the same coefficient for
treatment firms of -0.0245 equates to a difference of -2.42%. Thus, the decline in the
annual change in audit service fees is 4.76% greater for firms that adopt IFRS relative to
control firms.
Panel B of Table 2-4 reports results for the non-Big 4 client sample partition.
Again, the coefficient on POST is negative and significant (p < 0.001). However, this
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result applies to both treatment and control firms. Thus, there appears to be some timevarying factor impacting the change in non-Big 4 auditors’ fees beyond changes in the
market for IFRS-related audit services. This is also apparent when comparing the
associated effects of the two parameter estimates. For treatment firms, the coefficient of 0.0518 is equal to a decline in the change in audit fees over time of -5.05%. For control
firms, the coefficient of -0.0394 translates into a -3.87% difference in the change in audit
fees over time. The difference between the two is only 1.18%, which is smaller than the
corresponding difference for Big 4 auditors. The differentiated results suggest that H2
holds only for Big 4 auditors.
For both treatment and control firms, and for both Big 4 and non-Big 4 clients,
nearly all of the significant control variables are in the expected direction and inferences
are similar to those drawn from the reported results for the full sample. The only significant
control variable which is contrary to expectations is LOSS_NEW for non-Big 4 clients in
the treatment group, though the coefficient is only marginally significant (p < 0.10). A
possible explanation is that smaller auditors may be more likely to reduce audit fees for
clients in times of financial distress in order to secure payment, rather than increasing
fees due to greater risk as with Big 4 auditors.
Overall, the results reported in this section support my hypotheses that the fee
premium related to IFRS adoption has declined over time. Although not unexpected, this
holds only for Big 4 auditors. I also find evidence that experience in auditing IFRS
financial statements is positively associated with the change in audit fees in the year of
IFRS adoption in earlier years, consistent with the argument that the IFRS-related fee
premium is higher when these services are provided by fewer firms. Conversely, more
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experienced firms charge a lower fee premium for services in the year of IFRS adoption
for clients more recently adopting IFRS, which I attribute to an increase in competition
among auditors.
2.5.2 Results: The Change in Audit Service Fees versus the Change in Total Fees
Although I assess the change in audit service fees over time using a control
sample, there remains the possibility that some other factor influences the change in audit
fees surrounding IFRS adoption over time that is not controlled for in my tests. As a
means to mitigate this concern, I compare the results of the model estimated using the
change in audit service fees, as reported in the previous section, with the alternative
dependent variable of change in total fees paid to the auditor.
The results for the full sample are reported in Table 2-5. After changing the
dependent variable to the change in total fees paid to the auditor, the coefficient on POST
becomes positive, but insignificant. The associated effect equates to an increase of 5.08%,
compared to a decrease of -14.03% for the model estimated using change in audit fees.
Thus, the trend in the change in audit fees in the year of IFRS adoption appears to be
restricted specifically to audit service fees, which further supports H2. Similarly,
IFRS_EXP is not significant at conventional levels, and, interestingly, the interaction
term IFRS_EXP*POST is positive and marginally significant (p < 0.10). Thus, exposure
to IFRS financial statements appears to have a positive association with the change in
total fees paid to the auditor for clients adopting IFRS in more recent years. This may be
due to changes in fees in the year of IFRS adoption related to nonaudit services (e.g.,
consulting or tax compliance) that require still greater experience and expertise of IFRS
not shared by all auditors.
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I also compare results for the subsamples based on auditor size, as reported in
Table 2-6. For Big 4 clients, the coefficient on POST derived from estimating Equation
(3) becomes positive and significant (p < 0.001). Again, this may be caused by other
services provided in the year of IFRS adoption for which the Big 4 audit firms do not
necessarily compete with smaller auditors, such as consulting or tax compliance. The
effect translates into an increase of 5.02%, which further supports H2 that the change in
the IFRS related fee premium is restricted to audit services for Big 4 auditors. For nonBig 4 clients, the coefficient on POST remains negative and is marginally significant (p <
0.10). This implies that the downward trend in the change in audit fees for non-Big 4
clients is due to some factor other than changes to the market for IFRS-related audit
services. Similar inferences are drawn when translating the coefficients into their
respective effects, as there is only a 1.09% difference between the two effects. As with
tests for the change in audit fees between treatment and control firms, I fail to find
support for H2 with respect to non-Big 4 auditors.
Taken together, these results generally support my predictions. The declining
trend in the change in audit fees surrounding IFRS adoption is restricted to audit fees, and
this effect is driven primarily by Big 4 auditors. For non-Big 4 auditors, there is also a
downward trend in the change in total fees in the year of IFRS adoption. Thus, changes in
the market for IFRS-related audit services seem to have primarily affected Big 4 auditors.
This is consistent with my predictions that as the market for IFRS-related audit services
becomes less concentrated, the most experienced firms (i.e., the Big 4) become less able
to demand a large fee premium for their services and instead offer the client a
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comparably less costly audit made possible by their knowledge of IFRS financial
statements.
2.5.3 Sensitivity Tests
I repeat my analyses based on defining large auditors as Global 6 (the Big 4, plus
BDO and Grant Thornton). This makes my results comparable to prior studies (e.g.,
Wieczynska, 2013), and it is also possible that the second tier global auditors were
similarly affected over the sample period. Untabulated results suggest that there are
differences in the results for the tests of the change in audit service fees. For the Global 6
client partition, the coefficient on POST derived from estimating equation (3) for the
treatment sample is equal to -0.0371 and only marginally significant (p < 0.10). For
control firms, the coefficient of -0.0182 is also marginally significant (p < 0.10). Thus,
there appears to be no time-varying difference between adopting and non-adopting client
firms of the collective Global 6, and the difference of their associated effects is only
1.84%. Inferences drawn from the non-Global 6 partition are generally consistent with
the non-Big 4 subsample. The coefficients on POST are more significantly negative (p <
0.001) for this subsample for both treatment and control firms (compared to the non-Big
4 partition), and the difference in the associated effects of these coefficients is only
1.99%. This further supports my initial classification scheme, as the fee impact of BDO
and Grant Thornton appears to be more similar to other non-Big 4 auditors.
An additional concern is that my results could be overstated by measuring the
change in audit service fees from the year before (year t-1) to the year of (year t) IFRS
adoption. In compliance with IFRS 1: First-Time Adoption of International Financial
Reporting Standards, the financial statements for the year prior to IFRS adoption must be
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fully restated to reflect compliance with IFRS, which requires additional audit effort in
the adoption year. To alleviate this concern, I adjust my tests by examining the change
from year t-1 to year t+1. Untabulated results yield similar qualitative inferences,
although the corresponding magnitudes of all effects are reduced. Adjusting the
parameter estimates to their associated effects, similar procedures to those described in
the previous section suggest a decline in the IFRS-related fee premium of 7.73% for the
full sample, 3.81% for the Big 4 client subsample, and 0.89% for the non-Big 4 subsample
(compared to 9.44%, 4.76%, and 1.18%, respectively, when measured from year t-1 to
year t).
2.6 Conclusion
This essay examines how the market for IFRS-related audit services has changed
over time as a result of a global shift in the accounting regime of individual countries
from local standards to IFRS. I examine whether there is a change in the fee premium for
these services over time. Prior studies posit that a concentrated market leads to an expert
advantage in favor of large, global auditors, and that this leads to greater increases in
audit fees in the year of IFRS adoption (Lin and Yen, 2010; Kim et al., 2012). However, I
find a downward trend in the change in audit fees in the year of IFRS adoption. I also
find that this effect is driven at least partially by a change in the association between the
auditor’s exposure to IFRS financial statements and the change in audit fees in the year of
IFRS adoption. These results hold neither for the control sample nor for the change in
total fees paid to the auditor in the year of IFRS adoption for firms in the treatment group.
When I partition the sample based on audit firm size, I find that the above results hold
only for Big 4 clients, suggesting that the largest auditors became less able to charge as
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high a fee premium in the year of IFRS adoption as it becomes more practical for clients
to utilize a smaller auditor.
The above results add to the international auditing literature by providing
evidence on changes to a major cost faced by firms as a result of IFRS adoption, which
has become a popular topic in current research. The results of this essay suggesting that
gradual changes in the audit market have potentially reduced part of the financial impact
associated with IFRS adoption should add to the debate over whether or not the U.S.
should require publicly-listed companies to adopt IFRS. An important caveat of this
study is that I draw these inferences based on a global sample not including U.S. firms.
These results are therefore inconclusive regarding how the U.S. audit market may be
affected following IFRS adoption, especially given the relatively more stringent reporting
environment relative to other countries. In addition, I examine only the initial transition
costs without consideration to subsequent periods. Nevertheless, it is important for
regulators in the U.S. to consider changes in the global audit market over time in addition
to the consequences surrounding more concentrated events (e.g., mandatory IFRS
adoption) in order to draw reliable inferences regarding both positive and negative
outcomes of IFRS adoption in the U.S.
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Table 2-1: Sample Selection and Description - Change in Audit Fees
Panel A: Sample Selection
Firm-Year Observations
Treatment
Control

Sample
Initial Sample#

10,052

28,422

(240)
(1,088)
(710)
(5,833)
2,181

(6,200)
(5,712)
(1,127)
(6,368)
9,015

Less:
Mising audit firm data
Financial firms (SIC Code 6000-6999)
Missing financial data
Missing fee data
Sample used in change in audit fee regression analysis:
Panel B: Sample distribution by country
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Chile
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Korea
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Phillipines
Portugal
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom

Treatment
271
12.4%
11
0.5%
12
0.6%
12
0.6%
395
18.1%
9
0.4%
70
3.2%
61
2.8%
19
0.9%
37
1.7%
21
1.0%
47
2.2%
35
1.6%
21
1.0%
257
11.8%
27
1.2%
34
1.6%
67
3.1%
72
3.3%
18
0.8%
19
0.9%
28
1.3%
18
0.8%
63
2.9%
26
1.2%
531
24.3%
20.8% 2,181 100%

Control
1,366
15.2%
256
2.8%
502
5.6%
19
0.2%
0.0%
265
2.9%
173
1.9%
173
1.9%
659
7.3%
716
7.9%
52
0.6%
55
0.6%
11
0.1%
435
4.8%
0.0%
23
0.3%
145
1.6%
59
0.7%
335
3.7%
155
1.7%
64
0.7%
387
4.3%
287
3.2%
542
6.0%
459
5.1%
1,877
9,015
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100%

Table 2-1 (Continued)
Panel C: Sample distribution by year
Treatment
2004
26
1.2%
2005
493
22.6%
2006
445
20.4%
2007
239
11.0%
2008
182
8.3%
2009
37
1.7%
2010
76
3.5%
2011
683
31.3%
2,181
100%

Control
112
963
925
891
1,095
1,196
1,919
1,914
9,015

1.2%
10.7%
10.3%
9.9%
12.1%
13.3%
21.3%
21.2%
100%

This table summarizes the procedure to select the sample used in the auditor switching analysis. Panel A
details the selection criteria for the treatment (IFRS-adopting) and control (non-adopting) firm-year
observations.
#

The initial sample consists of all publicly-listed firms available from Worldscope from 2004 through 2011
located in the countries listed in Panel B. I first identify treatment (IFRS-adopting) firms based on
accounting standards data in Worldscope, and delete remaining observations with missing accounting
standards data.
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Table 2-2: Descriptive Statistics - Change in Audit Fees
Panel A: Full Sample

Panel B: Sample Partition based on Auditor Size
Non-Big 4 Clients

Treatment

Control

Treatment

Control

Treatment

Control

(n = 2,181)

(n = 9,015)

(n = 823)

(n = 3,225)

(n = 1,192)

(n = 5,220)

Std.
Variable
Test Variables
ΔAUDFEES
POST(%)
Control Variables
ΔSIZE
ΔINVREC
ΔQUICK
ΔACCRUAL
ΔDEBT
ΔROA
ΔNUMSEG
LOSS_NEW (%)
PROFIT_NEW (%)
QUAL_NEW (%)
CLEAN_NEW (%)
BIG_SWITCH (%)
SMALL_SWITCH (%
AUDSWITCH (%)
VOLUN (%)
USLIST (%)
REGQ

Big 4 Clients

Std.

M e an De v.

Mean

0.5112 1.0422
0.8767 0.3288

0.1789 *** 0.7571
0.8804
0.3160

0.0504
-0.0200
-2.0910
-0.0752
-0.0256
-0.0399
0.1035
0.0950
0.0932
0.0938
0.1131
0.0392
0.0308
0.0048
0.0814
1.5038

0.9624
0.1376
9.5533
0.5014
0.3450
0.5495
0.3024
0.2932
0.2907
0.2915
0.3167
0.1941
0.1727
0.0693
0.0899
0.3677

0.0431
-0.0089 ***
-0.7713 ***
-0.0440 ***
-0.0140 **
-0.0406
0.0318 ***
0.0958
0.1044 **
0.0755 ***
0.0730 ***
0.0253 ***
0.0185 ***
0.0446 ***
0.0259 ***
1.5407

De v.

0.7013
0.1036
7.9782
0.4090
0.2541
0.5526
0.2077
0.2943
0.3059
0.2643
0.2601
0.1572
0.1349
0.4971
0.0508
0.3570

Std.
M e an De v.
0.4871 0.8869
0.9398 0.2380
0.0648
-0.0332
-4.0795
-0.2129
-0.1067
-0.2778
0.0820
0.0900
0.0912
0.1223
0.1334
0.1690
0.0741
0.0820
1.5216

1.0070
0.1749
16.700
1.2484
0.7791
1.6398
0.2540
0.2863
0.2880
0.3278
0.3402
0.3749
0.2720
0.2540
0.5221

Mean

Std.

Std.

De v.

M e an De v.

Mean

0.2485 0.7547
0.8194 0.3848

0.1202 *** 0.5539
0.8215
0.3918

0.1078 *** 0.6853
0.9347
0.2228
0.0918
-0.0153 **
-1.9308 ***
-0.1423 **
-0.0374 ***
-0.1038 ***
0.0319 ***
0.0818
0.0911
0.0940 **
0.0824 ***
0.1359 **
0.4993 ***
0.0319 ***
1.5687

0.8301
0.1412
14.389
1.0322
0.5709
1.3496
0.1940
0.2741
0.2877
0.2919
0.2749
0.3427
0.5001
0.1940
0.4935

0.0995
-0.0082
-0.8396
-0.0107
0.0098
-0.0322
0.1155
0.0919
0.0900
0.0719
0.0806
0.1690
0.0741
0.0820
1.5216

0.4763
0.0923
4.0549
0.1807
0.1728
0.2455
0.3269
0.2889
0.2863
0.2584
0.2723
0.3749
0.2720
0.2540
0.5221

Std.

0.0399 ***
-0.0031 **
-0.2131 ***
-0.0098
-0.0046 ***
-0.0352
0.0312 ***
0.0988
0.1107 **
0.0617
0.0624 **
0.0548 **
0.3994 ***
0.0399 ***
1.5249

De v.

0.3575
0.0690
3.2898
0.1650
0.1366
0.2229
0.2040
0.2984
0.3138
0.2406
0.2419
0.2275
0.4898
0.0630
0.4783

This table presents descriptive statistics for variables used in my analysis of the change in audit fees in the year of IFRS adoption. Treatment observations
are years in which firms adopt IFRS. Control observations include years in which firms applied IFRS, having adopted at least five years earlier. I provide
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data for the full sample (Panel A) and clients of non-Big 4 and Big 4 auditors (Panel B). A percentage sign (%) following the name of dichotomous variables
denotes that that mean value represents the proportion of firms for which the variable is equal to one. The prefix Δ indicates that the variable is measured as
the change from year t-1 to year t.
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Table 2-2 (Continued)
AUDFEE is equal to the natural log of the sum of audit plus audit-related fees. POST is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-years ending after
11/30/2006 and zero otherwise. SIZE is measured as the natural log of total assets. INVREC is the sum of inventory and receivables scaled by total assets.
QUICK is the quick ratio, measured as the sum of current assets less inventory divided by current liabilities. ACCRUAL is total accruals, measured as net
income less cash flows from operations. DEBT is the debt ratio, measured as total liabilities divided by total assets. ROA is equal to net income scaled by
total assets. NUMSEG is measured as the natural log of one plus the number of total operating segments. LOSS_NEW is an indicator variable equal to one for
firms reporting net income in year t-1 and a net loss in year t, and zero otherwise. PROFIT_NEW is equal to one for firms reporting net income in year t and
a net loss in year t-1, and zero otherwise. QUAL_NEW is an indicator variable equal to one for firms that receive a clean audit opinion in year t-1 and a
qualified opinion in year t, and zero otherwise. CLEAN_NEW is equal to one for firms receiving a clean audit opinion in year t and a qualified audit opinion
in year t-1. BIG_SWITCH is an indicator variable for firms switching from a non-Big 4 to a Big 4 auditor in year t, and zero otherwise. SMALL_SWITCH is
an indicator variable equal to one for firms that switch from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4 auditor in year t, and zero otherwise. AUDSWITCH is equal to one for
firms that switched auditors from year t-1 to year t. VOLUN is an indicator variable for firm-years ending before the mandatory adoption of IFRS in firm i's
country of domicile. USLIST is an indicator variable equal to one for firms cross-listed in U.S. capital markets. REGQ is an index variable capturing each
country's regulatory quality, as measured by Kaufmann et al. (2009).
All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level.
*, **, *** denote statistically significant differences between treatment and control observations at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (based on two-tailed pvalue), respectively.
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Table 2-3: The Change in Audit Fees for Treatment versus Control Groups
Dep Var = ΔAUDFEES
Variable
Intercept
POST
IFRS_EXP
POST*IFRS_EXP
ΔLNTA
ΔINVREC
ΔQUICK
ΔACCRUAL
ΔDEBT
ΔROA
ΔTOTSEG
LOSS_NEW
PROFIT_NEW
QUAL_NEW
CLEAN_NEW
BIG_SWITCH
SMALL_SWITCH
US LIST
VOLUN
REGQ
Country Fixed-effects
Model
Adjusted R2

Exp.
?
+
+
+
?
+
+
+
+
+
+
?
+

Treatment Sample
(n = 2,181)
Estimate Sig
0.0279 ***
-0.1511 **
0.0040 **
-0.0032 *
0.4984 ***
0.0183 *
-0.0012 ***
-0.0799 ***
0.0195 **
-0.0817 ***
-0.0054
-0.0599
-0.0711 *
0.0906 **
-0.1114 ***
0.1946 ***
-0.3974 ***
0.0321 *
-0.2594 ***
0.1644 ***
Yes
F = 50.33
44.89%

Control Sample
(n = 9,015)
Estimate Sig
0.4430 ***
-0.0470
-0.0026
0.0035
0.3543 ***
0.0003 ***
-0.0004
-0.0007 ***
0.0002 ***
-0.0012 ***
0.1937 ***
0.0001
-0.0262 *
0.1017 ***
-0.0704 ***
0.0412 *
-0.4557 ***
0.0834 **
0.0125
0.0849 ***
Yes
F = 77.38
23.37%

This table presents the results of estimating Equation (2) to test for the change in audit fees for treatment
(IFRS adopting) and control (non-adopting) firms. The dependent variable, ΔAUDFEES, is measured as the
change in the natural log of audit plus audit-related fees.
POST is an indicator variable equal to one for observations after 11/30/2006, and zero otherwise. IFRS_EXP
is measured as the auditor's market share of IFRS client assets, computed using an expanded sample.
ΔLNTA is measured as the annual change in the natural log of total assets. ΔINVREC is measured as the
annual change in the sum of inventory plus receivables, scaled by total assets. ΔQUICK is measured as the
annual change in the quick ratio, measured as current assets (less inventory) divided by current liabilities.
ΔACCRUAL is measured as the annual change in total accruals, measured as net income less cash flows
from operating activities. ΔDEBT is measured as the annual change in the debt ratio, measured as total
liabilities divided by total assets. ΔROA is measured as the annual change in net income scaled by total
assets. ΔTOTSEG is measured as the change in the natural log of one plus the number of total business
segments. LOSS_NEW is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i reported a profit in year t-1 and a loss
in year t, and zero otherwise. PROFIT_NEW is equal to one if firm i reported a loss in year t-1 and a profit
in year t, and zero otherwise. QUAL_NEW is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i received a clean
audit opinion in year t-1 and a qualified audit opinion in year t, and zero otherwise. CLEAN_NEW is equal
to one if firm i received a qualified audit opinion in year t-1 and a clean audit opinion in year t, and zero
otherwise. BIG_SWITCH is equal to one for switches from a non-Big 4 to a Big 4 auditor, and zero
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Table 2-3 (Continued)
otherwise. SMALL_SWITCH is equal to one for switches from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4 auditor, and zero
otherwise. USLIST is an indicator variable equal to one for firms cross-listed in U.S. markets. VOLUN is an
indicator variable equal to one if year t is before the mandatory adoption of IFRS in firm i's country of
origin. REGQ is an index variable capturing the regulatory quality across countries (Kaufmann et al.,
2009).
All
continuous
variables
are
winsorized
at
the
top
and
bottom
1%
level.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (based on one-tailed p-values),
respectively.
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Table 2-4: The Change in Audit Fees for Treatment and Control Groups, Big 4 and non-Big 4 Partitions

Dep Var = ΔAUDFEES

Variable
Intercept
POST
ΔLNTA
ΔINVREC
ΔQUICK
ΔACCRUAL
ΔDEBT
ΔROA
ΔTOTSEG
LOSS_NEW
PROFIT_NEW
QUAL_NEW
CLEAN_NEW
AUDSWITCH
USLIST
VOLUN
REGQ

Exp.
?
+
+
?
+
+
+
+
+/+
?
+

Country Fixed-Effects
Model
2
Adjusted R

Panel A: Big 4 Clients
Treatment Sample
Control Sample
(n = 1,192)

(n = 5,220)

Estimate Sig
-0.2004 **
-0.0745 **
0.6015 ***
-0.0134
-0.0015 *
0.0012
-0.0931
-0.1888 ***
-0.0210
0.0516 *
0.0007
0.0227 **
-0.0233
-0.0761 *
0.0873 *
-0.1823 ***
0.1669 ***

Estimate Sig
0.0763 *
-0.0245
0.4034 ***
0.0041 **
-0.0020 ***
0.0152 ***
-0.0021 **
-0.0093 ***
0.1085 ***
-0.0007
-0.0190
0.0750 ***
-0.0320 *
-0.1922 ***
0.0565 *
0.0087
-0.0469

Yes
F = 30.04

Yes
F = 33.71

43.83%

16.71%
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Panel A: Non-Big 4 Clients
Treatment Sample
Control Sample
(n = 823)
Estimate Sig
0.6752 ***
-0.0518 ***
0.1399 ***
0.0085
-0.0012 **
-0.0231 *
0.0021
-0.0231 *
-0.0668
-0.1794 ***
-0.0620
0.1395 ***
-0.0547
0.0365
0.1154 *
-0.0709
0.1581 ***
Yes
F = 15.29
22.35%

(n = 3,225)
Estimate Sig
1.0725 ***
-0.0394 ***
0.2494 ***
-0.0022
0.0000
-0.0005 **
0.0002 ***
-0.0009 ***
0.1545 ***
0.0050
-0.0394
0.1186 ***
-0.0858 ***
-0.0813 ***
0.6117 **
0.0082
0.0618 ***
Yes
F = 21.17
16.68%

71

Table 2-4 (Continued)
This table presents the results of estimating Equation (3) to test for the change in audit fees for treatment (IFRS adopting) and control (non-adopting) firms
separately for the Big 4 (Panel A) and non-Big 4 (Panel B) sample partitions. The dependent variable, ΔAUDFEES, is measured as the change in the natural
log of audit plus audit-related fees.
POST is an indicator variable equal to one for observations after 11/30/2006, and zero otherwise. ΔLNTA is measured as the annual change in the natural log
of total assets. ΔINVREC is measured as the annual change in the sum of inventory plus receivables, scaled by total assets. ΔQUICK is measured as the
annual change in the quick ratio, measured as current assets (less inventory) divided by current liabilities. ΔACCRUAL is measured as the annual change in
total accruals, measured as net income less cash flows from operating activities. ΔDEBT is measured as the annual change in the debt ratio, measured as total
liabilities divided by total assets. ΔROA is measured as the annual change in net income scaled by total assets. ΔTOTSEG is measured as the change in the
natural log of one plus the number of total business segments. LOSS_NEW is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i reported a profit in year t-1 and a
loss in year t, and zero otherwise. PROFIT_NEW is equal to one if firm i reported a loss in year t-1 and a profit in year t, and zero otherwise. QUAL_NEW is
an indicator variable equal to one if firm i received a clean audit opinion in year t-1 and a qualified audit opinion in year t, and zero otherwise. CLEAN_NEW
is equal to one if firm i received a qualified audit opinion in year t-1 and a clean audit opinion in year t, and zero otherwise. BIG_SWITCH is equal to one for
switches from a non-Big 4 to a Big 4 auditor, and zero otherwise. SMALL_SWITCH is equal to one for switches from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4 auditor, and
zero otherwise. USLIST is an indicator variable equal to one for firms cross-listed in U.S. markets. VOLUN is an indicator variable equal to one if year t is
before the mandatory adoption of IFRS in firm i's country of origin. REGQ is an index variable capturing the regulatory quality across countries (Kaufmann
et al., 2009).
All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (based on one-tailed p-values), respectively.
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Table 2-5: The Change in Audit Fees versus the Change in Total
Fees, Treatment Group

Variable
Intercept
POST
IFRS_EXP
POST*IFRS_EXP
ΔLNTA
ΔINVREC
ΔQUICK
ΔACCRUAL
ΔDEBT
ΔROA
ΔTOTSEG
LOSS_NEW
PROFIT_NEW
QUAL_NEW
CLEAN_NEW
BIG_SWITCH
SMALL_SWITCH
US LIST
VOLUN
REGQ
Country Fixed-effects
Model
Adjusted R2

Exp.
?
+
+
+
?
+
+
+
+
+
+
?
+

Dep Var = Δ AUDFEES
(n = 2,181)
Estimate Sig
0.0279 ***
-0.1511 **
0.0040 **
-0.0032 *
0.4984 ***
0.0183 *
-0.0012 ***
-0.0799 ***
0.0195 **
-0.0817 ***
-0.0054
-0.0599
-0.0711 *
0.0906 **
-0.1114 ***
0.1946 ***
-0.3974 ***
0.0321 *
-0.2594 ***
0.1644 ***

Dep Var = ΔTOTFEES
(n = 2,540)
Estimate Sig
0.3564 **
0.0496
0.0006
0.0028 *
0.3925 ***
-0.0018 ***
-0.0001 *
0.0051 ***
-0.0037 ***
-0.0077 ***
0.1496 ***
-0.0326
-0.0950 **
0.0400
-0.0603
0.3724 ***
-0.3336 ***
0.1071 **
-0.0994
0.1265

Yes
F = 50.33

Yes
F = 13.25

44.89%

14.79%

This table presents the results of estimating Equation (3) to test for the change in audit fees and the change
in total fees for treatment (IFRS adopting) firms. The dependent variables, ΔAUDFEES and ΔTOTFEES,
are measured as the change in the natural log of audit plus audit-related fees and the change in the natural
log of total audit fees, respectively. POST is an indicator variable equal to one for observations after
11/30/2006, and zero otherwise. IFRS_EXP is measured as the auditor's market share of IFRS client assets,
computed using an expanded sample.
ΔLNTA is measured as the annual change in the natural log of total assets. ΔINVREC is measured as the
annual change in the sum of inventory plus receivables, scaled by total assets. ΔQUICK is measured as the
annual change in the quick ratio, measured as current assets (less inventory) divided by current liabilities.
ΔACCRUAL is measured as the annual change in total accruals, measured as net income less cash flows
from operating activities. ΔDEBT is measured as the annual change in the debt ratio, measured as total
liabilities divided by total assets. ΔROA is measured as the annual change in net income scaled by total
assets. ΔTOTSEG is measured as the change in the natural log of one plus the number of total business
segments. LOSS_NEW is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i reported a profit in year t-1 and a loss
in year t, and zero otherwise. PROFIT_NEW is equal to one if firm i reported a loss in year t-1 and a profit
in year t, and zero otherwise. QUAL_NEW is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i received a clean
audit opinion in year t-1 and a qualified audit opinion in year t, and zero otherwise. CLEAN_NEW is equal
to one if firm i received a qualified audit opinion in year t-1 and a clean audit opinion in year t, and zero
otherwise. BIG_SWITCH is equal to one for switches from a non-Big 4 to a Big 4 auditor, and zero
otherwise. SMALL_SWITCH is equal to one for switches from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4 auditor, and zero
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Table 2-5 (Continued)
otherwise. USLIST is an indicator variable equal to one for firms cross-listed in U.S. markets. VOLUN is an
indicator variable equal to one if year t is before the mandatory adoption of IFRS in firm i's country of
origin. REGQ is an index variable capturing the regulatory quality across countries (Kaufmann et al.,
2009).
All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (based on one-tailed p-values),
respectively.
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Table 2-6: The Change in Audit Fees versus the Change in Total Fees, Treatment Group, Big 4 and non-Big 4 Partitions
Panel A: Big 4 Clients
Dep Var = Δ AUDFEES
Dep Var = ΔTOTFEES
n = 1,192
n = 1,554
Variable
Intercept
POST
CHG_LNTA
CHG_INVREC
CHG_QUICK
CHG_ACCRUAL
CHG_DEBT
CHG_ROA
CHG_SEG
LOSS_NEW
PROFIT_NEW
QUAL_NEW
CLEAN_NEW
AUDSWITCH
USLIST
VOLUN
REGQ

Exp.
?
+
+
?
+
+
+
+
+/+
?
+

Country Fixed-Effects
Model
Adjusted R2

Estimate
-0.2004
-0.0745
0.6015
-0.0134
-0.0015
0.0012
-0.0931
-0.1888
-0.0210
0.0516
0.0007
0.0227
-0.0233
-0.0761
0.0873
-0.1823
0.1669

Sig
**
**
***
*

***
*
**
*
*
***
***

Estimate
0.2960
0.0490
0.5296
0.0019
-0.0001
-0.0034
0.0271
-0.0067
0.0222
0.0433
-0.0849
0.0558
0.1548
-0.2381
-0.0967
0.0307
0.2171

Sig
*
***
***
**
*

*
*
*
*
***

*

Panel A: Non-Big 4 Clients
Dep Var = Δ AUDFEES
Dep Var = ΔTOTFEES
n = 823
n = 826
Estimate Sig
0.6752 ***
-0.0518 ***
0.1399 ***
0.0085
-0.0012 **
-0.0231 *
0.0021
-0.0231 *
-0.0668
-0.1794 ***
-0.0620
0.1395 ***
-0.0547
0.0365
0.1154 *
-0.0709
0.1581 ***

Estimate Sig
0.3402 **
-0.0404 *
0.1973 ***
0.0120 ***
-0.0039 ***
0.0019
0.0027 **
-0.0062 ***
0.1993 ***
-0.1811 **
-0.1940 ***
-0.0266
-0.2381 **
-0.1816 ***
0.3906
-0.1582
0.2391

Yes
F = 30.04

Yes
F = 10.38

Yes
F = 15.29

Yes
F = 5.81

43.83%

16.20%

22.35%

10.31%

This table presents the results of estimating Equation (3) to test for the change in audit fees and the change in total fees for treatment (IFRS adopting) firms
separately for the Big 4 (Panel A) and non-Big 4 (Panel B) sample partitions. The dependent variables, ΔAUDFEES and ΔTOTFEES, are measured as the
change in the natural log of audit plus audit-related fees and the change in the natural log of total audit fees, respectively. POST is an indicator variable equal
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to one for observations after 11/30/2006, and zero otherwise. IFRS_EXP is measured as the auditor's market share of IFRS client assets, computed using an
expanded sample. ΔLNTA is measured as the annual change in the natural log of total assets. ΔINVREC is measured as the annual change in the sum of
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Table 2-6 (Continued)
inventory plus receivables, scaled by total assets. ΔQUICK is measured as the annual change in the quick ratio, measured as current assets (less inventory)
divided by current liabilities. ΔACCRUAL is measured as the annual change in total accruals, measured as net income less cash flows from operating
activities. ΔDEBT is measured as the annual change in the debt ratio, measured as total liabilities divided by total assets. ΔROA is measured as the annual
change in net income scaled by total assets. ΔTOTSEG is measured as the change in the natural log of one plus the number of total business segments.
LOSS_NEW is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i reported a profit in year t-1 and a loss in year t, and zero otherwise. PROFIT_NEW is equal to one
if firm i reported a loss in year t-1 and a profit in year t, and zero otherwise. QUAL_NEW is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i received a clean audit
opinion in year t-1 and a qualified audit opinion in year t, and zero otherwise. CLEAN_NEW is equal to one if firm i received a qualified audit opinion in
year t-1 and a clean audit opinion in year t, and zero otherwise. BIG_SWITCH is equal to one for switches from a non-Big 4 to a Big 4 auditor, and zero
otherwise. SMALL_SWITCH is equal to one for switches from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4 auditor, and zero otherwise. USLIST is an indicator variable equal to
one for firms cross-listed in U.S. markets. VOLUN is an indicator variable equal to one if year t is before the mandatory adoption of IFRS in firm i's country
of origin. REGQ is an index variable capturing the regulatory quality across countries (Kaufmann et al., 2009).
All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (based on one-tailed p-values), respectively.
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CHAPTER 3: DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE BIG 4 GLOBAL NETWORKS
3.1 Introduction
Contemporary advances in multinational strategies of large corporations have led
to a response by large audit firms to establish global networks. As summarized by Carson
(2009, page 358), use of global networks creates several competitive advantages,
including global expertise, superior brand name image, and robust audit methodologies,
and these practices attract clients seeking higher quality audits. Such qualities may be of
greater importance to companies located in emerging markets, where additional emphasis
is sometimes placed on the monitoring role of external auditors (Michas, 2011).
However, published reports by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) in the United States (U.S.) raise concerns about the quality of foreign auditors;
about half of the inspection reports of international audit firms released through 2012 cite
audit deficiencies, while two-thirds report quality control defects (Bishop, Hermanson,
and Houston, 2013). Although fewer of these issues arise for clients audited by members
of the Big 4 global networks, the PCAOB also faces complications in executing
inspections of foreign auditors due to regulatory disagreements between the U.S. and
other jurisdictions. As of the end of 2013, 58 foreign audit firms with publicly-listed U.S.
clients that were not yet inspected, and at least 39 of these were member firms of the Big
4 global networks (Norris, 2014; PCAOB, 2014).
While previous studies conclude that clients are willing to pay global auditors a
premium for their services (Carson, 2009) and that these firms provide higher-quality
audits relative to smaller, local auditors (Francis and Wang, 2008), the extent to which
variation exists within these global networks is unclear. These questions have become
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increasingly important given skepticism by regulators (e.g., PCAOB, 2008). This study
utilizes newly-available data to classify members of the Big 4 global networks as either
“Parent” firms, “Brand Name” affiliates, or “Local” affiliates, as described in more detail
later.23 I first examine if any fee premium exists for these three separate classifications of
the Big 4 auditors, relative to non-Big 4 firms, based on both audit service fees and total
fees paid to the auditor.24 Further, I test whether there are any statistically significant
differences in the premiums of these groups of firms. Second, I examine the extent to
which these three types of auditors provide services of superior quality relative to nonBig 4 auditors, using discretionary accruals to proxy for audit quality. Taken together, the
results of these tests address questions regarding the effectiveness of knowledge-sharing
and other benefits derived from membership within global audit firm networks. The
considerable resources invested by large audit firms to facilitate their international
operations and claims that such investments lead to of superior audit quality draw
particular attention to the issues addressed in this study.
This study is based on a comprehensive sample of publicly-listed companies
located in 26 countries. The results suggest that Big 4 “Parent” firms command the
highest premium over non-Big 4 auditors based on both audit service fees and total fees
paid to the auditor; though premiums exist for both types of affiliate firms, they are lower
than those charged by the “Parent” firms. Though I do find a statistically significant
23

The sample period in this study begins in 2001, before the collapse of Arthur Andersen. Although not
absent from the sample until 2002, for ease of exposition I refer only to the “Big 4,” except when
referencing prior studies.
24

Throughout this study, the terms “fees,” “audit fees,” or “auditor fees” denote a general term irrespective
of data definitions, while “audit service fees” and “total fees paid to the auditor” refer to the respective
classifications based on the types of services provided.
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difference in the audit service fee premium between “Brand Name” and “Local”
affiliates, the premiums based on total fees paid to the auditor are similar. In terms of
audit quality, I find a significant negative association between absolute discretionary
accruals and use of any of these types of auditors. The effect is greatest for Big 4
“Parent” firms, and the results also suggest no difference in levels of discretionary accruals
reported by clients of “Brand Name” compared to “Local” affiliates, despite the
significantly higher fee premiums of the former. Partitioning the sample into client firms
with income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals offers similar
inferences, although only use of a Big 4 “Parent” firm results in significantly lower levels
of negative discretionary accruals. In additional analyses I find some evidence that audit
service fees are positively associated with concurrent levels of audit quality, suggesting
that premiums are derived from offering services of superior quality. Further tests suggest
that impaired auditor independence is not a causal explanation for this effect.
This study offers several contributions to the literature. First, I find that fee
premium differences exist within the Big 4 global network. While prior research
investigating fee premiums treats the Big 4 as a homogeneous group, this is the first study
to dissect and assess differences within the global networks of these firms. In addition,
using competing data sources, the inferences drawn are somewhat sensitive to the choice
of fee measures. In light of the data limitations noted in previous international auditing
studies (e.g., Kim, Liu, and Zheng, 2012), it is particularly important for future research
in this area to carefully consider how results could differ based on the type of auditor fee
data employed. Third, I find that while all three classifications of Big 4 network member
firms provide higher-quality audits than non-Big 4 auditors, differences exist in that
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clients of “Parent” firms report significantly lower levels of discretionary accruals than
clients of either type of affiliate. Given the increased globalization of business,
accounting, and auditing environments, it is important to further our understanding of
variability within the Big 4 global networks. Moreover, given concerns by the PCAOB
regarding the quality of foreign auditors, the results of this study may offer inferences
worthy of further consideration.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior
research relevant to this study and develops research questions. In Section 3, I detail the
research design. Section 4 explains the data and sample selection procedures. I
summarize the empirical results in Sections 5 and 6. I conclude in Section 7 and offer
implications for future research.
3.2 Prior Research & Development of Research Questions
The topic of audit fee premiums charged by large audit firms has drawn
significant attention from researchers throughout the years. In various contexts, prior
studies report significantly higher auditor fees for “Big N” auditors (Francis, 1984;
Palmrose, 1986; Francis and Simon, 1987; Ireland and Lennox, 2002). These premiums
are often explained as resulting from relatively higher quality audits (DeAngelo, 1981).
One common proxy for audit quality is the magnitude of discretionary accruals reported
by clients. While managers can use accruals-based earnings to communicate private
information to outsiders, aggressive reporting of accruals can undermine the intended
improvement in the informativeness of earnings. Auditors serve an important role in
mitigating these agency costs by constraining the opportunistic reporting of accruals, and
prior research generally finds lower levels of discretionary accruals for companies
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audited by “Big N” firms (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyan, 1998; Francis,
Maydew, and Sparks, 1999). Consistent with the viewpoint that the external auditor
serves an important monitoring role, Krishnan (2003) finds that the association between
stock returns and discretionary accruals is greater for companies audited by what were at
that time the “Big 6” accounting firms.
Another proxy for audit quality that focuses on audit firm characteristics, as
opposed to clients’ financial reporting behavior, is industry expertise. Whether or not
industry specialization results in higher levels of audit fees is an issue of contention
within existing research.25 In a sample of publicly-listed Australian firms, Craswell,
Francis, and Taylor (1995) find a positive association between Big 8 industry expertise
and audit service fees, suggesting premiums of 16% over Big 8 non-specialists, although
the results are sensitive to market share cutoffs used in defining industry specialization.
Ferguson and Stokes (2002) present evidence that suggests these premiums decreased
following the subsequent mergers that created the Big 6 and, later, Big 5 audit firms.
Carson (2009) extends prior research in industry specialization to the global level,
asserting that specialization by global audit firm networks adds values to clients,
especially multinational corporations. She finds that significant fee premiums exist for
industry specialists at the national and global level both compared to smaller auditors and
within global audit firm networks. The topic of global audit firm networks has drawn
additional attention in recent years as large auditors make their differentiated
25

Numerous prior studies exist that measure industry specialization using a variety of methods, test the
association between specialization and audit fees in different time periods and countries, and condition
industry expertise at the city level as opposed to the national level. In aggregate, the results of these studies
offer evidence of no association, a positive association, and a negative association between industry
specialization and auditor fees.
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specialization strategies plainly available to clients. Each of the Big 4 auditors discloses
information regarding the benefits of their structure as a global network and, more
specifically,

knowledge-sharing

among member

firms.26 Given

that

statutory

requirements within individual countries often require local member firms within the
networks to be comprised of domestically-licensed practitioners or restrict the use of
international brand names, it is difficult for audit firms to expand into the global market
in the traditional sense. The creation of global networks circumvents this problem by
permitting each of the member firms to operate as separate and independent legal entities.
While Carson (2009) notes that such a “loose” structure may be beneficial to the firm as a
whole due to variable litigation environments in which individual member firms practice,
it remains unclear if member firms of the Big 4 global networks can be treated as a
homogeneous group. In fact, practitioners and regulators have become increasingly
concerned with the international operations of and cooperation within the networks
(Norris, 2008; PCAOB, 2008).
As such, this study differentiates individual firms within the Big 4 global
networks into three categories: “Parent” firms, “Brand Name” affiliates, and “Local”
affiliates (the details of this coding are explained later). It is important to note that the
promotion of these global networks may be constrained by the regulations in individual
countries, where individual audit firms may or may not be permitted to use the parent
entity’s international brand name. Smaller member firms may retain their own identity
while marketing themselves as affiliates of a Big 4. For example, “Ernst & Young LLP”
26

An example of such disclosure is found on Ernst & Young’s website: ‘‘With the development of the
CBK (Center for Business Knowledge), every Ernst & Young employee now has access to the collective
global knowledge and intellectual capital of the firm.’’
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is the primary presence of Ernst & Young Global in Australia, but there is one affiliate in
Tasmania operating as “Wise Lord & Ferguson.” Similarly, PricewaterhouseCoopers has
a large presence in Korea as both “PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP” and “Samil
Accounting Corp.” In addition, affiliates of the Big 4 global networks may be structured
at the national or regional level.
While previous studies offer evidence suggesting that auditor fees are generally
higher for companies audited by the Big 4, the extent to which variation exists among
members of the global networks of these firms has not been addressed. There are at least
two competing hypotheses that lead to this question. If the creation of global networks
has led to effective knowledge management between individual firms and/or employees,
then it is reasonable to expect few differences within the network. Although it is not
possible to directly measure the effectiveness of these systems, clients may perceive the
advantages of engaging a Big 4 auditor without differentiating between member firms. In
this case, while a fee premium relative to non-Big 4 auditors may be observed, it is
unlikely that variation exists within the Big 4 global networks.
An alternative explanation that would introduce variation within these three
classifications is that two of the three operate under the Big 4 brand names. Craswell et
al. (1995) find that Big 8 auditors enjoy a premium of over 30% relative to non-Big 8
auditors, which they attribute to the costly process of developing and sustaining brand
name reputations. To the extent that such a result is generalizable, it may be expected that
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some member firms of the Big 4 global networks enjoy higher premiums than others.
Given these opposing explanations, I state the following two research questions in lieu of
directional hypotheses:
RQ1: Relative to non-Big 4 auditors, do Big 4 “Parent” firms, “Brand Name”
affiliates, and “Local” affiliates exhibit audit fee premiums?
RQ2: Are audit fee premiums similar between Big 4 “Parent” firms, “Brand
Name” affiliates, and “Local” affiliates?
I address these two research questions with consideration to both audit service fees and
total fees paid to the auditor. It is possible that the usefulness of information management
within the Big 4 global networks differs between various types of services. Any
premiums driven by nonaudit services will not be captured using only audit service fees.
Similar arguments exist with respect to audit quality. Although uniform standards
exist within each of the Big 4 global networks with respect to standards of quality aimed
at governing the operations, services, and competitiveness of each firm within the
network, each member firm is ultimately responsible for enforcing these network-wide
policies.27 If one accepts that member firms within the Big 4 global networks operate
under identical standards, then there should be little-to-no variation in the quality of
services offered. Again, it is impossible to directly observe these internal processes. And
as with fee premiums, it is possible that individual firms operating under a reputable

27

For example, KPMG’s transparency report (2013) states: “Under agreements with KPMG International,
member firms are required to comply with KPMG International’s policies and regulations including quality
standards governing how they operate and how they provide services to entities to compete
effectively…Each member firm takes responsibility for its management and the quality of its work.”
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brand name strive to offer services of superior quality, even within their own or similar
networks.
Using discretionary accruals as a proxy for audit quality, I assess whether each of
the three different classifications member firms within the Big 4 global networks provide
higher-quality audits than non-Big 4 auditors. Specifically, I address the following
research question:
RQ3: Relative to non-Big 4 auditors, do Big 4 “Parent” firms, “Brand Name”
affiliates, and “Local” affiliates provide audits of superior quality?
Although there is little reason to expect lower audit quality for any of these types of
auditors relative to non-Big 4 firms, variation may be present.
RQ4: Are the differences in audit quality between the different classifications of
Big 4 member firms and non-Big 4 auditors similar?
3.3 Research Design
3.3.1 Model: Audit Fee Premiums of the Big 4 and Affiliate Firms
To address the first research question and test the audit fee premium of Big 4
“Parent” firms and affiliates, I pool all observations in the sample and estimate the
following OLS regression models that control for factors identified in prior research as
being associated with audit fees or to capture cross-country differences that may affect
audit pricing.
ln(FEE )i,t =

1 2 SIZEi,t 3CATAi,t 4 LOSSi,t 5 DEBTi,t 6 QUALi,t
 7 ROAi,t  8 AUDSWITCHi,t 9 REGQi,t  10 ACCTSTNDi,t
  11USLISTi,t 12 Big 4i,t 13 Named _ Affiliate i,t 
14 Local _ Affiliate i,t COUNTRY YEAR i,t
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(4)

In Equation (4) the dependent variable ln(FEE) is defined the natural log of either of
audit service fees (AUDFEE) or total fees paid to the auditor (TOTFEE) by firm i in
period t.28
SIZE

= the natural log of total assets;

CATA

= the ratio of current assets to total assets;

LOSS

= an indicator variable equal to one if firm i reports a loss in period t,
and zero otherwise

DEBT

= the ratio of total liabilities to total assets;

QUAL

= an indicator variable equal to one if firm i receives a qualified audit
opinion in period t, and zero otherwise;

ROA

= net income before extraordinary and preferred dividends divided
by total assets;

AUDSWITCH

= an indicator variable equal to one if firm i switches to a new
auditor in period t, and zero otherwise;

REGQ

= an index variable capturing the regulatory quality of firm i’s
country of domicile (Kaufmann et al., 2009);

ACCTSTND

= an indicator variable equal to one if firm i reports under
international accounting standards or U.S. GAAP, and zero
otherwise;

28

Including audit-related fees in the measure of audit service fees has no impact on the reported results.
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USLIST

= an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is cross-listed on a U.S.
stock exchange, and zero otherwise;

Big4

= an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is audited by one of the
Big 4 “Parent” auditors, and zero otherwise;

Named_Affiliate = an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is audited by a Big 4
“Brand Name” affiliate firm, and zero otherwise;
Local_Affiliate

= an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is audited by a Big 4
“Local” affiliate firm, and zero otherwise;

COUNTRY

= country fixed-effects;

YEAR

= year fixed-effects.

The variables of interest in the above models are Big4, Named_Affiliate, and
Local_Affiliate. These variables each capture the fee premium of the various
classifications of Big 4 auditors relative to non-Big 4 auditors. Positive and statistically
significant estimates of any of these coefficients suggest a fee premium relative to nonBig 4 audit firms.29
I classify the individual audit firms a Big 4 “Parent” auditor, a “Brand Name”
affiliate, or a “Local” affiliate in the following manner. The data item extracted from the
database is a code, rather than the name, of the individual audit firm as reported on the
client firms’ annual reports. To assist in translating this code, I received a spreadsheet
from Thompson Reuters detailing, for each auditor code, the name of the corresponding

29

One concern specific to companies in France is the dual audit requirement. The data used in this study
represents the company’s primary auditor. Thus, I classify observations where a Big 4 member firm is
secondary as having a non-Big 4 auditor.
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audit firm and the code of the associated “Parent Auditor”.30 The Big 4 “Parent” firms
include: Arthur Andersen; Deloitte & Touche LLP; Ernst & Young LLP; KPMG LLP;
and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. I classify the auditor as a “Brand Name” affiliate if
Thompson Reuters identifies the individual auditor as an affiliate of any of the Big 4, but
the name used includes some derivation of the parent firm’s internationally-recognized
name. Finally, the auditor is classified as a “Local” affiliate if Thompson Reuters identifies
that the individual auditor is an affiliate of one of the Big 4, but the name used by the
individual firm is not derived from the name of the parent firm. Examples of the data
provided by Thompson Reuters are provided in Appendix A.
I test for the fee premium using both AUDFEE and TOTFEE for several reasons.
First, to the extent that clients perceive quality differences among the various services
offered by auditors, they may be more likely to engage a Big 4 auditor for nonaudit
services. This may affect the pricing of nonaudit services that are not captured by
AUDFEE. Second, prior research finds conflicting evidence on the associations between
nonaudit service fees and audit quality (Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson, 2002; DeFond,
Raghunandan, and Subramanyan, 2002; Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew, 2003), which
is the focus of the second part of this study. Third, these data items are collected from
different databases, and existing international auditing literature raises the concern that
results may differ based on the specific type of audit fees analyzed (Kim et al., 2012).
The control variables included in the model capture differences in auditor fees due to
client size and complexity (SIZE, CATA) and audit risk (LOSS, DEBT, QUAL, ROA), as
30

I am extremely grateful to Jason Hartman, Pedrag Cvetkovski, and David Coluccio of Thompson Reuters
for providing this additional data.
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well as the impact of auditor switches on audit fees (AUDSWITCH). I include REGQ, an
index variable that captures the strength of each country’s regulatory quality as
determined by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009),31 and USLIST to capture the
impact of exposure to various regulatory and enforcement regimes and ACCTSTND to
control for differences that may be present due to application of higher quality accounting
standards. ACCTSTND also captures any audit fee effect present after firms adopt IFRS
(Kim et al., 2012).
It is possible (and to some extent, expected) that the magnitude of the fee premium
for these different classifications of Big 4 auditors may differ, and the parameter
estimates derived from the above regressions only offer evidence regarding the differential
pricing relative to non-Big 4 auditors. To further evaluate differences between Big 4
“Parent” firms and the two types of affiliates, I perform an F-test for statistically
significant differences between the three derived regression coefficients.
3.3.2 Discretionary Accruals as a Proxy for Audit Quality
As in prior research (Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Frankel et al., 2002;
Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Krishnan, 2003), I use discretionary accruals as a proxy for audit
quality. To the extent that the Big 4 and their affiliates charge a fee premium relative to
non-Big 4 auditors, a logical extension is to examine if these premiums may be driven by
higher-quality audits. I follow Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) in estimating
discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones (1991) model. Specifically, I compute
a predicted value of nondiscretionary accruals as
31

The sample period in Kaufmann et al. (2009) ends in 2008. Thus, for subsequent years, I use the value of
REGQ from 2008.
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=

NDAt

1 (1/ ASSETS t 1 )  2 (REVt REC t )  3 (PPE t ).

(5)

In the above equation:
=

predicted nondiscretionary accruals;

ASSETS

=

total assets;

ΔREV

=

annual change in revenue, scaled by prior year total assets;

ΔREC

=

annual change in receivables, scaled by prior year total assets;

PPE

=

gross property, plant, and equipment, scaled by prior year total assets,

and the parameter estimates β1, β2, and β3 are obtained from the following OLS
regression model estimated by year, country, and industry (based on two-digit SIC
codes).32,33
TAt

=

b1 (1/ ASSETS t 1 ) b2 (REVt REC t ) b3 (PPE t ) t

(6)

As in prior studies (Healy, 1985; Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995), TA in Equation (6) is
total accruals, measured as
TAi,t

=

(CAi,t CLi,t Cashi,t STDi,t Depi,t ) /( Assetsi,t 1 ),

where:
ΔCA

=

annual change in current assets;

ΔCL

=

annual change in current liabilities;

ΔCash

=

annual change in cash and cash equivalents;

32

For brevity, subscripts for country and industry are suppressed.

33

I delete observations where there are fewer than ten firms in each year/country/industry combination in
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order to estimate Equation (4).

90

ΔSTD

=

annual change in short-term debt;

Dep

=

depreciation and amortization expense;

Assets

=

total assets.

Discretionary accruals (DA) are then calculated by subtracting the predicted value of
nondiscretionary accruals ( ) obtained in Equation (3) from computed total accruals (TA).
For the subsequent analysis, I use the absolute value of discretionary accruals
(Abs_DA) as the primary dependent variable, and I also partition the sample based on
observations with income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals.
I first perform univariate comparisons of the various types of discretionary
accruals between clients audited by Big 4, Big 4 “Brand Name” affiliates, Big 4 “Local”
affiliates, and non-Big 4 auditors. Tests for statistically significant differences in the
means (medians) are based on t-tests (Wilcoxon two-sample tests). My multivariate
results are based on the following OLS regression model,
Abs_DAi,t

=

1 2 SIZEi,t 3CFOi,t 4 DEBTi,t 5 LOSSi,t 6 ABS _ TAi,t
 7 CSHARES i,t 8 GROWTHi,t 9 REGQi,t 
10 ACCTSTNDi,t 11USLISTi,t 12 NUMEX i,t 13CLOSEi,t
 14 Big 4 i,t 15 Named

Affiliate i,t 16 Local

Affiliate i,t

 COUNTRY YEAR i,t ,

where:
Abs_DA

=

absolute discretionary accruals;

SIZE

=

the natural log of total assets;

CFO

=

cash flows from operations, scaled by total assets;
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(7)

DEBT

=

the ratio of total liabilities to total assets;

LOSS

=

an indicator variable equal to one if firm i reports a loss in period
t, and zero otherwise;

ABS_TA

=

the absolute value of total accruals, scaled by total assets;

ΔCSHARES

=

the change in the number of shares of common stock outstanding;

GROWTH

=

the percentage change in sales;

REGQ

=

an index variable capturing the regulatory quality of firm i’s
country of domicile (Kaufmann et al., 2009);

ACCSTND

=

an indicator variable equal to one if firm i reports under
international accounting standards or U.S. GAAP, and zero
otherwise;

USLIST

=

an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is cross-listed on a U.S.
stock exchange, and zero otherwise;

NUMEX

=

the number of exchanges on which firm i is listed;

CLOSE

=

the percentage of closely-held shares of common stock;

Big4

=

an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is audited by one of the
Big 4 “parent” auditors, and zero otherwise;

Named_Affiliate =

an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is audited by a Big 4
affiliate firm that uses the name of the associated parent auditor,
and zero otherwise;

Local_Affiliate

=

an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is audited by a local
affiliate of one of the Big 4 audit firms, and zero otherwise;
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COUNTRY

=

country fixed-effects;

YEAR

=

year fixed-effects.

Again, the variables of interest are Big4, Named_Affiliate, and Local_Affiliate. Negative
and significant coefficients on these variables suggest lower levels of discretionary
accruals, which I interpret as higher audit quality, relative to non-Big 4 auditors.
I control for a number of factors found in prior research to be associated with use
of accruals and managers’ discretion over financial reporting. SIZE controls for
differences in reporting of accrual for firms of various sizes and also surrogates for a
number of potentially omitted variables (Becker et al., 1998). Accruals have also been
found to be correlated with operating cash flows, CFO. As highly leveraged firms are
more likely to violate debt covenants and debt covenant violation has been found to be
associated with accrual choice (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994), I include DEBT. LOSS
captures any incentives to manipulate earnings in periods of financial distress. ABS_TA
controls for firms with larger absolute total accruals having greater discretionary accruals.
To capture managers’ incentives related to stock transactions, I include ΔC_Shares (Teoh,
Welch, and Wong, 1998). Finally, prior research has found accruals to be associated with
sales growth (Dechow, Kothari, and Watts, 1998), and GROWTH captures this effect.
The remaining independent variables control for cross-country or firm-specific
differences related to the international setting of this study. REGQ, USLIST, and NUMEX
capture differences in regulatory and enforcement regimes, which may constrain or
otherwise alter managers’ incentives to use discretionary accruals. ACCTSTND controls
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for the use of higher-quality accounting standards; use of U.S. GAAP (Lang, Raedy, and
Yetman, 2003) or IFRS (Barth, Landsman, and Lang, 2008) are found to result in relatively
higher financial reporting quality compared to non-U.S. domestic standards. CLOSE
captures the differing incentives of firms with greater insider control, and previous studies
in the international accounting literature find this to be associated with financial reporting
quality (Lang et al., 2003; Lang, Raedy, and Wilson, 2006; Barth et al., 2008).
3.4 Data and Sample Selection
I begin by obtaining a list of public companies in Worldscope for the period 2001
through 2011. The coverage of firms in Worldscope extends to smaller companies and
those listed in less regulated markets. I exclude firms in certain East Asian countries
(China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand) since firms in these countries
face significantly different reporting environments and incentives compared to other
countries, despite similar legal systems (Ball, Robin, and Wu, 2003). All financial data
and the total fees paid to the auditor are obtained from Worldscope. However, auditor
data in Worldscope covers only the most recently reported fiscal year. Therefore, data on
the engaged audit firm is obtained from Thompson Reuters Fundamentals, which also
provides more detailed audit fee data; it is from this source that I obtain data on audit
service fees. The initial sample consists of 291,982 firm-year observations representing
33 countries.
As described in Table 3-1, I delete 65,815 observations with missing auditor data
in Thompson Reuters Fundamentals and 59,149 observations missing financial data used
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to construct control variables. Due to the differing operating characteristics of financial
institutions, I further delete 52,225 observations with SIC codes 6000-6999. This results
in an available sample of 114,793. For the auditor fee analyses, I delete an additional
65,264 (70,781) observations with missing data for audit service fees (total fees paid to
the auditor). These exclusions result in a sample size of 49,529 (44,012) used in the audit
service fee (total audit fee) analysis, which represents 26 countries. For the discretionary
accruals analysis, I delete 26,435 observations missing financial data needed to estimate
discretionary accruals or used in the construction of control variables and an additional
24,729 observations where the estimation of discretionary accruals is based on
year/country/industry combinations with less than 10 observations. This results in a final
sample of 63,629 observations in 22 countries.34,35 Table 3-2 presents the sample
distributions by country for the three primary analyses. Not surprisingly, five countries
contribute significantly more observations to the overall sample (Australia; Canada; Japan;
Korea; and the United Kingdom).36 Table 3-3 reports descriptive statistics for variables
used in each analysis for the full sample and partitioned based on auditor type.

34

All three classifications of Big 4 auditors (“Parent” firms, “Brand Name” affiliates,” and “Local”
affiliates) are present in 17 out of 26 countries in the audit fee analyses and 13 out of 22 countries in the
discretionary accruals analysis.
35

Note that the sample construction is not based on a matching approach. Due to the relatively smaller
number of observations with auditor affiliates, a one-to-one matched design would produce a sample that
severely underrepresents the overall population.
36

Inferences are similar if any one of these countries are removed from the sample, mitigating concerns
that results are driven by some dominating effect within the sample.
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3.5 Empirical Results
3.5.1 Results: Audit Fee Premiums of the Big 4 and Affiliate Firms
Table 3-4 presents the results of the tests for the audit fee premiums of the Big 4
and their affiliates relative to non-Big 4 firms. Panel A presents the results of estimating
Equation (4) with the dependent variable based on audit service fees (AUDFEE), which
tests for the premium related only to audit service fees. The overall model is significant
(F = 65.29) and has high explanatory power (adjusted R2 = 93.27%). The coefficients on
the three auditor type indicator variables are all positive and significant (p < 0.001),
suggesting that Big 4 “Parent” firms, “Brand Name” affiliates, and “Local” affiliates all
charge a fee premium relative to non-Big 4 auditors. Adjusting each coefficient to its
respective effect yields a premium of 35.8% for Big 4 “Parent” auditors, 26.7% for
“Brand Name” affiliates, and 12.3% for “Local” affiliates relative to non-Big 4
auditors.37 These results suggest that clients face higher audit service fee premiums not
only when choosing a Big 4 over a non-Big 4 auditor, but that the premium differs
depending on where the individual firm lies within the Big 4 global network.38

37

These effect sizes can be obtained by applying EXP[ ]-1 for Big 4 “Parent” auditors, EXP[ ]-1for “Brand
Name” affiliates, and EXP[ ]-1 for “Local” affiliates.

38

Caron (2009) investigates the audit fee premiums for global audit firm networks (GAFN) based on global
and national industry expertise. Results based on her Table 4 suggest a fee premium of GAFN ranging from
a low of 15.1% (26.2%) for global auditors with no industry expertise to a high of 33.1% (47.1%) for
global auditors with national industry expertise in 2000 (2004). Although both Carson (2009) and the
current study examine audit service fees, the differences in our results may be driven by three factors. First,
my sample spans 2001 through 2011, whereas she examines only two years (2000 and 2004). Second, her
sample spans many countries not included in this study. Finally, she includes BDO and Grant Thornton in
her classification of GAFN, whereas this study considers these two firms to be smaller auditors (i.e., nonBig 4).
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Except for ROA, LOSS, and AUDSWITCH, all of the control variables are
statistically significant. Consistent with prior research, larger clients (SIZE), those with
greater complexity (CATA), firms receiving a qualified audit opinion (QUAL) face higher
audit service fees. The positive estimates of REGQ and USLIST suggest that firms listed
in countries with greater regulatory or enforcement environments also face higher audit
service fees. The coefficient on ACCTSTND is also positive, which is most likely driven
by higher audit service fees due to adoption of international accounting standards (Kim et
al., 2012) or the stricter reporting requirements of U.S. GAAP.
Panel B of Table 3-4 provides the results of estimating Equation (4) using TOTFEE
as the dependent variable. Again, the model is significant (F = 29.49) and has reasonably
high explanatory power (adjusted R2 = 86.95%). Again, the coefficients on all three
auditor type indicator variables are positive and significant, offering somewhat similar
inferences to the model based on audit service fees. That is, the Big 4 “Parent” auditors
and both types of affiliates charge a premium over non-Big 4 auditors. However, the
magnitudes of the coefficients differ; the translated effects yield a premium of 54.2% for
Big 4 “Parent” auditors, 19.8% for “Brand Name” affiliates, and 19.5% for “Local”
affiliates. Thus, compared to audit service fees, the Big 4 “Parent” firms command a
higher premium than their affiliates. Using total fees paid to the auditor, both “Brand
Name” and “Local” affiliates have lower premiums relative to the premium based on
audit service fees. In addition, using this measurement, the two affiliates appear to be
more or less equal, whereas based on audit service fees the “Brand Name” affiliates
command a higher premium.
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All of the control variables in this model are statistically significant and
inferences are similar to those drawn from the audit fee model. The only notable difference
is the negative and significant (p < 0.001) on the AUDSWITCH variable, suggesting
that total fees paid to the auditor are lower in the first year after switching auditors.
This could be driven either by “lowballing” (DeAngelo, 1981) or switches to a smaller
auditor (citation).
3.5.2 Results: Differences between Regression Coefficients for the Audit Fee Premium
Model
The results from estimating Equation (1) offer insight only into the fee premiums
charged by Big 4 auditors and their affiliates relative to non-Big 4 auditors. With regard
to the associated effects of the parameter estimates, it seems that the premiums are not
equal between the Big 4 “Parent” firms and the two types of affiliates. To statistically
assess this finding, I perform an F-test for differences in the parameter estimates α12, α13,
and α14. Panel A of Table 3-5 reports the differences of the coefficients from estimating
Equation (1) using the dependent variable based on audit service fees. All three
differences are significant (p < 0.001), suggesting that there is a statistically significant
difference in the premiums charged by the Big 4 “Parent” auditors and their affiliates, as
well as between the “Brand Name” and “Local” affiliate firms. Panel B reports similar
results based on estimating Equation (1) based on total fees paid to the auditor as the
dependent variable. In this case, the only difference is that there is no statistically
significant difference in the fee premiums between the two types of affiliates.
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Taken together, these results offer several implications. First, clients face
significant premiums regardless of whether they choose a Big 4 “Parent” auditor or an
affiliate firm over a non-Big 4 auditor. In the next section, I address whether there is a
difference in audit quality between the Big 4 “Parent” firms, their affiliates, and non-Big
4 auditors. Second, the premium that clients face when engaging a Big 4 “Parent” auditor
is highest based on total fees paid to the auditor, though smaller premiums are present for
affiliate firms. Although the Big 4 global networks are said to provide services of similar
quality, it remains an empirical question whether or not knowledge-sharing occurs equally
in all aspects of the services offered by the auditor. Further, it is unclear whether clients
perceive the Big 4 “Parent” firms as a more desirable choice for consulting and other
nonaudit services relative to their affiliates. Finally, these results highlight the
importance of selecting the appropriate data sources to assess empirical questions related
to audit fees, especially at the international level where significant differences may be
present among sample firms.
3.5.3 Sensitivity Tests
Note that the results in the previous section are drawn based on audit service fee
data collected from Thompson Reuters Fundamentals, whereas data on total fees paid to
the auditor is taken from Worldscope. Thus, while the two samples are similar in size, the
exact composition may differ. To offer more comparable results between the two fee
models, I repeat the analysis using a sample of firms covered by both databases. For
brevity, I discuss only the variables of interest and their implications.
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The adjusted sample size includes firms with available data that are covered by
both databases (n = 26,048).39 Table 3-6, Panel A repeats the estimation of Equation (1)
with the dependent variable AUDFEE. While all of the classifications of a Big 4 auditor
report a premium over non-Big 4 auditors, some differences arise. The coefficient on
Big4 of 0.3101 is still significant (p < 0.001) and translates to a premium over non-Big 4
auditors of 36.4%, which is similar to that derived in the previous section. The gap
between the Big 4 “Parent” premium and that of “Brand Name” affiliates is slightly
larger; the coefficient on Named_Affiliate of 0.1857 remains significant (p < 0.001) and
its associated effect is 20.4%. However, the parameter estimate of 0.750 on
Local_Affiliate is not significant at conventional levels (p > 0.10), suggesting no
statistically significant premium of “Local” affiliates over non-Big 4 auditors. In Panel B
of Table 6, I repeat the estimation of Equation (1) for the adjusted sample using the
dependent variable TOTFEE. Inferences with respect to the premium of Big 4 “Parent”
firms are virtually identical in that the coefficient is still significant (p < 0.001) and
translates into a premium of 54.0% compared to non-Big 4 audit firms. However, the
premium is larger for “Brand Name” affiliates than in the earlier results; the associated
effect of the coefficient of 0.3089 is 36.2%, and the estimate remains significant (p <
0.001). In addition, the premium of “Local” affiliates is reduced; the estimate of
Local_Affiliate of 0.1115 translates into a premium over non-Big 4 auditors of 11.8%,
and this result is only marginally significant (p < 0.10). The results of an F-test for

39

In terms of the distrubition by country and year, the adjusted sample from which results in this section
are drawn is similar to those used in the previous section. However, some differences exist with respect to
the auditor type classifications.
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differences in the regression coefficients (untabulated) suggest that all differences are
statistically significant at conventional levels (p < 0.10 or higher).
Although some differences exist using this stricter sample, the overall conclusion
remains that the highest premiums, both for audit service fees and total fees paid to the
auditor, are charged by the Big 4 “Parent” firms, followed by the “Brand Name” affiliates.
While the results in this section suggest smaller premiums for “Local” affiliates over nonBig 4 audit firms, this may be driven in part by an underrepresentation of this type of
audit firm in the adjusted sample.
3.5.4 Univariate Results: Discretionary Accruals
In this section I discuss the results of univariate tests for various measures of
discretionary accruals, which I consider a proxy for audit quality. Table 3-7 presents
descriptive statistics for the discretionary accruals measure (Abs_DA) and for the
alternative sample partitions based on observations with income-increasing and incomedecreasing discretionary accruals. Both the means and medians of these measures are
smallest for the Big 4 “Parent” auditors, though firms audited by “Local” affiliates have
similar results. Interestingly, results suggest that the clients of “Brand Name” affiliates
have higher levels of discretionary accruals than their “Local” counterparts based on both
means and medians. As expected, the values for the non-Big 4 partition are highest.
Table 3-8 presents the results of testing for statistically significant differences in
the means (medians) between various combinations of auditor type based on t-tests
(Wilcoxon two sample tests). Panel A compares Big 4 “Parent” auditors to both types of
affiliates and to non-Big 4 auditors. All differences of both means and medians are
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significant at the 1% level, suggesting that clients of the Big 4 “Parent” firms have lower
levels of discretionary accruals. Note, however, that there are no significant differences in
either the means or medians between the Big 4 “Parent” auditors and the “Local” affiliates.
Compared to non-Big 4 auditors, clients of the Big 4 “Parent” firms report lower
levels of discretionary accruals based on both means and medians, as all differences
(except for the difference in the means of signed discretionary accruals) are significant
at the 1% level.
In Panel B of Table 3-8, I compare the “Brand Name” affiliates with the “Local”
affiliates and non-Big 4 partitions. Compared to “Local” affiliates all differences in both
means and medians are statistically significant (p < 0.05 or higher) and suggest that
clients of “Local” affiliates report lower levels of discretionary accruals. In relation to
non-Big 4 auditors, clients of “Brand Name” affiliates report lower levels of discretionary
accruals; except for the difference in the means of signed discretionary accruals, all other
differences are statistically significant (p < 0.05 or p < 0.001). Finally, in Panel C, I
compare “Local” affiliates to non-Big 4 auditors, and the results suggest that
discretionary accruals are lower for clients of “Local” affiliates than non-Big 4 audit
firms. All differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. Taken together, these
results suggest that audit quality is higher for Big 4 “Parent” firms and “Local” affiliates
compared to “Brand Name” affiliates, but that all results in lower levels of discretionary
accruals than non-Big 4 audit firms.
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3.5.5 Regression Results: Discretionary Accruals
A limitation of the preceding analysis is that it ignores any firm- or countryspecific factors that may impact managers’ ability to exercise discretion over the
reporting of accruals. Therefore, I also perform a multivariate analysis through estimation
of Equation (4). Table 3-9 reports these results for the primary analysis based on Abs_DA
and for the samples partitioned based on observations with income-increasing and
income-decreasing discretionary accruals.
Significant results arise when discretionary accruals are specified in absolute
terms (Abs_DA) and when the observations with income-increasing and incomedecreasing discretionary accruals are partitioned into individual samples. Table 3-9, Panel
A reports the results for the model estimated with the dependent variable Abs_DA. The
model is highly significant (F = 12.19) and the parameter estimates of the three variables
yield significant results. Specifically, the coefficient of -0.0118 on Big4 is statistically
significant (p < 0.001), suggesting that clients of Big 4 “Parent” auditors report lower
levels of absolute discretionary accruals relative to non-Big 4 audit firms. The parameter
estimate of Named_Affiliate also produces a negative and significant (p < 0.05)
coefficient of -0.0083, suggesting that these “Brand Name” affiliates also provide higher
audit quality. Although only marginally significant (p < 0.10), the coefficient on
Local_Affiliate provides similar insights. Interestingly, the magnitude of the coefficient is
larger for “Local” affiliates relative to “Brand Name” affiliates, although this difference
is not statistically significant at conventional levels (p > 0.10). An untabulated F-test
suggests that the relative quality of Big 4 “Parent” firms (i.e., compared to non-Big 4
auditors) is greater than that of both types of affiliates.
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The results in Panel B of Table 3-9 are derived from estimating Equation (4) for
firms with income-increasing discretionary accruals (DA). The inferences drawn from
these results are similar to those when estimating the model using total absolute
discretionary accruals. Specifically, the coefficient of -0.0193 on Big4 is statistically
significant (p < 0.001), suggesting higher audit quality relative to non-Big 4 auditors.
Consistent with the previous results, the parameter estimates of Named_Affiliate and
Local_Affiliate remain negative and significant (p < 0.05 and p < 0.10, respectively), and
the coefficient is greater in magnitude for “Local” affiliates, although again, this
difference is not statistically significant. An untabulated F-test implies that the effect of
Big4 is significantly (p < 0.05) greater than the effects of both affiliates. Table 3-9, Panel
C presents the same results for firms with income-decreasing discretionary accruals. Of
the three variables of interest, only the coefficient on Big4 is significant (p < 0.05). This
suggests that “Brand Name” and “Local” affiliates of the Big 4 may not scrutinize the use
income-decreasing discretionary accruals to the same extent as the Big 4 “Parent” firms.
In summary, based on both absolute discretionary accruals and observations with
income-increasing discretionary accruals, the results suggest that all three classifications
of Big 4 auditors—“Parent” firms, “Brand Name” affiliates, and “Local” affiliates—
provide higher-quality audits than non-Big 4 firms, though the improvement in quality is
highest for “Parent” firms. In addition, it appears that only Big 4 “Parent” firms are
associated with significantly lower levels of income-decreasing discretionary accruals.
However, an interesting finding is that similar levels of audit quality appear to be present
for “Brand Name” and “Local” affiliates, despite the significantly higher premiums
charged by the former. This raises the question of whether some affiliates within the Big
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4 global networks capitalize on brand name reputations without significant benefits to the
client in terms of the quality of services offered.
3.6 Additional Analyses
Although the inferences drawn from the preceding sections offer some evidence
regarding fee premiums and audit quality, the following question remains: are the
premiums of the Big 4—the “Parent” firms and the two types of affiliates—driven by the
quality of services offered? To address this question, I perform an additional analysis that
tests for any

statistically

significant association between auditor fees and

contemporaneous absolute discretionary accruals, which proxies for audit quality. I
modify Equation (4) as follows to execute this test:
ln(FEE)i,t

=

1 2 SIZEi,t 3CATAi,t 4 LOSSi,t 5 DEBTi,t 6 QUALi,t
 7 ROAi,t 8 AUDSWITCHi,t 9 REGQi,t 10 ACCTSTNDi,t
  11USLISTi,t 12 Big 4i,t 13 Named _ Affiliate i,t 
14 (Big 4 * Abs _ DA)i,t 15 (Named _ Affiliate * Abs _ DA)i,t
 16 (Local _ Affiliate * Abs _ DA)i,t COUNTRY YEAR i,t

(8)

Again, I consider both audit service fees (AUDFEE) and total fees paid to the auditor
(TOTFEE) as alternative dependent variables. For the purposes of this test, I exclude
clients of non-Big 4 auditors and interact each of the auditor type indicator variables with
absolute discretionary accruals, Abs_DA. Negative and significant coefficients on any of
the interaction terms included in Equation (8) suggest a positive relationship between
auditor fees and concurrent audit quality.40 In other words, such a result implies that fee

40

In a study of Australian firms, Gul, Chen, and Tsui (2003) find a positive association between audit fees
and the absolute value of discretionary accruals. The authors attribute this finding to an increase in audit
effort as a result of greater inherent risk. In the international context of this study, this competing result is
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increases are driven at least partially by the quality of services offered. As this test
requires both audit fee data and data items needed to estimate discretionary accruals, the
adjusted sample size without non-Big 4 clients is 21,760.41
The results of this analysis are provided in Table 3-10. As seen in Panel A, the
coefficient on Big4*Abs_DA of -0.0149 is significant (p < 0.001), suggesting that clients
of Big 4 “Parent” firms face higher fees with increases in audit quality. Similar inferences
are drawn for “Local” affiliates, though the coefficient on Local_Affiliate*Abs_DA of 0.0086 is only marginally significant (p < 0.10). However, there does not appear to be a
significant association between audit service fees and audit quality for “Brand Name”
affiliates. In Panel B, the test is repeated with the dependent variable TOTFEE, and no
significant results are found.
Though these results imply associations between auditor fees and audit quality,
the causal relationship remains unclear. It is possible that auditors receive higher fees in
previous years and permit clients to produce financial information of lower quality in
subsequent years, which could be a symptom of impaired independence. To draw
additional inferences, I use the adjusted sample of 21,760 observations that excludes nonBig 4 auditors and delete an additional 2,285 observations in which an auditor switch
occurred.42 I then estimate a modified version of Equation (7), removing the indicator

relatively unlikely due to the low frequencies of litigation against auditors due to clients’ misrepresentation
of financial information.
41

The reported results for this test are based on the modified sample with data availability for both audit
service fee and total fees paid to the auditor. Inferences are similar if I modify the two samples with
different fee data availability.
42

Failure to delete observations with an auditor switch could result in biased inferences, as audit quality
would be based on the auditor engaged in year t while the fee variables are based on the auditor in year t-1.
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variable Local_Affiliate and including interactions between all three types of Big 4
auditors and lagged auditor fee variables.
Abs_DAi,t

=

1 2 SIZEi,t 3CFOi,t 4 DEBTi,t 5 LOSSi,t 
6 ABS _ TAi,t 7 CSHARES i,t 8 GROWTHi,t 9 REGQi,t
 10 ACCTSTNDi,t 11USLISTi,t 12 NUMEX i,t 13CLOSEi,t
 14 Big 4i,t 15 Named _ Affiliate i,t 16 [Big 4 i,t * ln(FEE ) i,t 1 ]
 17 [Named _ Affiliate i,t * ln(FEE ) i,t 1 ] 
18[Local _ Affiliate i,t * ln(FEE )i,t 1 ] COUNTRY YEAR i,t

(9)

In equation (9), ln(FEE)i,t-1 denotes the natural log of either audit service fees (AUDFEE)
or total fees paid to the auditor (TOTFEE) in year t-1. The results of this test, reported in
Table 3-11, corroborate the previous inferences. For Big 4 “Parent” firms, I find that
prior-year audit service fees

are negatively associated with current-year absolute

discretionary accruals. The parameter estimate on the interaction term Big4*(AUDFEEt1)

of -0.0048 is statistically significant (p < 0.001). In other words, audit service fees in

the prior year are positively associated with future levels audit quality. I find similar,
albeit weaker effects for “Local” and “Brand Name” affiliates. The effect size is smaller
for “Brand Name” affiliates and the coefficient of -0.0020 on the interaction term
Named_Affiliate*(AUDFEEt-1) is also statistically significant (p < 0.05); though I also
find a negative effect for “Local” affiliates, the coefficient is not significant
conventional levels (p > 0.10). Using lagged total fees paid to the auditor
produces insignificant results for all three auditor type classifications.
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at

Thus, it seems unlikely that the positive association between auditor fees and audit
quality is a result of impaired auditor independence.43
3.7 Conclusion
This study investigates differences in auditor fee premiums and audit quality
within the Big 4 global networks. Though prior research has assessed differences between
Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors, these results are typically drawn on samples within
individual countries. Expanding the analysis to a global level and utilizing newly available
data, I differentiate member firms within the Big 4 networks as “Parent” firms, “Brand
Name” affiliates, or “Local Affiliates.” Results suggest that while all three types of Big
4 firms command audit fee premiums relative to non-Big 4 auditors, significant
differences exist. Likewise, with respect to audit quality, though clients of any of these
three report lower levels of discretionary accruals compared to clients of non-Big 4 audit
firms, variation exists within the network.
The results of this study advance our understanding of the international operations
of the Big 4 and suggest that member firms are not necessarily alike, at least with respect
to the two aspects examined in this essay—auditor fee premiums and audit quality. Given
the supposed benefits of knowledge sharing and information management within the Big
4 global networks, as well as claims that all member firms must meet certain quality
standards, this study raises several more specific questions that may be addressed by
future researchers, some of which cannot be examined using available archival data. Do
affiliate firms make use of the resources provided to them within the global network to
43

All results reported in this section are insensitive to using indicator variables for the top and bottom
decile ranks of absolute discretionary accruals or auditor fee variables in place of the continuous variables
in interaction terms.
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increase the quality of services offered to clients? What factors, if any, undermine the
overall effectiveness of quality management systems in place within these global
networks? Do affiliates using a Big 4 brand name strive to provide higher-quality services,
or do they simply adopt a label? In light of the troubles faced by the PCAOB, how does
noncompliance with a regulatory body by a member firm impact the overall image of
the Big 4’s international brand name?
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Table 3-1: Sample Selection - Big 4 Global Networks
Sample selection criteria:

Firm-year observations

Initial Sample#
Less: missing auditor data
Less: missing financial data used to construct variables
Less: financial service firms (SIC 6000-6999)
Available sample

291,982
(65,815)
(59,149)
(52,225)
114,793

Less: missing audit service fee data
Primay sample for audit service fee analysis

(65,264)
49,529

Less: missing total fee dada
Primay sample using total auditor fees analysis

(70,781)
44,012

Less: missing financial data used to construct additional variables or
estimate discretionary accruals

(26,435)

Less: year/country/industry combination contains less than 10 observations
Primary sample for discretionary accruals analysis

(24,729)
63,629

This table summarizes the selection procedure to create the samples used in various components of this
study.
#

The initial sample consists of publicly-listed companies available in Worldscope from 2001 through 2011
located in 33 countries. Through application of the sample selection criteria, the number of countries
represented in the audit fee (discretionary accruals) analysis decreases to 26 (22).
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Table 3-2: Sample Distribution by Country - Big 4 Global Networks
Audit Fee Analyses
Audit Service Fees
Total Auditor Fees

AUSTRALIA
AUSTRIA
BELGIUM
BRAZIL
CANADA
DENMARK
FINLAND
FRANCE
GERMANY
GREECE
IRELAND
ISRAEL
ITALY
JAPAN
KOREA
LUXEMBOURG
NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND
NORWAY
PHILLIPINES
PORTUGAL
SOUTH AFRICA
SPAIN
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
UK

Observations
6,210
274
634
39
7,101
439
293
1,710
1,621
82
203
178
617
11,153
6,851
24
319
460
711
297
98
1,100
448
1,521
425
6,721
49,529

%
12.5%
0.6%
1.3%
0.1%
14.3%
0.9%
0.6%
3.5%
3.3%
0.2%
0.4%
0.4%
1.2%
22.5%
13.8%
0.0%
0.6%
0.9%
1.4%
0.6%
0.2%
2.2%
0.9%
3.1%
0.9%
13.6%
100%

Observations
8,314
227
622
50
3,028
749
319
1,827
1,413
53
325
186
798
7,067
754
16
315
488
931
138
149
1,163
761
1,192
765
12,362
44,012

%
18.9%
0.5%
1.4%
0.1%
6.9%
1.7%
0.7%
4.2%
3.2%
0.1%
0.7%
0.4%
1.8%
16.1%
1.7%
0.0%
0.7%
1.1%
2.1%
0.3%
0.3%
2.6%
1.7%
2.7%
1.7%
28.1%
100%

Discretionary
Accruals Analysis
Observations
%
4,793
7.6%
230
0.4%
767
1.2%
407
0.6%
6,740
10.7%
112
0.2%
178
0.3%
2,841
4.5%
2,561
4.0%
607
1.0%
0.0%
644
1.0%
541
0.9%
19,512
30.8%
8,718
13.8%
0.0%
232
0.4%
0.0%
1,250
2.0%
185
0.3%
0.0%
794
1.3%
221
0.3%
2,057
3.3%
407
0.6%
9,472
15.0%
63,269 100.0%

This table presents the distribution by country for the various samples employed in this study.
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Table 3-3: Descriptive Statistics - Big 4 Global Networks
Panel A: Audit Service Fee analysis

Dependent Variables
AUDFEE
Independent Variables
SIZE
CATA
LOSS (%)
DEBT
QUAL (%)
ROA
AUDSWITCH (%)
REGQ
ACCTSTND (%)
USLIST (%)
Big4 (%)
Named_Affiliate (%)
Local_Affiliate (%)

Full Sample

Big 4 "Parent" Firms

"Brand Name" Affiliates

"Local" Affiliates

Non-Big 4

n = 49,529

n = 26,979

n = 3,063

n = 670

n = 18,817

Mean Median St. Dev.
13.97 13.16
3.11
20.59
0.49
19.4%
0.48
16.3%
(0.11)
17.6%
1.39
45.0%
1.5%
54.5%
6.2%
1.4%

20.33
0.49

3.96
0.26

0.44

0.43

0.01

0.49

1.46

0.38

Mean Median St. Dev.
Mean Median St. Dev.
Mean Median St. Dev.
Mean Median St. Dev.
14.85 14.76
2.86
14.04 13.80
1.85
13.98 12.97
2.59
12.83 11.39
3.17
21.82
0.49
12.0%
0.49
13.8%
(0.04)
10.3%
1.36
39.0%
2.0%
-

21.95
0.48

3.53
0.24

0.46

0.35

0.02

0.34

1.25

0.36
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19.93
0.48
14.5%
0.51
12.4%
(0.04)
17.7%
1.49
89.3%
0.5%
-

19.75
0.47

2.49
0.24

0.51

0.33

0.02

0.32

1.66

0.34

20.91
0.50
27.9%
0.47
18.8%
(0.02)
13.1%
0.94
51.5%
2.7%
-

20.01
0.51

3.13
0.24

0.45

0.36

0.03

0.29

1.11

0.41

18.90
0.51
21.3%
0.47
20.4%
(0.23)
24.6%
1.44
46.3%
0.5%
-

17.62
0.50

4.12
0.28

0.36

0.55

(0.02)

0.64

1.66

0.39

Table 3-3 (Continued)
Panel B: Total Auditor Fee analysis

Full Sample
n = 44,012

Dependent Variables
TOTFEE
Independent Variables
SIZE
CATA
LOSS (%)
DEBT
QUAL (%)
ROA
AUDSWITCH (%)
REGQ
ACCTSTND (%)
USLIST (%)
Big4 (%)
Named_Affiliate (%)
Local_Affiliate (%)

Mean Median St. Dev.
13.43 12.85
2.62
19.85
0.48
16.5%
0.50
12.2%
(0.08)
15.3%
1.51
45.9%
2.0%
61.0%
7.5%
1.6%

Big 4 "Parent" Firms
n = 26,857

19.32
0.48

3.50
0.25

0.47

0.37

0.02

0.41

1.62

0.32

Mean Median St. Dev.
14.42 14.08
2.50
20.62
0.47
11.3%
0.50
10.3%
(0.04)
9.2%
1.49
41.5%
2.5%
-

20.14
0.47

3.23
0.25

0.49

0.32

0.03

0.32

1.61

0.32
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"Brand Name" Affiliates
n = 3,313
Mean Median St. Dev.
14.03 13.46
2.28
20.52
0.48
18.4%
0.51
16.5%
(0.01)
17.3%
1.40
69.2%
0.7%
-

20.94
0.48

3.07
0.24

0.51

0.30

0.03

0.24

1.46

0.34

"Local" Affiliates
n = 693

Non-Big 4
n = 13,149

Mean Median St. Dev.
13.19 12.98
2.34
19.47
0.50
13.1%
0.49
22.5%
0.01
11.9%
1.09
38.5%
2.2%
-

19.14
0.48

3.09
0.25

0.48

0.35

0.03

0.20

1.11

0.33

Mean Median St. Dev.
11.88 11.28
2.26
17.74
0.51
21.1%
0.49
14.7%
(0.19)
21.2%
1.59
49.3%
1.0%
-

17.04
0.49

3.18
0.27

0.41

0.48

(0.00)

0.55

1.71

0.29

Table 3-3 (Continued)
Panel C: Discretionary Accruals analysis
Dependent Variables
Abs_DA
Independent Variables
SIZE
CFO
DEBT
LOSS (%)
ABS_TA
CHG_CSHARES
GROWTH
REGQ
ACCTSTND (%)
USLIST (%)
CLOSE
NUMEX
Big4 (%)
Named_Affiliate (%)
Local_Affiliate (%)

Full Sample
n = 63,629

Big 4 "Parent" Firms
n = 28,981

Mean Median St. Dev.
0.113 0.062 0.179
21.05 21.73
(2.71)
0.05
0.49
0.45
16.6%
0.14
0.08
11.58
9.01
22.20 21.09
1.34
1.23
43.5%
1.0%
4.61
0.14
1.29
1.00
45.5%
15.3%
7.5%

3.41
19.15
0.63
0.21
23.51
26.86
0.34

12.90
0.74

Mean Median St. Dev.
0.090 0.051 0.147
23.94 23.76
(0.89)
0.06
0.50
0.46
13.5%
0.14
0.09
13.79
9.08
32.74 19.07
1.42
1.39
49.3%
1.6%
7.50
0.19
1.30
1.00
-

3.16
19.01
0.48
0.22
26.38
20.01
0.29

17.19
0.81

"Brand Name" Affiliates
n = 9,768
Mean Median St. Dev.
0.111 0.063 0.197
23.13
(1.26)
0.50
19.9%
0.10
4.78
19.39
1.15
44.4%
0.3%
2.90
1.35
-

23.64
0.05
0.45

2.32
29.37
0.36

0.06
0.15
3.21 17.47
1.01 180.16
1.11
0.27

0.05
1.00

8.64
0.77

"Local" Affiliates
n = 4,739

Non-Big 4
n = 19,781

Mean Median St. Dev.
0.092 0.053 0.127
23.46
(1.23)
0.48
14.9%
0.10
2.78
19.56
0.97
37.7%
2.7%
0.88
1.31
-

23.91
0.05
0.43

2.09
21.88
0.32

0.06
1.74
7.71
1.05

0.13
19.11
13.84
0.32

0.01
1.00

6.16
0.61

Mean Median St. Dev.
0.130 0.071 0.219
19.59 18.26
(2.34)
0.03
0.49
0.43
20.3%
0.16
0.09
13.58 10.91
13.84
6.90
1.39
1.44
39.5%
0.4%
1.78
0.31
1.25
1.00
-

3.65
18.66
0.92
0.24
14.56
16.50
0.35

7.98
0.64

This table presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the analyses of this study. Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C report these statistics for the audit
service fee analysis, total fee analysis, and discretionary accruals analysis, respectively. Separate partitions are provided for the full sample and for each
auditor type classification. A percentage sign (%) following the name of dichotomous variables indicates that the reported mean is the percentage of
observations for which that variable is equal to one.
In Panels A and B, AUDFEE is defined as the natural log of audit service fees, and TOTFEE is the natural log of total fees paid to the auditor. SIZE is the
natural log of total assets. CATA is the ratio of current assets to total assets. LOSS is an indicator variable for firm-year observations with negative net
income, and zero otherwise. DEBT is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. QUAL is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-year
obsevations with a qualified (going-concern or other) audit opinion, and zero otherwise. ROA is defined as the ratio of net income to total assets.
AUDSWITCH is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-year observations in which a switch between parent auditors occurred, and zero otherwise. REGQ
is an index variable to capture the regulatory quality of each country as computed by Kaufmann et al., 2009. ACCTSTND is an indicator variable equal to
one for firms that report financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP or international accounting standards (IAS or IFRS), and zero otherwise.
USLIST is an indicator variable for firm-year observations in which the stock of the company is cross-listed on a U.S. stock exchange, and zero otherwise.
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Table 3-3 (Continued)
Big4 is an indicator variable equal to one for observations where the auditor is a Big 4 "Parent" firm, and zero otherwise. Named_Affiliate is an indicator
variable equal to one for observations where the auditor is a "Brand Name" affiliate, and zero otherwise. Local_Affiliate is an indicator variable equal to one
for observations where the auditor is a "Local" affiliate, and zero otherwise.
The additional variables reported in Panel C are defined as follows. CFO is cash flows from operations, scaled by total assets. ABS_TA is the absolute value
of total accruals. CHG_CSHARES is the percentage change in the number of common shares of stock outstanding. GROWTH is defined as the percentage
change in sales. CLOSE is the proportion of closely-held shares of common stock, as reported by Worldscope. NUMEX is the aggregate number of stock
exchanges on which the firm is listed.
The statistics in this table are based on all continuous variables having been winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
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Table 3-4: Audit Fee Premium Models for Big 4 and Affiliates

Variable
Intercept
SIZE
CATA
LOSS
DEBT
QUAL
ROA
AUDSWITCH
REGQ
ACCTSTND
USLIST
Big4
Named_Affiliate
Local_Affiliate

Panel A: Audit Service Fees
Dep Var = AUDFEE
n = 49,529
Estimate p-value
6.2156 ***
0.4228 ***
0.0002 ***
-0.0113
0.0000 ***
0.1411 ***
0.0000
-0.0164
0.4639 ***
0.2006 ***
0.6290 ***
0.3063 ***
0.2369 ***
0.1163 ***

Panel B: Total Auditor Fees
Dep Var = TOTFEE
n = 44,012
Estimate p-value
5.1348 ***
0.5207 ***
0.0001 *
0.0468 ***
0.0000 **
0.0885 ***
0.0001 **
-0.0588 ***
0.5135 ***
0.1982 ***
0.4159 ***
0.4330 ***
0.1809 ***
0.1784 ***

COUNTRY FIXED-EFFECTS
YEAR FIXED-EFFECTS

Included
Included

Included
Included

Adjusted R-square
F -statistic

93.27%
65.29

86.95%
29.49

This table presents the results of estimating Equation (1), an OLS regression to model the effect of the type
of Big 4 auditor on the audit fee premium relative to non-Big 4 auditors for the primary samples.
AUDFEE is defined as the natural log of audit service fees, and TOTFEE is the natural log of total fees
paid to the auditor. SIZE is the natural log of total assets. CATA is the ratio of current assets to total assets.
LOSS is an indicator variable for firm-year observations with negative net income, and zero otherwise.
DEBT is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. QUAL is an indicator variable equal to one
for firm-year obsevations with a qualified (going-concern or other) audit opinion, and zero otherwise. ROA
is defined as the ratio of net income to total assets. AUDSWITCH is an indicator variable equal to one for
firm-year observations in which a switch between parent auditors occurred, and zero otherwise. REGQ is
an index variable to capture the regulatory quality of each country (Kaufmann et al., 2009). ACCTSTND is
an indicator variable equal to one for firms that report financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP
or international accounting standards (IAS or IFRS), and zero otherwise. USLIST is an indicator variable
for firm-year observations in which the stock of the company is cross-listed on a U.S. stock exchange, and
zero otherwise. Big4 is an indicator variable equal to one for observations where the auditor is a Big 4
"Parent" firm, and zero otherwise. Named_Affiliate is an indicator variable equal to one for observations
where the auditor is a "Brand Name" affiliate, and zero otherwise. Local_Affiliate is an indicator variable
equal to one for observations where the auditor is a "Local" affiliate, and zero otherwise.
All
continuous
variables
are
winsorized
at
the
1%
and
99%
level.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on twotailed p-values.
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Table 3-5: Differences of Regression Coefficients - Fee Premium Model
for Big 4 and Affiliates
Panel A: Audit Service Fees
Difference Sig.
Difference Sig.
Named_Affiliate
Local_Affiliate
( α12 - α13 )

Big 4 (α12)
Named_Affiliate

0.0694 ***

( α12 - α14 )

0.1900 ***
( α13 - α14 )
0.1206 ***

-

Panel B: Total Auditor Fees
Difference Sig.
Named_Affiliate
( α12 - α13 )

Big 4

0.2521 ***

Difference Sig.
Local_Affiliate
( α12 - α14 )

0.2546 ***
( α13 - α14 )

Named_Affiliate

0.0025

-

This table presents the results of performing an F-test for differences in the regression coefficients derived
from estimating Equation (1). The parameter estimates α12, α13, and α14 are derived from the variables Big4,
Named_Affiliate, and Local_Affililate, respectively. All differences in the regression coefficients are
calculated as shown.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on twotailed p-values.
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Table 3-6: Audit Fee Premium Models for Big 4 and Affiliates (Robust Sample)
Panel A: Audit Service Fees
Dep Var = AUDFEE
n = 26,048
Estimate p-value
5.2044 ***
0.4710 ***
0.0000
0.0039
0.0000 ***
0.1543 ***
0.0000 *
-0.0336 **
0.1808
0.2631 ***
0.6915 ***
0.3101 ***
0.1857 ***
0.0750

Panel B: Total Auditor Fees
Dep Var = TOTFEE
n = 26,048
Estimate p-value
4.6752 ***
0.4960 ***
0.0000
0.0109
0.0000 **
0.1064 ***
0.0001 **
-0.0450 ***
0.3218 **
0.3749 ***
0.5716 ***
0.4316 ***
0.3089 ***
0.1115 *

COUNTRY FIXED-EFFECTS
YEAR FIXED-EFFECTS

Included
Included

Included
Included

Adjusted R-square
F -statistic

91.46%
52.57

89.39%
27.93

Variable
Intercept
SIZE
CATA
LOSS
DEBT
QUAL
ROA
AUDSWITCH
REGQ
IAS
USLIST
Big4
Named_Affiliate
Local_Affiliate

This table presents the results of estimating Equation (1), an OLS regression to model the effect of the type
of Big 4 auditor on the audit fee premium relative to non-Big 4 auditors for the sample of firms with data
availability for both audit service fees and total fees paid to the auditor.
AUDFEE is defined as the natural log of audit service fees, and TOTFEE is the natural log of total fees
paid to the auditor. SIZE is the natural log of total assets. CATA is the ratio of current assets to total assets.
LOSS is an indicator variable for firm-year observations with negative net income, and zero otherwise.
DEBT is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. QUAL is an indicator variable equal to one
for firm-year obsevations with a qualified (going-concern or other) audit opinion, and zero otherwise. ROA
is defined as the ratio of net income to total assets. AUDSWITCH is an indicator variable equal to one for
firm-year observations in which a switch between parent auditors occurred, and zero otherwise. REGQ is
an index variable to capture the regulatory quality of each country (Kaufmann et al., 2009). ACCTSTND is
an indicator variable equal to one for firms that report financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP
or international accounting standards (IAS or IFRS), and zero otherwise. USLIST is an indicator variable
for firm-year observations in which the stock of the company is cross-listed on a U.S. stock exchange, and
zero otherwise. Big4 is an indicator variable equal to one for observations where the auditor is a Big 4
"Parent" firm, and zero otherwise. Named_Affiliate is an indicator variable equal to one for observations
where the auditor is a "Brand Name" affiliate, and zero otherwise. Local_Affiliate is an indicator variable
equal to one for observations where the auditor is a "Local" affiliate, and zero otherwise.
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on twotailed p-values.
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Table 3-7: Univariate Analysis of Discretionary Accruals Based on Auditor Type
Big 4 "Parent" Firms
n = 28,981

"Brand Name" Affiliates
n = 9,768

Median
0.0511

Absolute discretionary accruals (Full Sample )

Mean
0.0899

increasing DA sample partition

n = 14,430
0.0911
0.0510

decreasing DA sample partition

n = 14,551
-0.0886
-0.0512

Mean
0.1112
n = 4,791
0.1083

"Local" Affiliates
n = 4,739

Median
0.0631

Mean
0.0922

0.0640

n = 2,314
0.0921
0.0521

n = 4,977
-0.1142
-0.0622

n = 2,425
-0.0924

Median
0.0534

-0.0544

Non-Big 4 Auditors
n = 19,781
Mean
Median
0.130402
0.0708
n = 9,888
0.1235
n = 9,893
-0.1380

Income0.0687
Income-0.0732

This table presents descriptive statistics for absolute discretionary accruals for the full sample and, separately, for subsamples of firms with incomeincreasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals. The procedures for estimating discretionary accruals consistent with Dechow et al. (1995) are
described in Section 3.1, Equations (2) and (3). The means and medians are reported for the four sample partitions based on auditor type. The Big 4 "Parent"
firms include: Arthur Andersen; Deloitte & Touche LLP; Ernst & Young LLP; KPMG LLP; and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. "Brand Name" affiliates
include auditors that are members of the Big 4 global networks and use the international brand name. "Local" affiliates include member firms of the Big 4
global networks that use individual, non-brand names.
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Table 3-8: Univariate Analysis of Differences in Discretionary Accruals Based on Auditor Type
Versus: "Brand Name" Affiliates
Difference in
Mean
Median

Versus: Big 4 "Local" Affiliates
Difference in
Mean
Median

Versus: Non-Big 4 Auditors
Difference in
Mean
Median

Panel A: Big 4 "Parent" Firms
Absolute discretionary accruals (Full Sample )

0.0214 ***

0.0120

###

0.0024

0.0023

0.0405 ***

0.0197

###

Income-increasing DA sample partition

0.0172 ***

0.0130

###

0.0010

0.0011

0.0324 ***

0.0177

###

Income-decreasing DA sample partition

-0.0256 ***

0.1133

###

-0.0038

-0.0033

-0.0494 ***

-0.0221

###

-0.0190 ***

-0.0097

###

0.0192 ***

0.0077

###

0.0152 ***

0.0047

###

-0.0238 ***

-0.0110

##

Panel B: "Brand Name" Affiliates
Absolute discretionary accruals (Full Sample )

-

-

Income-increasing DA sample partition

-

-

-0.0162 ***

-0.0119

###

Income-decreasing DA sample partition

-

-

0.0218 ***

0.0078

##

Absolute discretionary accruals (Full Sample )

-

-

-

-

0.0382 ***

0.0174

###

Income-increasing DA sample partition

-

-

-

-

0.0314 ***

0.0166

###

Income-decreasing DA sample partition

-

-

-

-

-0.0456 ***

-0.0188

###

Panel C: "Local" Affiliates

This table reports differences in discretionary accruals between the sample partitions based on auditor type. All differences are computed as the value of the
"smaller" auditor type less the corresponding "larger" auditor type. For the full sample comparing absolute discretionary accruals and for the incomeincreasing discretionary accrual sample partition, positive (negative) differences signify lower (higher) levels of discretionary accruals for the "larger"
auditor type. For the income-decreasing discretionary accruals sample partition, negative (positive) differences signify lower (higher) levels of discretionary
accruals for the "larger" auditor type. The procedures for estimating discretionary accruals consistent with Dechow et al. (1995) are described in Section 3.1,
Equations (2) and (3). The Big 4 "Parent" firms include: Arthur Andersen; Deloitte & Touche LLP; Ernst & Young LLP; KPMG LLP; and
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. "Brand Name" affiliates include auditors that are members of the Big 4 global networks and use the international brand name.
"Local" affiliates include member firms of the Big 4 global networks that use individual, non-brand names.
Tests
*, **,

of
and

differences
in
*** denote statistical

means
(medians)
are
based
on
t-tests
(Wilcoxon
two-sample
tests).
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on two-tailed p-values.

119

Table 3-9: Multivariate Analysis - Discretionary Accruals Regression Model

Variable

Panel A: Full Sample
Dep Var = Abs_DA
n = 63,269
Estimate p -value

Panel B: Income-Increasing DA
Dep Var = DA
n = 31,423
Estimate p -value

Panel C: Income-Decreasing DA
Dep Var = DA
n = 31,846
Estimate p -value

0.1732
-0.0064
0.0000
0.0759
0.0098
0.0016
0.0000
0.0000
-0.0267
-0.0035
-0.0150
0.0027
0.0000
-0.0193
-0.0112
-0.0160

0.1246
-0.0072
0.0001
0.0946
0.0409
0.0129
0.0000
0.0000
-0.0526
-0.0164
0.0061
-0.0027
0.0000
-0.0092
-0.0043
-0.0079

Intercept
SIZE
CFO
DEBT
LOSS
ABS_TA
ΔCSHARES
GROWTH
REGQ
ACCTSTND
USLIST
CLOSE
NUMEX
BIG4
NAMED_AFFILIATE
LOCAL_AFFILIATE

0.1503
-0.0068
0.0001
0.0889
0.0267
-0.0168
0.0000
0.0000
-0.0379
-0.0091
0.0131
-0.0003
0.0000
-0.0118
-0.0083
-0.0095

COUNTRY FIXED-EFFECTS
YEAR FIXED-EFFECTS

Included
Included

Included
Included

Included
Included

9.23%
F = 15.19

6.27%
F = 11.85

13.14%
F = 19.14

Adjusted R-square
Model

***
***
*
***
***
***
*
***
**

***
**
*
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***
***
***
**
**
***
*

***
**
*

***
***
***
***
***
**

**
***

**

Table 3-9 (Continued)
This table presents the results of estimating Equation (4), the regression model for the multivariate analysis of discretionary accruals. Panel A reports results
for the full sample, while Panels B and C report the results for sample partitions of firms with income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary
accruals, respectively.
Abs_DA is the absolute value of discretionary accruals and DA is signed discretionary accruals. The procedures for estimating discretionary accruals
consistent with Dechow et al. (1995) are described in Section 3.1, Equations (2) and (3). SIZE is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets. CFO is cash
flows from operations, scaled by total assets. DEBT is defined as total liabilities divided by total assets. LOSS is an indicator variable equal to one for
observations with negative net income, and zero otherwise. ABS_TA is absolute total accruals. CHG_CSHARES is the percentage change in the number of
shares of common stock outstanding. GROWTH is the percentage change in sales. REGQ is an index variable to capture the regulatory quality of each
country as computed by Kaufmann et al., 2009. ACCTSTND is an indicator variable equal to one for observations where the firm reports under U.S. GAAP
or international accounting standards (IAS or IFRS), and zero otherwise. USLIST is an indicator variable equal to one for observations where the firm is
cross-listed on a U.S. stock exchange, and zero otherwise. CLOSE is the proportion of closely-held shares of common stock, as reported in Worldscope.
NUMEX is the aggregate number of stock exchanges on which the firm is listed.
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the

10%,

5%,
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and

1%

levels,

respectively,

based

on

two-tailed

p-values.

Table 3-10: Audit Fee Regression Models with Absolute Discretionary Accruals
Interaction Terms
Panel A: Audit Service Fees
Dep Var = AUDFEE
n = 21,760
Estimate p-value
6.3234 ***
0.4350 ***
0.0034 ***
-0.0124 **
-0.0006 **
0.0761 ***
-0.0130 ***
-0.0289 ***
0.3506 **
0.1857 ***
0.6911 ***
0.1425 ***
0.1516 ***
-0.0149 ***
-0.0024
-0.0086 *

Panel B: Total Auditor Fees
Dep Var = TOTFEE
n = 21,760
Estimate p-value
5.6470 ***
0.5299 ***
0.0017 ***
0.0395 ***
-0.0030 ***
0.0087
-0.0009
-0.1217 ***
0.8530 ***
0.2063 ***
0.4727 ***
0.2626 ***
0.0032
-0.0021
-0.0115
-0.0062

COUNTRY FIXED-EFFECTS
YEAR FIXED-EFFECTS

Included
Included

Included
Included

Adjusted R-square
F -statistic

93.52%
67.35

88.25%
32.64

Variable
Intercept
SIZE
CATA
LOSS
DEBT
QUAL
ROA
AUDSWITCH
REGQ
IAS
USLIST
Big4
Named_Affiliate
Big4*Abs_DA
Named_Affiliate*Abs_DA
Local_Affiliate*Abs_DA

This table presents the results of Equation (5), a modified version of Equation (1) that includes interaction
terms between auditor type and absolute discretionary accruals. The sample for this test excludes non-Big 4
auditors. AUDFEE is defined as the natural log of audit service fees, and TOTFEE is the natural log of total
fees paid to the auditor. SIZE is the natural log of total assets. CATA is the ratio of current assets to total
assets. LOSS is an indicator variable for firm-year observations with negative net income, and zero
otherwise. DEBT is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. QUAL is an indicator variable
equal to one for firm-year obsevations with a qualified audit opinion, and zero otherwise. ROA is defined as
the ratio of net income to total assets. AUDSWITCH is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-year
observations in which a switch between parent auditors occurred, and zero otherwise. REGQ is an index
variable to capture the regulatory quality of each country (Kaufmann et al., 2009). ACCTSTND is an
indicator variable equal to one for firms that report financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP or
international accounting standards (IAS or IFRS), and zero otherwise. USLIST is an indicator variable for
firm-year observations in which the stock of the company is cross-listed on a U.S. stock exchange, and zero
otherwise. Big4 is an indicator variable equal to one for observations where the auditor is a Big 4 "Parent"
firm, and zero otherwise. Named_Affiliate is an indicator variable equal to one for observations where the
auditor is a "Brand Name" affiliate, and zero otherwise. Local_Affiliate is an indicator variable equal to one
for observations where the auditor is a "Local" affiliate, and zero otherwise. Abs_DA is the absolute value
of discretionary accruals, and the procedures for estimating discretionary accruals consistent with Dechow
et al. (1995) are described in Section 3.1, Equations (2) and (3).
All
continuous
variables
are
winsorized
at
the
1%
and
99%
level.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on twotailed p-values.
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Table 3-11: Discretionary Accrual Regression Models with Lagged Audit Fee
Interaction Terms

Variable
Intercept
SIZE
CFO
DEBT
LOSS
ABS_TA
ΔCSHARES
GROWTH
REGQ
IAS
USLIST
CLOSE
NUMEX
Big4
Named_Affiliate
Big4* (AUDFEE t-1)
Named_Affiliate* (AUDFEE t-1)
Local_Affiliate* (AUDFEE t-1)
Big4* (TOTFEE t-1)
Named_Affiliate* (TOTFEE t-1)
Local_Affiliate* (TOTFEE t-1)
COUNTRY FIXED-EFFECTS
YEAR FIXED-EFFECTS
Adjusted R-square
F -statistic

Panel A: Audit Service Fees
Dep Var = Abs_DA
n = 19,475
Estimate p-value
0.4837 ***
-0.0132 ***
0.0000
0.0000 *
0.0377 ***
0.0000 *
0.0000
0.0000 ***
-0.1133 ***
0.0290 **
-0.0151 *
0.0044 **
0.0000
-0.1133 **
-0.0997 *
-0.0048 ***
-0.0020 **
-0.0008
-

Panel B: Total Auditor Fees
Dep Var = Abs_DA
n = 19,475
Estimate p-value
0.3968 ***
-0.0088 ***
0.0000
0.0000
0.0301 ***
-0.0001
0.0000
0.0000
0.0814 **
0.0168 **
-0.0064
0.0029 *
0.0000
-0.1179 **
-0.1162 *
-0.0006
0.0001
0.0017

Included
Included

Included
Included

9.43%
48.63

9.06%
43.07

This table presents the results of estimating Equation (6), a modified version of Equation (4) that includes
interaction terms between auditor type and lagged auditor fee variables. The sample for this test excludes
non-Big 4 auditors. Abs_DA is the absolute value of discretionary accruals, estimated as described in
Section 3.1, Equations (2) and (3). SIZE is defined as the natural log of total assets. CFO is cash flows from
operations scaled by total assets. DEBT is defined as total liabilities divided by total assets. LOSS is an
indicator variable equal to one for observations with negative net income, and zero otherwise. Abs_TA is
absolute total accruals. CHG_CSHARES is the percentage change in the number of shares of common stock
outstanding. GROWTH is the percentage change in sales. REGQ is an index variable to capture the
regulatory quality of each country as computed by Kaufmann et al. (2009). ACCTSTND is an indicator
variable equal to one for observations where the firm reports under U.S. GAAP or international accounting
standards, and zero otherwise. USLIST is an indicator variable equal to one for observations where the firm
is cross-listed on a U.S. stock exchange, and zero otherwise. CLOSE is the proportion of closely-held
shares of common stock. NUMEX is the number of stock exchanges on which the firm is listed. AUDFEEt-1
(TOTFEEt-1) is the natural log of prior-year audit service fees (total fees paid to the auditor).
All
continuous
variables
are
winsorized
at
the
1%
and
99%
level.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on twotailed p-values.
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Appendix A: Samples of Auditor Data Provided by Thompson Reuters
Panel A: General Example of Data Provided
Auditor

AuditorName

YMMU

PVND

PVND

Notes: (i) The "auditor code" described in the paper is the column "Auditor"; (ii) The above includes ten random
audit firms provided by Thompson Reuters; (iii) PVND in the "AuditorParent" column indicates that the parent
auditor is "Not Disclosed." Any observations in the sample with an undisclosed auditor parent are coded as nonBig 4; (iv) Many audit firms, based on "AuditorName," are no longer represented in the database as a result of
mergers and acquisitions or closures.

Panel B: Data provided by Thompson Reuters for Big 4 "Parent" Firms
Auditor
AA
PVAN
DHS
PVDT
EY
PVEY
KPMG
PVKP
PWCL
PVPW

AuditorName
Arthur Andersen LLP
Arthur Andersen
Deloitte & Touche LLP
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International
Ernst & Young LLP
Ernst & Young Global
KPMG LLP
KPMG International
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
PricewaterhouseCoopers International

AuditorParent
PVAN
NULL
PVDT
NULL
PVEY
NULL
PVKP
NULL
PVPW
NULL

Notes: (i) In the AuditorParent column, "NULL" denotes that either the associated auditor is the "coordinating
entity" or is not an affiliate of any other firm; (ii) the codes PVAN, PVDT, PVEY, PVKP, and PVPW are the internal
codes used by Thompson Reuters to classify members of the respective Big 4 networks.
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Panel C: Example of data provided by Thompson Reuters for Big 4 "Brand Name" Affiliates
Auditor
KAFS
FPTC
OPAW
PWCO
DAYC

AuditorName
KPMG Al Fozan & Al Sadhan
KPMG Ford Rhodes Thornton & Company
Ohrlings PricewaterhouseCoopers AB
PwC Oberoesterreich
Deloitte Auditores y Consultores Ltda

AuditorParent
PVKP
PVKP
PVPW
PVPW
PVDT

Notes: (i) This presents a random selection of the Big 4's "Brand Name" affiliates based on the data provided by
Thompson Retuers. These firms may not be represented in the sample included in this study.

Panel D: Example of data provided by Thompson Reuters for Big 4 "Local" Affiliates
Auditor
PLUK
CLMC
OTA
JAA
SAML

AuditorName
Auditorska Palata Ukraina
C.L. Manabat & Co.
Century Ota Showa & Co.
Joao Augusto & Associados, SROC
Samil Accounting Corp.

AuditorParent
PVAN
PVDT
PVEY
PVKP
PVPW

Notes: (i) This presents a random selection of each of the Big 4's "Local" affiliates based on the data provided by
Thompson Retuers. These firms may not be represented in the sample included in this study; (ii) note that some of
these firms may be "affiliated" with one of the Big 4 auditors without being the primary name used in the country or
region in which they operate.
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